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This is a study of Sir Robert Ainsliefs embassy in 
Istanbul, 1776 - 1794.
The arrival of Sir Robert Ainslie in Istanbul is dealt 
with in chapter I, which also outlines the existing situation 
at the Porte and discusses the circumstances surrounding the 
Russian annexation of the Crimea, together with the British 
and French response to this development.
The new situation arising in Europe as a result of the 
treaty of Versailles of 1783 is dealt with in chapter II which 
further discusses French attempts at mediation between Russia 
and the Ottoman Empire, the British efforts to frustrate these 
attempts and the events of the war between Russia and the 
Ottoman Empire.
Chapter III is concerned with Prussian intervention and 
the Austrian involvement in the Russo-Turkish war, and analyses 
in detail British support of Prussian endeavours to mediate a 
peace and the subsequent alliance between Russia and the 
Ottoman Empire,
The complicated, negotiations of the Reichenbach Conventio
*
of July 1790? which resulted in an Austrian agreement to make 
peace with the Porte, are covered in chapter IV.
British and Prussian efforts to induce the Ottomans to 
make peace with Austria are described in chapter V, which 
clarifies the British failure to support Prussia in putting 
pressure on Catherine II, and concludes with a discussion of 
the terms of the final peace treaties signed in 1791 &nd 1792*
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The transliteration of Turkish and Arabic names and terms 
in this study follows the system employed in the Turkish 
Encyclopedia of Islam. (Islam Ansiklopeaisi, Istanbul, 1940) 
English readers unfamiliar with this system should understand that 
the letter ’9* represents the sound 1 chf, as in the English 
word church, while *9* represents the sound ?shf, as in the 
word shoe*
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C H A P T E R  I
11.
The early years in Istanbul 
and the Russian annexation of the Crimea (l7?6 - 1783)*
Sir Robert Ainslie was descended from one of the ancient 
families of Scotland. He was horn either in 1729 or more 
probably, in 1730.^ There is no abundant store of evidence 
about the period of his life preceding his appointment, in 
1776, as ambassador to Istanbul.
His father, George Ainslie, is known to have spent long
years at Bordeaux as a merchant. George Ainslie seems to have
returned to Scotland in 1727* He then purchased the estate of
2
Pilton in Midlothian. Robert Ainslie himself also worked in 
due course as a merchant at Bordeaux. At a date so far unknown 
he became, to all appearance, an agent serving the British 
government. In 1773 he procured from the office of the Due 
d,Aiguillon, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, copies of 
despatches sent from Paris to Madrid during the Falkland Islands 
dispute. Robert Ainslie sent these copies to Lord Rochford,
1. Cf. The Dictionary of National Biography, see^ Sir Robert 
Ainslie.
2. Cf. J. Debrett, Baronetage of England, ii (London, 1808)
pp. 986-7.
12.
then Secretary of State for the British Foreign Office (October
1770 - October 1775)* Lord Rochford, in June 1773. wrote to
George III, enclosing in his letter some of the evidence that
Ainslie had gathered together and assuring the Xing that he
3
would do his best to obtain further information. One author, 
writing a little later in time, noted that Ainslie was employed 
in "several important services", no indication being given, 
however, as to their nature.^ It was perhaps in return for these 
labours on behalf of the British government that Ainslie was 
raised to ambassadorial status.
On 27 June 1775 John Murray, the British ambassador at 
Istanbul (1765-1775) was given leave to return home to England 
for a few months in order to settle his private affairs. He died, 
however, at Venice on 9 August 1775 during the course of his 
journey to London^ The conduct of affairs in Istanbul had been 
entrusted to Anthony Hayes, the British consul (1762-1794) at
3. Lord Rochford to George III, 8 June 1773 in The Correspondence 
of George III (1768-1773)» ed. Sir J. Fortescue, Tl [London, 
192771 1e11er no• 1266, pp. 496-7*
4. J* P. Hood, The Ancient and Modern State of Parish of Cramond 
(London, 1794)V p. 22.
5# Cf,, for example, D. B. Horn, The British Diplomatic Service 
I689—1789 (Oxford, 196l), p. 275, where the author notes that 
a number of diplomats and consuls owed ambassadorial appoint­
ments to their success as agents of the government at London.
6. Cf. , see, Ainslie.
13.
7
Izmir* On 15 September 1775 Lord Rochford wrote to Kayes,
informing him that Robert Ainslie had been nominated as ambassa-
8
dor in succession to Murray. A few days later an official
9 10announcement appeared in the London Gazette, stating that :
The King has been pleased to appoint Robert Ainslie, Esq*, 
to be His Majesty’s ambassador to the Ottoman Porte, in 
the Room of John Murray, Esq*, deceased; and His Majesty 
was pleased this Day to confer upon him the Honour of 
Knighthood; upon which occasion he had the Honour to kiss 
His Majesty’s Hand*
A letter from the Levant Company in London informed Hayes,
in October 1775? that Ainslie would set out for Istanbul in
February 1776.^ It was not, however, until April 1776 that
Ainslie received from the British government his instructions
as ambassador, and not in fact until June of this year that he
sailed from Falmouth in the packet vessel "Eagle” travelling to
12Marseilles and then to Istanbul,* Sir Robert Ainslie reached 
Istanbul on 2 October 1776.^
Sir Robert Ainslie had received from the British government
7. Murray to Rochford, P. R* 0*, S* P* 97/51, no« 8, 18 April 
17755 cf* Rochford to Hayes, no* 1, 11 July 1775*
8* Rochford to Hayes, P. R* 0*, S* P* 97/51* 15 September 1775*
9* London Gazette, 20 September 1775*
10* ibid.*
11.Levant Company to Hayes, P. R. 0., S. P. 105/120, London, 31 
October 1775*
12.Levant Company to Hayes, P. R* 0., S. P. 105/120, 25 June 
1776.
13*Hayes to Lord Weymouth, P. R* 0*, S. P. 97/52, 3 October 1776.
14.
orders to^^s
instruct yourself in the manner of making your address 
with our credentials to the Grand Signor and Grand Vizir,
, and at your audience from the Grand Vizir, you are to 
insist to he treated with the same ceremonies and respect 
that have heen usually shewn to the ambassadors of other 
Princes,
Soon after his arrival in Istanbul, he notified the Ottoman 
government officially of his presence. A few days later, on 6 
October, a message came to Ainslie from the Qrand Visir, through 
one of the dragomans of the Porte, stating that his first audience 
would have to be postponed until the end of Bayram.
The audience took place on 30 November 1776, Ainslie 
entered the Porte accompanied by six janissaries, by the “porter11 
at the head of six grooms, also by sixteen servants, four valets 
de chambre and two maatres d*hotel (all in gold liveries) and 
by his dragomans and the embassy secretaries. He was led through 
the hall of the divan into the second room, where he was intro­
duced to the Grand Vizir. The ambassador and the Grand Vizir 
saluted each other with great civility, Sir Robert Ainslie 
handed over the letter of King George III and made a speech.^
14. Weymouth to Ainslie, P. R. 0., S. P. 97/52, 17 April 1776 
(instructions to Ainslie, article l).
15* It was the Ottoman usage to postpone all diplomatic
ceremonies during the observance of the chief religious 
festivals of islam.
16. Ainslie to Weymouth, ?• R. 0., 3. P. 97/52, no. 5j 3 December 
1776. See appendix I.
The Grand Vizir replied, through his dragoman, that he cherished 
"most perfect esteem for the English Nation which he looked 
upon..* as the constant friend of this Empire." Ainslie was then 
invested with a pelisse of furs. His chief secretaiy received a 
rohe of honour (liiVat), a distinction which Ainslie believed 
never before to have been shown to an English ambassador. The 
following day Ainslie had a formal audience also with the Sultan.
Sir Robert Ainslie had received his official instructions 
in London, on 17 April 177^, before he left for Istanbul. They 
consisted of eleven articles.
As the British interest in the Ottoman Empire was directed 
above all towards trade, the instructions dwell at some length 
on commercial matters. In the second article of the instructions 
reference is made to the "observance of the peace and corres­
pondence towards our subjects in their trade, which is so
* 8benf'icial to those parts above any nation."* Ainslie was urged 
therefore to act in the best and most effectual manner and to 
be firm and active in maintaining all the privileges given to 
British trade. Furthermore, he was to encourage the capitulations
17# Ainslie to Weymouth, P. R. 0., S. P. 97/52, no. 5* 3 December 
1776.
18. Weymouth to Ainslie, P. R. 0., S. P. 97/52, 17 April 1776, 
(instructions to Ainslie, article 2).
16.
19in favour of English commerce which already existed.
Particular stress was laid on the relations "between Ainslie
and the merchants of the Levant Company. Ee was reminded that it
was for their "Good and Benefit you are most especially to 
20
reside there." He was not only to perform all good offices for
the merchants, but also to do all in his power to ensure satis-
’ 21faction to the Levant Companyfs merchants, allowing them free
22access to his person. Moreover on all occasions he was to make
available to them both his own assistance and also that of the
23dragomans and of the other staff at the embassy.
The instructions relating to trade dealt with the special 
problem of the English pirates in the Mediterranean. These 
pirates had caused numerous incidents disadvantageous to the 
Turks in the Levant. Owing to Turkish weakness at sea, Muslim 
merchants, at times, entrusted their goods to British ships.
Sir Robert Ainslie was instructed that, in respect of incidents 
caused by British pirates, the government at London declined to 
accept any responsibility whatsoever. None the less, the Crown 
declared its positive resolution and desire to preserve the
19* ibid., article 5«
20. ibid., article 5*
21. ibid., article 10.
22. ibid., article 11.
23. ibid., articles 7 and 11.
17.
24ancient amity existing between the two courts.
As to political affairs - not much was said about them in
the instructions. Only two points were made. Firstly, the
ambassador should strive to preserve peace; and, secondly, he
was to endeavour to maintain good co-operation with those
foreign ministers at Istanbul who were thought to be in some
25degree of friendship and understanding with Great Britain. J
Ainslie*s instructions were, by and large, rather negative 
in character, bringing no new and specific changes in the general 
policy of the embassy. British policy in the Ottoman Empire at 
this time was based on the maintenance of the status q u o , and 
in 1776 the a,ffairs of the Ottoman Empire had no especial 
prominence in the eyes of the statesmen and politicians at London.
The good relations hitherto existing between the Porte and 
the British Government had been much weakened during the years 
of the Russo-Turkish war (1768-74). England had given assistance 
to the Russian fleet which in 1770 had sailed from the Baltic to
24. ibid., article 9* Ainslie also discusses this matter in his 
despatches later on. See, for example, Ainslie to Weymouth,
P. R. 0., S. P. 97/55, 13 October 17795 Ainslie to Hills­
borough, F« 0. 78/1, 17 February 1780, 1 July 1780, 17 July 
1780, 17 August 1780, and see also A. C. Wood, A History of /X :-  
Levant Company (London, 1964), p. 148.
25. instructions to Ainslie, articles 3 and 4*
18.
the Mediterranean, and which had, on 10 July 1770, burnt and 
destroyed the Ottoman fleet in the harbour of pe^me, on the 
western coast of Asia Minor. The Turkish government believed
4
that the aid which Britain had granted to the Russians was
responsible in no small degree for the disaster which befell
the Ottomans at pe^me.^ '^e attitude of the Porte therefore
became rather cold and hostile towards Great Britain and towards
her ambassador at Istanbul. Threats were indeed made against the
factories of the Levant Company at Istanbul and Izmir and against
27
British trade in general. On several occasions the Porte indeed 
refused the offers of Great Britain to mediate between the Turks 
and Russians in the war then in progress.
Later, however, with the v;ar running unfavourably to them,
the Turks did turn to Britain for support. On coming to the
throne, Sultan 1Abd-ul-hamid 1 (1774-89) was eager to obtain the
mediation of Britain. No positive results emerged however, from
28this new climate at the Porte. The Re1is Efendi, " 1Abd^ul-rezzak
Bahir, a person hostile to the British ambassador, was said to
26. See, M. S. Anderson, ,fGreat Britain and the Russian Fleet 
1769-70.” in The Slavonic and East European Review, XXXI 
(1952), pp. 148-63s idem, "Great Britain and the Russo- 
Turkish War of 1 7 6 8 - 1 7 7 4 in The English Historical Review,
LXIX (1954)* pp» 38-98;'^ehabettin Tekindag, in IA, see 
"Pepme"; I. H. Usur^ar^ili, Qsmanli Tarihi, IV/l””[Ankara, 1956), 
p. 401.
27. Hayes to Rochford, P. R. 0., S. P. 97/51* 30 October 1775*
28. See glossary.
19.
2Q
have informed the Sultan  ^ in 1773 that the "English Ambassador 
will do nothing for the Porte,"^ The war between the Ottomans
and the Russians was to end ultimately, in 1774* in the peace
” »• 31negotiated, without any foreign mediation, at Kupuk Kaynarca.
The Re*is Efendi, 1Abd~ul~rezzak Bahir was deposed from his office 
almost a year after the departure from Istanbul on 25 May 1775 
of the British ambassador, John Murray, in order to settle his 
personal affairs in England, Thus, at the moment when Ainslie 
assumed the office of ambassador at the Porte in 1776* there was 
an evident need for measures to restore good relations between 
the two empires and to end the coldness of the preceding years.
At the end of the Russo-Turkish war of 1768-74* Catherine II
* it
had forced the Turks to sign the humiliating treaty of Kuguk 
Kaynarca (21 July 1774)* The Turks yielded to the Russians, for 
the first time, a permanent foothold on the shores of the Black 
Sea, though for the time being it was of limited extent. Again, 
for the first time, the Russians received the right to send 
their merchant ships freely into the Black Sea, which the Turks
29. Mustafa III (1757-1774).
30. Murray to Rochford, P. R. 0., S. P. 97/49» n°» 4, 17
February 1773*
31. The treaty of Kupuk Kaynarpa was concluded on 21 July 1774; 
see, G, E, Noradounghian, RecueiI d*Actes Internationaux do
l8Empire Ottoman, I (Paris, 1897), PpV 319-34 and M, S,
Anderson, The Great Powers and the Near East, '1774-1923: 
Documents of Modern History (London, 197017" PP* 9-14#
20.
had closed, since the end of the sixteenth century, to all non- 
32
Muslims. Moreover, she acquired the regions of the Kuban and 
the Terek, part of Azov and, in addition, the fortresses of 
Ker<p and Yenikale in the Crimea.^ Last but not least Russia, 
was able, also for the first time, to impose on the Porte the 
idea of independence of the Crimea, the Sultan being allowed to 
retain over the Crimea only a supremacy in matters spiritual.
This development was going to be an issue of the first importance 
in the years ahead. The treaty was ratified in 1775 > "but mean­
while tension was growing rapidly between the two courts. 
Dissensions increased rapidly also within the Crimea itself 
through the years 1775-79* Russia supported there a puppet, Khan 
JJahin Giray, while the Ottoman Porte favoured another claimant 
to the Khanate, Devlet Giray. Thanks to St. Priest, the French 
ambassador at Istanbul, who acted as a mediator between the two - 
powers, Russia and the Porte entered into an agreement intended 
to bring the troubles in the Crimea to a close. This agreement 
was the Convention of Aynalikavak concluded on 21 March 1779*
The main issue in dispute between Russian and the Porte
32. Cf. C. M. Kortepeter "The Ottoman Imperial Policy and the 
Economy of the Black Sea Region in the XVIth century" in 
Journal of the American Oriental Society, LXXXVI (April - 
June 1966), pp. 86-113.
33. Uzunqar^ili, op. cit., IV/l, pp. 422-5? M* S. Anderson,
The Eastern Question, 1774-1923s A Study in International
Relations (Lo'ndon, I966), ppV^XI-XII: A. Fisher, The Russian 
Annexation of the Crimea, 1772-1783 (London, 1970TT~PP* 5^-7*
21.
was the status of the Crimea. All the foreign ministers at 
Istanbul concerned themselves with this problem, each minister 
responding to it in accordance with the particular interests of 
his own state in the Ottoman Empires Austria and France, for 
example, desired to gain, like Russia, the right to send their 
ships into the Black Sea.
t.
For Sir Robert Ainslie the situation was delicate and 
critical, as Britain had not, of late, shown much immediate 
interest in the political affairs of the Ottoman Empire, In 
the first general instructions given to Ainslie before he left 
London no mention at all was made of the critical situation 
developing between the Porte and Russia. Soon after his arrival 
at Istanbul, therefore, Ainslie sought from London new instruc­
tions for his guidances "I should be very glad to receive Your
Lordship’s instructions how I ought to act... in the present
Mreduced state of the Ottoman Empire.”^
—  —  i*
On 15 November 1776 the new Re1is Efendi, ’Atifzade ’Orner 
tried through Pisani, the first dragoman of the British Embassy, 
to gain information as to Ainslie’s views about the state of 
affairs in the Crimea. Ainslie did not hesitate to give his
34. Ainslie to Weymouth, P. R. 0., S. P. 97/52, no. 3> 17 October
1776.
22.
opinion and, next day, sent a verbal message to the Re*is
Efendi, as from the minister of a power enjoying the closest
amity with the Porte:
I sincerely regretted that any seeds of discontent should 
still exist... I did not see that the Porte had any 
reasonable prospect of bettering their situation by 
refusing to comply with their engagements, but on the 
contrary would expose themselves to great misfortunes, 
and perhaps to farther demands from Russia.
Ainslie therefore advised the Re*is Efendi "by all means to
avoid Disputes and to execute the late Treaty in all its
articles." The Re*is Bfendi thanked Ainslie for his "veiy
35sincere and honest" advice. The Porte approached Ainslie once 
more on 20 December 1776, when Great Britain was asked to lend 
to the Ottomans twelve ships of war, to be employed in protecting 
Muslim vessels in the Black Sea. Ainslie resolved to refuse 
this request and, in order to explain his refusal and at the same 
time to underline to the Turks "the ridiculousness of the
demand", lost no time in seeking an audience with the Kapudan
37 38Paga, Gazi Hasan, with whom he was on the best of terms.' In
the course of the meeting Ainslie, well inclined towards the
Porte, insisted on the need to avoid a rupture with Russia and
35* Ainslie to Weymouth, P. R. 0., S. P. 97/52, no. 4, 18 
November 1776.
36. Ainslie to Weymouth, P. R. 0., S. P. 97/53, no. 1, 3 January
1777.
37* See glossary.
38. Ainslie to Weymouth, P. R. 0., S. P. 97/53, no. 1, 3 January 
1777 o
23.
advised the Porte to execute the recent treaty of Ku9uk Kaynarca
in all its articles. The Kapudan Paga thanked Ainslie for his
advice and asked him if he would set forth his opinion in writing.
Ainslie agreed to do so. A copy of the statement that he wrote
for the benefit of the Kapudan Pasa is extant- as an enclosure
39in a letter, dated 3 January 1777? which Ainslie sent to the 
Secretary of State, Lord Weymouth,^ at London. Ainslie under­
lined that the two essential articles of the treaty of Ku<puk 
Kaynarca were the third, stipulating the independence of the 
Crimean Tatars, and the eleventh, granting Russia freedom of 
navigation in the Black Sea. Although admitting that the Tatars, 
by reason of their Muslim faith and their dynastic loyalties, 
showed great reluctance to accept the terms of the treaty,
Ainslie none the less urged the Porte to avoid trouble with 
Russia. He compared the Ottoman Empire to a man strong indeed,
but impaired by a long and dangerous illness. As long as Russian
41troops under the command of General Field-Marshal Rumyantsev, 
occupied such fortresses as Kilburun, Yenikale and Ker<p, it 
would be perilous for the Ottomans to provoke a new conflict
over the Crimea, all the more since the Ottomans had to deal at
42
the sa,me time with friction along their frontier with Persia,.
39. ibid.
40. See appendix II.
41. Rumyantsev, Petr Aleksandrovich, Count (1725—1796) 't^ie 
leading Russian general in the 1768-74 war with the Turks.
42. Cf. Uzuncai^ili, op. cit., IV/l, pp. 458-514*
The tension in the Crimea continued unabated in the spring
of 1777* Ainslie was hound by advice which he had received
43earlier from London, Lord Weymouth then declared that :
v
whatever Propositions may be made to Your Exc#'- with 
Respect to a Mediation, you will receive and transmit to 
me; being careful not to express any opinion of the 
reception it may meet with here, nor giving any indication 
that you had anticipated the event and written on the subje
In fact Ainslie at this time was to receive from the Ottomans
no request for his mediation in the matter of the Crimea# And
it is relevant to note that Weymouth, in his letter of 28
January 1777? reiterated the desire of the British government
to retain ’’the strict"^ relations with Russia. Ainslie no doubt
was eager to make a good impression at the beginning of his
45
career as ambassador; but Weymouth did not want him to commit
himself too far in writing# Replying to Ainslie in a letter
46
dated 14 February 1777> Weymouth stated :
Nothing can be more proper than Your endeavoring..# to 
represent to the Ministers of the Ottoman Porte the 
propriety and expediency of their conforming with the 
utmost punctuality to the several articles of the Treaty 
concluded by that Power with the Court of Russia, but such 
opinions must be verbal, and I must recommend you not [-to] 
deliver in writing any political opinion however well 
founded#
43* Weymouth to Ainslie, P. R. 0., S. P. 97/53, 28 January 1777*
44* ibid#
45* Cf., for example, a remark of Ainslie in a later despatch 
dated 3 April 1777? requested Lord Weymouth that "Your 
Lordship will not refuse me some degree of indulgence at my 
outset, in a residence, where the modes of transacting 
Eussiness so widely differ from those of any other Court."
46. Weymouth to Ainslie, P. R. 0., S. P. 97/53? no# 2, 14 
February 1777*
25.
Thereafter Ainslie maintained a constant reserve in the expression 
of his political opinions to the ministers of the Porte? and his 
attitude was to remain unaltered until in 1783 Charles James Pox, 
desired him to advise the Turks to consent to the Russian 
annexation of the Crimea. ^  Now in 1777* Weymouth declined to 
send warships to the assistance of the Porte, realizing that, if 
he did so, he might injure the relations existing "between England 
and Russia. In a letter dated 14 February 1777> Ainslie was told 
that "The friendship subsisting between this Court and that of 
Russia cannot admit His Majesty*s lending twelve ships of war to 
the Ottoman Porte."^
Great Britain was at this time more concerned to maintain
good relations with Russia than with the Porte. Her main interest
in Russia was the lucrative trade in raw materials; much of the
timber needed for the British navy came in fact from Russia.
Furthermore, British merchants enjoyed a prosperous trade in
Russia. Britain’s relations with the Ottoman Empire had also
been based on commerce, but in the eighteenth century this
commerce was not so flourishing as it had once been. Much of the
50Levant trade had passed into the hands of the French;
47* See below, p. 3V*
48* Weymouth to Ainslie, P. R. 0., S. P. 97/53* no. 2, 14 
February 1777*
49* Isabel de Madariaga, Britain, Russia and the Armed Neutrality 
of 1780 (London, 1962*7*, p. 32.
50. ibid., p. 32; Wood, on. oit«, p. 159*
furthermore, the trade with India was now far more lucrative
for Britain than the trade with the Ottoman Empire. It is
understandable that Lord Suffolk, the Secretary of State for the
north, should be seeking at this time to renew the commercial
treaty negotiated between Britain and Russia in 1766. The British
ambassador James Harris (1777-83), recently appointed to St.
Petersburg, was seeking to achieve this purpose, and considerable
funds had been made available to him as a means to influence
51important personages at the Russian Court. Ainslie, too, had 
striven to obtain funds which he might use to mould opinion at 
the Porte, but his moves in this direction had met with no 
response from London. None the less he continued so far as he 
was able, to improve and strengthen his personal influence with 
the more influential of the Ottoman dignitaries.
Meanwhile the tension between the Ottomans and the Russians
over the future of the Crimea rapidly became more and more
serious. In the winter of 1777-78 Russian troops entered the
Crimea and raised their own nominee, Sahin Giray to be master 
52
of Bahc^esaray. Ainslie was careful to inform London in detail 
about the progress of events in the Crimea. On 3 March 1778 he
51. Cf. Madariaga, "The Use of British Secret Funds at St. 
Petersburg, 1777-1782", in The Slavonic Review, XXXII (1953- 
54)* pp. 464-74.
52. Ahmed Cevdet, Taf rTh» I (Istanbul, 1308/1890), p. 150?
A. Fisher, op. cit., pp. 97-9*
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wrote "I most earnestly entreat Your Lordship.•• to give me
53Directions how to act.’1 He received, however, no guidance 
beyond an exhortation not to commit himself in the quarrels 
then existing between the two courts of St. Petersburg and 
Istanbul.
It was Prance, not England, which at this juncture of
affairs exerted and effective influence on the course of the
Crimean dispute. The French Foreign Minister, Vergennes (1774-
87), reluctant to see the Turks involved in another war with
Russia which he was well aware might be disastrous for them,
instructed the French ambassador at Istanbul, St. Priest, to
persuade the Turks that their best course would be tc recognize
the independence of the Crimea; and in April 1779* as a result
of the French mediation, the convention of Aynalikavak was
54signed between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. Ainslie observed
in a letter to London (17 March 1779) that^:
it must however be confessed that the Force of a French 
Mediation was well imagined to save the Dignity of the 
Porte in her present distressed situation... The [French] 
ambassador, My Lord, is a man of acknowledged abilities, 
and merit, who profits to the utmost of the favour he at 
the present enjoys at this Court.
53* Ainslie to VJeymouth, P. R. 0., S. P. 97/54* no. 5* 3 March
1778.
54* Anderson, The Eastern Question, p. 7*
55* Ainslie to Weymouth, P. R. 0., S. P. 97/55* no. 6, 17 March 
1779*
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The first phase in the dispute over the Crimea was now at an 
end; but a second phase would soon begin - and terminate only 
with the Russian annexation of the Crimea in 1783*
The convention of Aynalikavak eased for a time the
situation in the Crimea# The Tatar Khan Jpahin Giray now sought
to impose reforms within the khanate. The Porte, however, was
still seeking to further its own interest in the Crimea, a
purpose which it hoped to achieve by making Bahadur Giray, the
brother of Jpahin, its own candidate for the office of Khan.
Tension began to grow once more in the Crimea and reached crisis
point by the year 1782. Catherine II, determined to counter the
intrigues of the Porte, ordered her minister Potemkin to
maintain Jpahin Giray as Khan. It became, however, increasingly
evident that Jpahin Giray was no longer able to preserve order
56within the Crimea. In order to secure Russia from outside 
interference while she prosecuted her ambitions at the expense 
of the Turks, Catherine negotiated a new entente with the 
Emperor Joseph II of Austria (May-June 1781). This entente 
of 1781 included a scheme for the organization of the entire
56. Fisher, op. cit., pp. 105-27.
57* I# de Madariaga, "The Secret Austrian-Russian Treaty of 1781" 
in S. E. R.. XXXII (London, 1954), pp. 464-74* M. S. Anderson, 
"European Diplomatic Relations, 1763-1790" ift The New 
Cambridge Modern History, VIII (London, 1968), pp. 270-72;
I. Young, "Russia" in The New Cambridge Modern History, VIII 
(London, 1968), pp. 326-7.
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Balkan peninsula. According to this "Greek Project", Russia 
would acquire the Black Sea coastal area between the rivers 
Bug and Bniestr, including the fortress of Ochakov, which 
commanded the mouths of the two rivers. The next phase envisaged 
would be the freeing of Bessarabia, Moldavia and Wallachia from 
the Turks and their amalgamation as a new state, to be named 
"Dacia" - a state which should be independent of Russia but 
under the rule of a prince of the Orthodox faith. And finally, 
when the Turks were driven out of Europe, it was planned to 
revive the Byzantine Empire, with the Russian Grand Duke 
Constantine as emperor. Austria was to receive a part of Servia 
including Belgrade, while Egypt and some other appropriate 
portion of the Ottoman Empire would be offered to Prance.
58In that plan there was mention neither of Britain nor of Spain.
Great Britain was hoping at this time that it would be 
possible to renew once more her commercial agreement with 
Russia, which was due to expire in 1786. The British government 
was also seeking to hire from Russia troops for use against the 
rebellious American colonists - a request which Catherine 
rejected. In Januaiy 1781 Britain suggested to Catherine that 
Russia might acquire Minorca in return for her mediation between
58. Young, loc. cit., p. 327.
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England, Prance and Spain. The Tsarina was determined however
to avoid all involvement in western Europe and refused to act
as mediator. A visible coolness developed between Great Britain
and Russia when, in December 1780, Catherine arranged the so-
called Armed Neutrality directed against the rights of search
which Great Britain claimed in relation to neutral shipping in 
59time of war.
In the summer of 1782 Russian troops entered the Crimea, 
and on 15 November 1782 the Russian and Austrian dragomans at 
the Porte, in the name of their ambassadors, submitted joint 
memoranda to the Porte, in which three demands were presented 
to the Turks: that the navigation of the Black Sea be tolerated, 
that the Ottomans should refrain from intervening in the affairs 
of the Tatars, either secretly or openly and that the princi­
palities of Wallachia and Moldavia be treated in accordance with 
the terms of the treaty of Ku^uk Kaynarca.^
The Porte had little hope of receiving foreign support in 
its desire to refuse these demands. Even France, from which the
59* Madariaga, The Armed Neutrality, pp. 9-105 see also The New 
Cambridge Modern History, VIII (London, 1968), pp. 2665 326.
60. R. Salomon, La Politique Orientale de Vergennes, 1780-1784 
(Paris, 1935)* PP- 128—33; see also Ainslie to Grantham,
P. R. 0., P. 0. 78/3, no. 32, 24 December 1782.
Turks hoped to obtain some positive help, did not feel able to 
assist the Porte: the finances of Prance had suffered badly 
from the war with Britain (1773-83), so that it was not until 
April 1732, when peace negotiations began in Paris to end the 
war between Prance and England, that the French thought the 
moment opportune to intervene once more in the Crimean imbroglio
i.e., to attempt to secure some concessions from Russia in 
favour of the Ottomans and then to persuade the Ottomans to 
accept the Russian d e m a n d s T h e  Turks, on the other hand, did 
not feel themselves strong enough to risk a new war with the 
Russians and sought to temporize, delaying an answer to the 
Russian demands.
On 28 November the Kapudan Papa, Hasan, in the name of the 
Sultan, invited Ainslie to a meeting and asked his opinion of 
the Crimean affair, Ainslie, having no new instructions from
62
London, advised the Porte not to begin a new war with Russia. 
Meanwhile, the Foreign Secretary, Lord. Grantham, in a despatch 
dated 18 October 1782, had instructed Ainslie to act in a
6**"perfect friendship with the Russian ambassador at Istanbul". ^
61. M* S. Anderson, "The Great Powers and the Annexation of the 
Crimea, 1783-34", in S. E./r .. XXXVII (1958-1959), PP. 17-41
62. Ainslie to Grantham, P. RV'O., P. 0. 78/3, no. 31, 10 
7) December 1782.
63. Grantham to Ainslie, P. R. 0#, P. 0. 78/3, no. 4, 18 October 
1782.
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Ainslie was informed of the far-reaching nature of the Tsarina 
Catherine’s ambitions and of her determination to realize them, 
even if it meant a new war with the Turks. Grantham also noted 
for Ainslie*s benefit that the Emperor Joseph II was filling to f u  
assist Russia in these schemes of aggrandisement, expecting to 
win Bosnia as a reward.
In February 1783? Charles James Fox replaced Lord Grantham
as Foreign Secretary. In spite of his radicalism in domestic
affairs, Fox was "in foreign affairs a complete conservative11.
Ke was hostile to the Bourbon powers, and would have liked to
create a great coalition of Horth-European states - Britain,
Russia, Denmark and Prussia — against them. In his judgment,
Russia, despite her territorial ambitions and her armed
neutrality, was the most valuable and most natural of allies for
65Britain - and this view was shared by George III. However, Fox 
sent no instructions to Ainslie on the Crimean question until 
September of 1783. Meanwhile, in April, Catherine II had 
announced to the whole world that she was annexing the Crimea to 
her empire.^ Prince Potemkin, in the name of the Tsarina, 
assumed control forthwith of the Crimea and also of the Kuban
64* Anderson, "The Great Powers and the Annexation of the
Crimea, 1783-84", in S. E. R., XXXVII (1958-1959), P* 25.
65. ibid., p. 26.
66. Salomon, op. cit.» 165-70*
and of the isle of Taman, thus confronting the Porte with a
fait accompli. Russia, with the annexation now complete, hoped
that the Porte would soon accept the change. But the Porte was
slow and hesitant in its answer. On 30 July 1783, the divan
refused to recognize the Russian annexation of the Crimea, for
the Ottomans feared that her absolute possession of the Crimea
would give to Russia a dominant position - a position so
dangerous that it might even threaten Istanbul itself and the
continued existence of Ottoman rale - in the European lands.
The Porte now resolved therefore to make preparations for a
possible recurrence of war. However, the Grand Vizir Halil
Hamid Pa^a did not want a new conflict with the Russians and
sought to secure foreign intervention in the crisis. On 10
October 1783 he asked Stefano Pisani, Ainslie*s dragoman, to
tell his ambassador that the Porte wished Great Britain to use
her good offices and to engage Russia "to adopt sentiments of
68moderation, the only means of preventing a destructive war".
The Qrand Vizir added that he trusted Ainslie would communicate
to London as quickly as possible this desire of the Forte for
69the good offices of Great Britain. Ainslie, having at this 
time no idea as to what the precise attitude of his government
67* Ainslie to Fox, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/4, no. 16, 9 August 1783# 
68. Ainslie to Fox, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/4, no. 20, 10 October 
1783.
69* ibid.
might he, was unable to make any positive response* In the
meantime, on 21 September 1783, Fox had in fact written to
Ainslie urging him to use the whole weight of British influence
at Istanbul to dissuade the Porte from offering resistance to 
70
Russia. Fox emphasized his belief that, should the Ottomans 
consent to accept the recent course of events in tho Kuban, the 
Crimea and the isle of Taman, Russia would then adhere 
scrupulously to all the other provisions of the Kupuk Kaynarca 
settlement of 1774* Pointing out the military weakness of the 
Porte in relation to Russia, Fox ordered Ainslie to make strong 
representations about the danger, for the Turks, of a new out­
break of hostilities. Ainslie was to co-operate with those 
Christian ambassadors at Istanbul who favoured the cause of 
peace. It was at the express wish of the Russian court, Fox 
now informed Ainslie, that Great Britain sought to dissuade the 
Turks from embarking upon a new war. Fox noted, moreover, that 
he had made contact with the French ambassador in London, in the 
hope that the French court might be induced to support the 
preservation of peace. Above all, Ainslie was to keep two things 
in minds first, he was to offer his own observations to the 
Turks "in the style of friendly advice, and not so a s .to commit 
his Majesty or the Nation to take any part either on one side or
70. F&x to Ainslie, P. R. 0., F. 0* 78/4, no. 9, 21 September 1783*
the other in case of a rupture"| and second, "that everything
we do is with the knowledge and privity of the Empress of Russia
71and agreeable to her desire". These instructions from Pox
reached Istanbul on 18 October 1783# Ainslie, having consulted
the Russian ambassador, Bulgakow lost no time in seeking an
audience at the Porte. On 23 October 1783 a meeting took place
at Scutari with the Re1is Efendi Mustafa (in office 1783-84),
the 0efterdar, ^  Peyzl Efendi (1782-84), and a dragoman of the 
73Porte. Ainslie told the Ottoman dignitaries that his earlier 
lack of precise instructions had arisen from the previous 
unawareness at London of the views of the other European powers 
over the Crimean question. Now, however, he was authorized to 
offer to the Porte his good offices, urging that if the Porte 
consented to the cession of the Crimea, the Kuban and the island 
of Taman, Russia would maintain scrupulously the stipulations of 
the treaty of Kucpuk Kaynarca. Ainslie urged the Porte to accept 
the fait accompli, as these territories were already effectively
rr a
in the possession of Russia. Nothing was determined at this 
meeting, although the ministers of the Porte seemed inclined, to 
accept Ainsliefs advice. Ainslie was told that he would receive
71# ibid.
72. See glossary.
73* Cf. Precis de la d&claration rendue par 1*ambassadeur 
d*Angleterre aux ministres de la Sublime Porte Ottomane, 
dans la conference qui a eu lieu le 23 d*0ctobre 1783, 
can be found in P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/4*
74* ibid.? Ainslie to Pox, P. R. 0., P. 0. 78/4, no. 21, 24 
October 1783*
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a formal answer after the Grand Vizir had been consulted about
the matter* On 25 October the Grand Vizir summoned Ainslie*s
dragoman, Stefano Pisani# The Grand Vizir thanked Ainslie for
his friendly intervention, informing Pisani that he was in
agreement with Ainslie*s view that the Tatar provinces had
indeed been irrevocably lost as a consequence of the Kiiquk
Kaynarca settlement in 1774* Halil Hamid now expressed, however,
a desire to see Prance invited to take part with Great Britain
75m  a joint mediation between the Porte and Russia. ^
On 29 October 1783* the Grand Vizir, through Ainslie*s
dragoman Pisani, invited the ambassador to yet another conference.
He intimated to Ainslie that he was ready to make concessions to
the Russians, and once more conveyed to Ainslie his gratitude
77for Great Britain’s friendly concern* On the following day,
30 October, Ainslie and Pisani met the Turkish ministers at the
palace of Aynalikavak, the Porte being represented at this
meeting by the Kapudan Pa^a, GazT Hasan, the Re*is Efendi,
7ft
Mustafa, and the Beglikyi. Ainslie opened the meeting, once 
more offering to the Ottoman dignitaries the good offices which
75* Ainslie to Pox, P. R. 0., P. 0. 78/4* no. 22, 25 October 
1783.
76. Ainslie to Pox, P. R. 0., P. 0. 78/4* no. 23, 2 November 
1783.
77. ibid.
78. See glossary.
he had proposed in the meeting of 23 October. He again urged
the Porte to consent to the Russian annexation of the Crimea,
the Kuban and the island of Taman. At this point the Kapudan
Pa^a intervened, declaring to Ainslie that the Porte desired to
end the Crimean problem and to secure a durable peace, and
arguing that Prance and Britain should join together and offer
their mediation. Ainslie told the Rasa that he was not authorized
to discuss a possible mediation of Prance and Great Britain.
He repeated, however, his earlier view of the matter and
emphasized how imprudent it would be for the Porte to risk a
further war with Russia, as the military situation of the Ottoman
79Empire was not strong enough for any such enterprise. The 
Kapudan Ra,f?a now reiterated his desire for a joint mediation of 
Prance and Great Britain - a desire which also found favour with 
the Beglikpi. With this, the meeting came to an end. On the 
following day, 31 October, Pisani was informed that the Forte 
was indeed desirous to avoid war? that it had the fullest 
confidence in the friendly disposition of Great Britain; and that 
it was disposed to accept whatever arrangement might be proposed
gO
by the king of England relative to the Crimea.
79* Precis de la conference a Ainali Cavac, que S. E. 1*Ambassadeur 
d’Angleterre a eu le 30 Octobre 1783, can be found in
P. R. 0., P. 0. 78/4? see also, Ainslie to Pox, P. R. 0.,
P. 0. 78/4, no. 23, 2 November 1783*
80. Cf. "Litteral translation of a report given in by Stephano Pisani 
dated 31 October 1783” to be found in P. R. 0., P. 0. 78/4-
38.
Meanwhile Vergennes, the French Foreign Minister (1774-87),
working through his ambassador at London, d’Adhemar, had
persuaded Fox to instruct Ainslie that he should act in close
co-operation with St. Priest, the French ambassador at Istanbul,
in order to induce the Turks to accept the annexation of the 
8l
Crimea. Fox was agreeable and on 22 October 1783, wrote to
82Ainslie, ordering him to take this courses "His Majesty’s
Pleasure is that you should communicate to the French ambassador
at Constantinople the tenour of your instructions.” Ainslie was
admonished, however, to bear in mind that^s
you are to act in perfect confidence with M. Bulgakow, 
and you are not to encourage any ideas which the French 
Ambassador may start of a modification of the Empress’s 
possession of the Kuban the Crimea or the Isle of Taman.
Ainslie received these instructions from Fox on 8 November 1783, 
and at once made contact with St. Priest and Bulgakow.^ The 
French ambassador had also received from Paris instruction to
■I s /
the same purpose: l’Angleterre ayant rompu la glace a cet egard;
Je ne suis nullement embarrasse de partager son intervention
85dans cette besogne” . On 13 November Ainslie and St. Priest 
met at the British Embassy, and St. Priest promised to support
81. Anderson, The Great Powers and the Annexation of the Crimea, 
1783-84", in S. E. R., XXXVII (1958-1959), PP. 26-8.
82. Fox to Ainslie, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/4, no. 12, 12 October 1783.
83. ibid.
84. Ainslie to Fox, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/4, no. 24, 10 November 1783*
85. St. Priest to Vergennes, C. P. T., I69 (1783), no. 27,
31 October 1783.
Ainslie at the Porte. He proposed also that the Forte should "be
persuaded to ask Russia to allow the selection, as Khan, of ”un
/ 86homme de paille qui n'auroit de cette dignite que le titre" , 
this personage to he chosen from amongst the Muslim subjects of 
the Tsarina# Ainslie opposed this proposal, since he had been 
instructed not to enter into far-reaching negotiations relating 
to the Crimea# He told St# Priest that delay might increase the 
danger of a rupture inconsistent with the intentions of their 
respective courts and with the interests of the Ottoman Empire#
He also underlined that there was no use in encouraging the
Q r j
Turks to seek for better terms. On the following day, 14 
November 1783, St. Priest declared his readiness to agree with 
Ainslie*s views and assured him that he would use his influence 
in the strongest manner at the Porte, in order to persuade the 
Turks to accept the loss of the Crimean territories. St# Priest 
even told Ainslie that in order to strengthen his arguments 
with the Turkish ministers he would submit to the Porte a 
document, "Le Tableau de 1*Empire Ottoman11 which had been sent 
to him from Paris.
On 21 November 1783 the Russian ambassador at Istanbul,
86. ibid•; see also no. 29, 19 November 1783#
87# Ainslie to Fox, P# R# 0., F# 0. 78/4, no. 25, 22 November 1783*
88. ibid.; of. St. Priest to Vergennes, C# P# T., 169 (1783),
no. 27, 31 October 1783#
Bulgakow, in a meeting with the Turkish ministers, asked the
Porte to consent to the Russian annexation of the Crimea.
Bulgakow declared that the French and British ambassadors were
not acting as mediators, but were offering their friendly good
offices to Russia and the Porte in order to end the dispute
between them. The Porte, after this meeting, sought support
once more from St. Priest and Ainslie for a modification of
Bulgakow1s demands. Both ambassadors urged the Porte to give a
89 ^positive reply to Bulgakow as soon as possible. On 6 December
Ainslie had another meeting with the Kapudan Pa^aiHasan at
which the Kapudan suggested that Great Britain and France should
90guarantee "the reciprocal Engagements” between Russia and the
Porte. Ainslie objected strongly that ”the idea of Mediation was
novel, and that His Majesty’s intervention had never extended
further than to give this £i.e., the OttomanJ court his friendly
91advice, in order to prevent their running headlong to ruin.”
Ainslie recommended that the Porte ”as the best, and most
dignified Policy [should] do with a good grace what could not
92
possibly be avoided." As to the position of the Tatars, Ainljsie
93emphasized that they existed ”no more as a Nation.” The Porte,
89* Ainslie to Fox, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/4, no. 27, 10 December 
1783.
90. ibid; cf. Cevdet, Ta’rift, III, pp. 38-9*
91. Ainslie to Fox, P. R. 0., F. 0., 78/4, no. 27, 10 December 
1783.
92. ibid.
93. ibid.
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— 94despite the opposition of the 1 ulema, would now accept the
loss of the Crimea and that the dispute between Russia and the
Porte would soon come to an end - all the more since the Grand
Vizir IJalil Hamid and the Kapudan Paga;Hasan continued to be of
the opinion that war had to be avoided with Russia# On 14
December Bulgakow was invited to meet the Ottoman dignitaries
on the following day. The Porte was represented by the Kapudan
Pa^a^Hasan, the Re1is Efendi,Haci Mustafa and Ahmed *Azmi Efendi,
an important member of the * ulema. The Kapudan Paga opened the
meeting by declaring that the Porte was ready to adopt a pacific
policy, provided the Russian demands were found to be consistent
with the dignity and safety of the Ottoman Empire. The Paga once
more insisted on British and French mediation and attributed the
Ottoman delay in answering the Russian demands to the desire of
the Porte to obtain a decision on this mediation from the
95governments at London and Versailles.  ^Bulgakow, though 
appreciating.the good and friendly offices of these courts, 
refused emphatically to envisage a formal mediation by Britain 
and France, telling the Ottoman ministers that his court was
96
determined not to accept a foreign mediation. Ainslie and St. 
Priest now sent verbal messages to the Grand Vizir, informing
94* See glossary.
95* Ainslie to Fox, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/4* no. 28, 24 December 
178?>5 cf. Cevdet, Taf rib, III, pp. 26-7*
96. ibid, pp. 26-7.
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him that they had no expectation of receiving instructions from
London and Versailles to offer an official mediation and guaran-
97tees to the Porte. On the contrary, both ambassadors once more 
urged the Porte to terminate the dispute with Russia as soon as 
possible. Meanwhile the Austrian internuncio, too, recommended 
the Ottoman government to follow this course.
•' - 98
^ mu^avere  ^ held at the Porte on 18 December 1783 discussed
in great detail the Russian demands as well as the French and
British ambassadors1 friendly advice that the Porte should
consent to the annexation of the Crimea by Russia. The Grand
Vizii) Halil Hamid Pa^ aj, opened the meeting and assured the
Ottoman dignitaries that no one would be blamed for his opinion,
99whatever he said. Yet the dignitaries fell into a curious 
silence and none of them uttered a word. The Vizir and the 
^eyh-ul-islam^Mehmed'^^ •Ata'u* llah Efendi asked the dignitaries 
to speak out and reveal their o p i n i o n s . A t  last, the digni­
taries present at the meeting began to give their views. Almost 
all of them suggested that Britain and France be invited again
97* Ainslie to Fox, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/4, no. 28, 24 December 
1783; see also, St. Priest to Vergennes, C. P. T., I69 
(1783), no. 33, 24 December 1783*
98. See glossary•
99* Cevdet, Ta* rifr, III, V» 34; cf. I. Uzunpar^ili,
"Sadrazam Halil Hamid Pa^a", in "Turkiyat Meemu*asi, V
(1935), p. 229.
100.See glossary.
101.Cevdet, Ta»rib, III, pp. 37-8, 40.
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102
to mediate, The Kapudan replied that the Russian ambassador 
showed no great enthusiasm to accept the good offices of France 
and Great Britain, let alone a formal m e d i a t i o n . T h e  1 ulema, 
on grounds of religion and of the interests of the Tatars, at 
first opposed strenuously all concessions threatening the safety 
of the Ottoman Empire. The Kapudan Pasa^Hasan told them frankly 
that the military and financial situation of the empire did not 
permit of effective resistance to Russia — an opinion which, 
contrary to the general expectation, was supported by the
/\ i
Cebecibasi. The Kapudan Par?a told the dignitaries about his 
meeting with Ainslie on 2 December, Bone the less, after a long 
debate, the meeting came to an end, with no positive answer 
formulated for transmission to the Russian ambassador.
On the next day, 19 December, a message was sent to Ainslie,
inviting him, in the name of Sultan fAbd-ul-hamid, to discuss
105the situation yet again with the Kapudan, Hasan,  ^Ainslie, 
desirous as ever to see the dispute ended, met the Kapudan at
Ok Heydani, the Sultan’s summer palace, on 20 December 1783. The
Kapudan Pa?a had been instructed to consult Ainslie as to whether 
the Sultan might trust the Russians to respect sincerely the
102. ibid., pp. 39-47*
103. ibid., pp. 38-9.
104. ibid., p. 42; for the term, see glossary.
105* Ainslie to Fox, P. R# O., F. 0. 78/4, no. 28, 24 December 
1783.
terms of an agreement about the Crimea. The Pa?a added that the 
Sultan, the prand Vizir and most of the Ottoman dignitaries,
including the chiefs of the military corps and even the principa
—  106 
members of the 'ulema, were in favour of peace. Ainslie told
the Pa?a that, "upon ray word of honour, as His Majesty's
Ambassador, and as his Friend” , he saw no danger in the
acceptance of the Russian demands, asserting that compliance
with the demands of Russia was "suitable to the real interests
107 108
of the Porte". Ainslie underlined, however, that
I did not pretend to be a Prophet, nor to make myself any 
ways responsible for future events, which might in process 
of time be produced by numberless causes... but answered 
[the] question... as a Man of honour, sincerely desirous 
to co-operate in the salutaiy work of conciliation, and 
Peace, most cordially recommended by my Royal Master, as 
absolutely necessaiy for the good
of the Ottoman Empire. On the following day, 21 December,
Ainslie learnt from the Beglikci that the divan was most
persistently and earnestly bent on securing the necessary
approbabion of the 'ulema to the measures which they wished to
enforce and that nothing could now defeat the peaceful
109intentions of the divan.
106. ibid. 
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By the Beginning of the new year the Turks, "weak, isolated, 
and bewildered", yielded to necessity and recognized the 
annexation of the Crimea in a formal agreement concluded with 
Russia on 8 January 1784*
j
110. Anderson, The Great Powers and the Annexation of the Crimea, 
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C H A P T E R  II 
The outbreak of the Russo — Turkish war (1787) •
After the Treaty of Versailles in 1783* which brought to 
an end the war between France and Great Britain, the balance 
of power in Europe was greatly altered. France, Spain and 
Austria appeared to stand "in alliance" with one another. 
Holland tended now to move in the same orbit. Great Britain 
and Prussia found themselves now in isolation.'*'
In 1784) the rivalry between Fox and Pitt ended in’ the 
latter*s victory. Henceforth, Britain was to have an 
administration more stable than she had known since the days 
of Walpole.^
During the early years of the new government, peace abroad 
was an ever present concern of Pitt and his colleagues. The fact
1. A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, ed. The Cambridge History of 
British Foreign Policy, 1783-1919* I (London, 1922), p . 143; 
cf. M. S. Anderson "European Diplomatic Relations, 1763-1798” 
in The New Cambridge Modern History, VIII (London, 1968),
pp. 266-75*
2. Sir Richard Lodge, Great Britain and Prussia in the Eighteenth 
Century (Oxford, 1912), p. 158$ cf. John Shrman, The Younger 
Fitt (London, 1969)) P* 467.
was that the Prime Minister aimed above all at success in domestic
affairs. The Irish problem, the national debt and naval affairs
occupied Pitt’s mind more than the problem of foreign relations.
Not that he eschewed all interest in foreign policy. On the
contrary, he maintained a close contact with Lord Carmarthen, the
3
Foreign Secretary. During his first years in power Pitt was rather
cautious and reserved towards continental involvement. As his
biographer Holland Rose has pointed out, Pitt’s attitude towards
foreign affairs was to "wait until the horizon cleared".^ Pitt
declared on one occasion: "Till I see this country in a situation
more respectable as to the Army, Navy and Finance, I cannot think
anything that may draw us into troubled waters either safe or 
5
rational". Pitt was no advocate of isolation. Indeed he wished to 
emerge from it as soon as he could and searched for the means to do 
so, though very cautiously. He hoped that, if he could range Great 
Britain with Austria, he might also gain the approval of Russia, 
for the simple reason that Russia had been in alliance with 
Austria since 1781. The Emperor Joseph II, however, was little 
inclined to accept a close connection with Great Britain. He 
believed that since the American War of Independence Britain 
had lost her influence everywhere and had fallen into the status
3. J. Holland Rose, William Pitt and National Revival, (London, 
1911), p. 301; Ehrman, The Younger Pitt, p. 469*
4. Rose, op. cit., p. 315*
5. B. M. Add. K3S. 27914; cf., Rose, op. cit., p. 301.
6. Ehrman, The Younger Pitt, p. 469.
of a second-rate power* Moreover, Austria's dislike of the
activities of George III as Elector of Hanover made it difficult
7
for Great Britain to win the confidence of Austria. Russia, too 
did not approve of George Ill's attitude towards German affairs. 
And, over and above these considerations, the main interest of 
both Russia and Austria was directed not to the West, but to the 
Ottoman Empire. The ambitions of Joseph II and Catherine II to 
win new territories at the expense of the Turks dominated their 
outlook. The two empires prefered therefore to view the
g
approaches of Great Britain with considerable reserve.
Catherine II would have liked to receive from Britain an evident 
readiness to acquiesce in her ambitions against the Ottoman 
Empire - a readiness more discernible perhaps in the attitude of 
Fox at the time of the annexation of the Crimea in 1783 than in
the attitude of Pitt during his first years of office after 1784*
o-
Neither Pitt nor the Foreign Secretary, Lord Carmarthen, seemed 
prepared to do more than talk in terms of the continuance of the 
amicable relations which had existed between Russia and Great 
Britain during the recent years. Vague protestations of goodwill 
meant little to the Tsarina. She declined to renew the Anglo- 
Russian commercial agreement concluded in 1786 and due for
7# Cf. Rose, op. cit., pp. 297-8, 304-5, 318-205 Ehrman, The 
Younger Pitt, p. 470-75*
8. ibid, 467-71, 502-6? Rose, op. cit., 299-303, 315*
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renewal in 1786 - and now made a commercial treaty with France,
g
giving to the French the status of most-favoured nation*
Prussia, like Great Britain, was also in a state of 
isolation in Europe# The death of Frederick II, however, in 
1786, and the situation developing in Holland created an 
opportunity for both powers to end their isolation# Pitt, in 
particular, viewed with suspicion the growth of French 
influence in the United Provinces* He feared that co-operation 
between the Dutch and the French East India Companies might 
prove dangerous to the interests of Great Britain in India#^^ 
Holland itself was beset during these years with the tensions 
arising from the conflict between the so-called "Patriots” 
and the supporters of the Stadtholdei^. France supported the 
former, Great Britain and Prussia tended to favour the latter*
In September 1787> when the^"Patriot" faction arrested the 
queen of Holland, Great Britain and Prussia used their joint 
influence in her support - and warned France not to intervene 
on behalf of the ‘'Patriots" * ^  The outbreak of a new war between 
Russia and the Ottoman Empire in August 1787 made the French
9* Cf# John Ehrman, The British Government and Commercial
Negotiations with Europe, 1783-1793 (Cambridge, 1962)/ PP. 92- 
111*
10*See, Rose, op. cit», p# 317; Ehrman, The Younger Pitt, p. <472#
11.For details see, Alfred Cobban, Ambassadors and Secret Agents 
(The Diplomacy of the First Earl of Malmesbury at the Hague), 
(London, 1954)•
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reluctant to embroil themselves too deeply in Dutch affairs.
In these circumstances it is not surprising that British and
Prussian influence was not* much strengthened in the United
Provinces - to such a degree indeed that in August 1788 Great
Britain, Prussia and Holland entered into a ’Triple Alliance*.
This alliance brought to an end the isolation of England and
Prussia in European affairs - and also initiated an era of good
12
relations between the two powers.
In 1783, through the good offices of the French and 
British ambassadors at Istanbul, the long conflict between 
Russia and the Turks ended with the Russian annexation of the 
Crimea. The Tsarina and Prince Potemkin, now in charge of the 
provinces of southern Russia, felt the need to develop new 
military and naval bases in the territories of the former 
Khanate. Kherson, situated on the Dniepr, became in 1783-84 
the site of a Russian naval base. In 1784 Potemkin built a 
great fortress at Sebastopol. Two years later, in 1786, he 
ordered the construction of a new town, Ekaterinosl&v, on the 
right bank of the Dniepr. At the same time he encouraged foreign
12. ibid.. pp. 203-65 Rose, op. cit., 368-90; British Foreign 
Policy. I, pp. 176-83; Lodge, op. cit., 180-3.
51.
merchants to settle in the Crimea and engage in trade.^
Meanwhile, a far different •climate of opinion’ was dis­
cernible in government circles at Istanbul. The Ottomans found 
it difficult to accept the loss of the Crimea to the Russians.
The Grand Vizir, IJalil Hamid Pa^a, with the help of St. Priest, 
the French ambassador, initiated a programme of reforms. His 
main aim was to modernize the Ottoman armed forces and, in order 
to achieve this end, he now established schools both for the 
army and for the navy. French army officers, teachers and 
engineers came now in considerable numbers to Istanbul. With 
their assistance the Ottomans began to repair and renovate their 
fortresses along the border with Russia.^ galll Hamid Pasja found, 
however, little effective encouragement in his reforming 
activities at the Porte. The Sultan*Abd-ul-hamidI (1774-89) 
showed no great inclination to co-operate with the Grand Vizir, 
indeed he began to suspect that IJalll Hamid might be preparing 
to dethrone him in favour of his nephew, the future Selim III.
At the Porte, the dignitaries hostile to galil Hamid - notable
13# Cf. Richard Willis, A Short Account of the Ancient and 
Modern State of Crim Tatary,(London,1787), PP* 48-545 
G. Soloveytchik, Potemkin, (new ed., London, 1949), PP# 116-27 
Boris Nolde, La Formation de l’Smpire Russe, II (Paris, 1953), 
pp. 177 ff#
14# L. Pingaud, Choiseul-Gouffier, La France en Orient sous 
Louis XVI (Paris, 1887), PP# 75-81; I. H. Uzuinpar^ili, 
"Sadrazam Iialil Hamid Pasa" in T. M., V (1935)* PP# 213-63; 
Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, 
(Montreal, 1964), PP* 65-6.
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amongst them being the well-known Kapudan Paga, Cezayirli
Hasan - strove to incite *Abd-ul-hamid against Halil Hamid. And
with success, for in March 1785 Halil Hamid was deposed from the
Grand Vizirate and soon after strangled at Bozcaada, near 
15Istanbul. These intrigues around the throne hindered the 
fulfilment of the reform programme emvisaged by Halil Hamid and 
boded ill for the Turks, should a new crisis arise between 
Russia and the Ottoman Empire.
The new Grand Vizir Hazinedar Jpahin fAli Pa^a held office 
for only a short time (March 1785 - January 1786). Now, the 
Grand Vizirate went to a man who was in fact the creature of 
Cezayirli Hasan - i.e., to Koca Yusuf Pa^a, Grand Vizir during 
the years 1786-89* It was during his administration that the new 
tensions already discernible between the Russians and the Turks 
began to assume serious proportions. Almost all the foreign 
ambassadors then at the Porte - and also the Turkish historians 
of this time - agree that Yusuf Pa^a lacked the abilities 
required to govern the empire at a moment of developing crisis. 
The Grand Vizir was ill-informed about the political realities
15* Pingaud, op. cit., pp. 79 ff? Salih Munir "Louis XVI et le 
Sultan Selim III" in Revue dlHistoire Dinlomatinue t Annee 26 
(1912), pp. 516-48; I. H. Uzunpar^ili, loc. cit., 213-63; 
idem, "Selim III *un veliaht iken Franca kra'li Louis XVI ile 
muhabereleri", in Belleten, II (1938), pp. 191-246; idem, 
"Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Papaya dair" in T . M ., VII-VIII (1940- 
42), pp. 17-40; E. I .a , "Djeza’irli Ghazi Hasan Pasha".
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now confronting the Ottoman Empire and ill-equipped to meet 
these realities, Yusuf Pa^a was fated soon to lead the Turks 
most ill-advisedly into a new war with the formidable power of 
Russia,
The government at St. Petersburg, in pursuit of its 
expansionist aims, had begun to intervene in the affairs of 
Georgia, a land where both the Russians and the Turks sought to 
establish spheres of influence advantageous to their respective 
interests. At this time (1785) Russia extended her "protection" 
over the King Erekle, then ruling a group of Georgians located 
in the region of K*art1lo-Kakhet*i. The Ottomans, for their part, 
gave their "protection" to another Georgian ruler in control of 
Akhaltsikhe, a certain Suleyman Pa^a. This opposition between 
Russia and the Ottoman Empire assumed in the course of 1785-86 
a more ominous character, Russian troops entered Georgia,
17threatening the Lezghis of Daghestan and the Khans of Tiflis, 
Tatar elements which had fled from the Crimea and the Kuban after 
1783 also harassed the Russians in Georgia and the adjacent 
territories, often with the encouragement of the Porte, which 
was ever mindful that under article 23 of the peace of Kupiik 
Kaynarca (1774) all Georgians had been defined as being under
16. Cevdet, Ta'rlh, II, pp. 61-6, 273-6? Ill, pp. 160-4;
cf. D. II. Lang, The Last Years of the Georgian Monarchy 
I638-I832 (New York, 1957) > PP* 205-11? Anderson," The 
Eastern Question, p, 11.
17. Lang, on. cit., p. 209.
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the protection of the Turks, and resentful therefore of the new 
Russian intervention in that area. The Tsarina Catherine was 
reluctant to accept that this article should continue in force.
In October 1784 the Russian Foreign Minister, Bezborodko,
wrote to Bulgakow, the Russian ambassador at Istanbul, urging
him to endeavour to render the clause ineffective - to correct
18it ’’not indeed on paper, but de fait” . Bulgakov/, though he
realized full v/ell that the clause, as formulated in 1774* was
quite clear, protested to the Porte on several occasions against
the intrusions of Suleyman Pa^a of Akhaltsikhe into the Georgian
territories of K*art 1lo-Kakhet'i, at that time under the pro-
19tection of Russia. At this time Bulgakow was seeking to take
o-
advantage of that clause in the Ku<j;uk Kaynarca settlement which
gave Russia the right to establish consulates in the Ottoman
20Empire. Russia was eager now to appoint a consul at Varna.
The Russian ambassador failed to obtain a definite response to 
his complaints about the situation in Georgia and to his rep­
resentations about Varna. In May 1786 we find him submitting a
21memorial to the Porte, demanding, inter alia, that the Ottoman
18. ibid, p. 206.
19. ibidi, pp. 206-207.
20. Cf. Anderson, The Eastern Question, p. 13$ Uzunqsar^ili, 
Osmanli Tarifti, IV/I, pp. 501-3*
21. The memorial is dated 18 May 1786, and a copy of it can be
found in P. R. 0., P. 0. 78/7.
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government should restrain Suleyman Pa^a, whose activities
continued to disturb the frontiers of the protectorate of
K*art flo-Kalchet1 i in Georgia. The Porte, in a reply dated 14 
22
July 1786, denied the Russian accusations, charging the
Russians with violation of Ottoman territory. Bulgakow, wearied
of Ottoman procrastination, advised the Tsarina to make a more
forceful approach to the Porte, in an effort to overcome the
stubbornness of the Turks. He also requested that the Tsarina
assign to him full powers, which would allow him to adopt a
more resolute attitude towards the Ottoman dignitaries at the 
23
Porte. Catherine at once complied with Bulgakow*s request,
informing him, however, that Mour sincere desire is not to let
24
matters reach breaking point, unless there is need11 ♦ The
Ottoman dignitaries, confronted now with more insistent demands
from Bulgakov;, again took refuge in procrastination, being
reluctant to bear the burden of 3, concrete decision in this 
25
matter. Indeed, as the tension became more and more evident,
the Ottoman ministers began to consider, with a sense of urgency
unfelt heretofore whether or not one or other of the European
2 6states, perhaps Great Britain, might be induced to resume a
22. A copy of the Porte*s reply also can be found in P. R. 0.,
P. 0. 78/7*
23. Bulgakow to Catherine, in Sbornik Imperatorskogo Russkogo 
Istoricheskogo Oteshchestva, xlvii  ^ (St. Petersburg,1885)> 
pp. 162-8, no. 100, 1(12) June 1786.
24. Catherine to Bulgakov;, In Sbornik, xlvii, p. 169, no. 102,
15 July 1786^ .
25. Cevdet, Ta*rib, IV, pp.'ll ff.
26. See below, p.6^,
role of mediation in the disagreement between the Ottoman 
Empire and Russia.
The general attitude of the government in London has shown,
as yet, little change from that of the preceding years. Ainslie
given thus far no definite instructions from London as to the
course he should follow in relation to the growing tension
between the Ottoman Empire and Russia - was inclined to believe
27
that it would be "prudent to remain perfectly quiet" and that 
"no favourable circumstance [couldj intervene to save" the 
Ottomans.
His own position at the, Porte had been much improved with 
the passing of the years, not least because of his role, limited 
though it was, in the matter of the Crimea. As the relations of 
the Ottoman Empire with Russia became more and more strained, 
the Turkish dignitaries began to turn to Ainslie in the hope of 
securing through him an effective measure of support from Great 
Britain. The ministers at the Porte, from the beginning of 1786, 
made several attempts to win Ainslie to their side. One motive 
behind their approaches to Ainslie was, no doubt, their appre­
hension that another Russian naval squadron might — with the
27* Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., P. 0. 78/7* no. 8, 27 
March 1786.
28. Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., P. 0. 78/7j no. 7* H  
March 1786.
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good, offices of England - penetrate into the Mediterranean, 
as had occurred before during the Russo-Ottcman War of 1768-74 - 
an apprehension which remained alive on the eve of the new war 
about to begin in 1787*
On 31 January 1786 the Kapudan, Hasan Pa^a, invited Ainslie 
to visit him at the Tersane (Arsenal) in Istanbul* Assuring 
Ainslie that the Sultan had been most content with the good 
advice that he had offered at the time of the annexation of the 
Crimea, Hasan Pa^a requested that the ambassador offer his 
opinion on the general situation of the Ottoman Empire at this 
time - for example, on affairs in Georgia, on the condition of 
Egypt, and on the border difficulties with Venice in the region
- ' O
of Albania, Ainslie declined, however, to commit himself, in
the sense of giving definite counsel on questions which, as of
this moment, he regarded as matters ”internal to the Ottoman 
29government” . ' Ainslie was later summoned to audience with the 
new Grand Vizir, Yusuf Pa^a. The Vizir greeted him cordially, 
assuring him of his best offices in relation to the concerns of 
the British merchants trading in Ottoman territories and of his
own reliance on the amicable disposition of the British govern—
+ 30 ment.
29* Ainslie to Carmarthen, P, R, 0,, F. 0, 78/7* no, 4?
10 February 1786.
30. Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R, 0#, F. 0, 78/79 no. 7>
11 March 1786.
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Ainslie once more avoided any particular involvement with
the Ottomans, Writing to London, he did, however, express his
view that "unless the Porte was prepared to make concessions to 
31Russia", it would find it difficult to overcome the present
irritations which divided the courts of Istanbul and St.
Petersburg. Ainslie also recommended to the Foreign Office in
32
London that the best course would be "to remain quiet", at
least for the time being. The Ottoman dignitaries continued,
however, to press for a closer understanding with Great Britain.
On 13 April 1786 Ainslie was invited to meet Yusuf Pasa at the
33latter*s "country house". The Pa^a urged the ambassador to
"recollect his constant Friendship for me, and the open preference
he had always given to the Interests of His Majesty*s Subjects
over all others" and "particularly in the affair of Masteria Duty."^
He also requested that Great Britain send two artificers to cast
35cannon for the use of the Porte. ^  Ainslie felt that this request 
was a "caprice" of the Porte, observing that the Porte had 
already at its disposal a considerable number of technical experts
31. ibid.
32. ibid.
33* The exact location is not given.
34* The masteria duty was a customs duty imposed on European
commodities imported into the Ottoman Empire. The French 
merchants had enjoyed the privilege of exemption from such 
dues since 1740, but it was not until after the annexation
of the Crimea that Ainslie in 1784, through the influence of
the Kapudan Pa?a was able to secure the same privilege for 
the English merchants. (SeeyAinslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0.,
F. 0. 78/5* no. 11, 25 May 1784) and also Appendix III.
35* Aift&lie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/, no. 10, 2p April 1786.
r
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from France, Germany and Italy. ^  None the less, in order to make
some gesture -which might serve to maintain British influence
amongst the Ottoman officials, he suggested to Lord Carmarthen
in London that it would perhaps be a sound course to fulfil this
request of the Grand Vizir, even though compliance \<Jould in fact
37be "contrary to our laws". Soon afterwards, early in May 1786, 
a further approach was made to Ainslie - this time by the Kapudan, 
Hasan Pa^a, who intimated that the ambassador, through compliance 
with the Turkish request, would be able "to secure his own credit
T O
in the eyes of the Sultan" and at the same time offset in the 
mind of the Sultan the impression which the French had tried to 
lodge there that, but for the good offices of Great Britain, a
Russian squadron would never have been able to enter the Medi—
- o
terranean during the war of 1768-74? so setting in motion the train 
of events which led at last to the disaster to the Ottoman fleet 
at pe^me in 1770. Ainslie, writing to Carmarthen on 10 May 1786, 
urged that two experts be despatched to the Porte, stating: "I 
cannot consistently avoid repeating to Your Lordship an affair 
upon which must in great measure depend the future influence of 
His Majesty’s Mission at this Residence", Ainslie explained to
36. ibid.
37. ibid. The law in question is: "A proclamation for Recalling 
and prohibiting seamen from serving foreign princes and 
States and for granting Rewards for discovering such seamen 
as shall conceal themselves". Dated 8th December 1777 by the 
King i.e., George III • (see, Patent Roils, 1-18, Geo. Ill)
38. Ainslie to Carmarthen, P., R. 0., F. 0* 78/7, no.11, 10 May 1786.
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39Carmarthen :
I certainly would have gone to every proper length to elude 
this commission, lout I could not hazard the consequences of 
disobliging a Grand Vizir and Capitan Pashaw from whom I have 
received such great Favours and who have so many means in 
their power of taking their Revenge at the expence of His 
Majesty1s commercial Subjects.
Carmarthen nevertheless refused the Sultan’s request, on the
ground that British artisans were not allowed to be sent out from
England to undertake employment in other countries.^
Meanwhile the Russian ambassador Bulgakow was still seeking
from the Porte an answer to his memorial of 18 May 1786,^ On 5
42
June Ainslie once more met the Grand Vizir Yusuf Papa. He re­
commended to the Porte a policy of prudence and moderation. Yusuf 
Papa, finding no positive encouragement in the attitude of Ainslie 
at that moment, now revealed the purpose which had led him to 
invite Ainslie to an audience. He desired Ainslie to consult the- 
govemment at London with regard to a request for "His Majesty’s 
interference, and kind influence, in order to conciliate the present 
differences with Russia; in case, that Court shall be found equally 
well disposed to refer all disputes to the mediation of mutual 
friends11. Yusuf Papa concluded by offering to Ainslie "the most 
solemn assurances of his sincere wish to cultivate the friendship
39* ibid.
40. Carmarthen to Ainslie, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/7? no.2, 4 July 1736.
Here - no doubt to the relief of Ainslie - the matter was allowed
to rest, for the Ottoman ministers did not raise it again.
41# see above, p.
42. Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. O., F. 0. 78/7? no.13? 10 Juno 1786.
of Great Britain".^ The Porte now proceeded to formulate an answer
to Bulgakow*s memorial of 18 May 1786. Before authorizing the
transmission of this answer to Bulgakow, the Grand Vizir sent a draft
of the Ottoman answer to Ainslie through the British dragoman Peter
Crutta, and asked Ainslie to give his opinion on this provisional
text — a text which, amongst other things, accused the Russians of
44attempting to provoke a new war. This Ottoman reply was in fact to
he handed to Bulgakow on 14 July. Ainslie, writing to Carmarthen on
4824 July, noted that he had recommended to the Grand Vizir :
the greatest Temper and Moderation in treating of an Event(i.e., 
the overthrow of the Ottoman Empire] which might possibly never 
happen as the present Difference between the two Courts was yet 
susceptible of being healed*
In the same despatch Ainslie observed that both the Porte and Ser­
aglio wish to introduce Great Britain into mediation of every 
arrangement to be concluded with the bordering Powers". Ainslie 
assured his superiors in London that he would continue to act with 
reserve unless and until "I receive ulterior instructions".
On 17 August 1786 Yusuf Pa^a asked Ainslie whether he had 
received instructions from London in connection with the request of
46
the Porte, made on 5 June, for the mediation of England, Ainslie 
as yet without definite advice from his government, informed the
43. ibid.
44* Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., P. 0. 78/7? no.l6, 24 July 1786.
45* ibid.
46. Ainslie to Carmarthen, P 0 R# 0*, P. 0. 78/7? no.l8, 25 August 178
62.
Grand Vizir that it was not possible for the English Court to give
a firm answer, since the mediation would depend on the existence of
a favourable disposition towards it at the Russian court. At this
point of the audience Yusuf Pa^a made a specific request that Ainslie
should set down his opinion in writing, so that it might be presented
for the personal inspection of the Sultan *Abd-ul-hamid I, A written
statement, so the Grand Vizir affirmed, would help to impress the
Sultan with the amicable attitude of Great Britain towards the
Ottoman Empire and even serve to counteract the effect on *Abd-ul-
hamid of the interferences emanating from the ambassadors of Prance
and Holland at Istanbul. Ainslie, anxious not to weaken his own
influence amongst the Ottoman dignitaries, agreed to this request on
the condition, however, that "it should be drawn up in the form, or
47in the style of a written message without signing or sealing".
The document dated 18 August 1786, contained little of a 
positive nature.^ His intention now, as on previous occasions, 
was to avoid a definite involvement of the British government 
in the discord existing between the Ottoman Empire and Russia.
The document assured the Sultan and the Ottoman ministers of the 
continuing goodwill of Great Britain towards the Ottoman Empire 
and of the British government*s readiness to view with approval
47* ibid.
48. The written statement of Ainslie was of course submitted
to the Grand Vizir in Turkish. Ainslie*s letter of 25 August 
to Carmarthen contained a literal translation of the 
document from the Turkish (see, P. R. 0., P. 0. 78/7)*
attitudes and policies tending to alleviate the difficulties
which might occur between the Porte and the Christian states
bordering on the Ottoman Empire. Ainslie, in a letter dated
25 August 1786, informed Carmarthen that he had handed over
49to the Grand Vizir the written statement mentioned above.
Meanwhile, the French ambassadors at Istanbul and St.
Petersburg had been endeavouring throughout 1786 to persuade
Russia and the Ottoman Empire to settle their differences
through the good offices of France. The Tsarina was willing to
accept the assistance of Choiseul-Gouffier at the Porte, but at
the same time instructed her own ambassador there, Bulgakow, to
insist firmly on the fulfilment of the Russian demands and not
to let control of the whole matter fall into the hands of
SO sChoiseul-Gouffier. To Segur, the French ambassador at St.
Petersburg, Potemkin argued that "the existence of the Turks is
bla real scourge to the human race” /  The position of Choiseul- 
Gouffier, and above all of Segur, was a delicate one, since at 
this moment France was negotiating a new commercial agreement
49- Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/7» no. 18,
25 August 1786.
50. Catherine to Bulgakow, in Sbornik, xlvii,p.l69, no. 102,
15 July 1786. ^
51# Memoirs and Recollections of Count Segur; ambassador from 
France to the Courts of Russia and Prussia written by 
himself, II (London, 1826), p. 277»
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with Russia, As to the good offices of France at Istanbul,
Bulgakow1s close adherence to his instruction from St, Petersburg
that Russia desired the fullest compliance of the Turks with their
demands limited seriously the room for manoeuvre available to
Choiseul-Gouffier - left him indeed with little real prospect of
achieving a settlement by compromise, a solution which the Turks
might perhaps have been induced to accept. Of the French
intention in the Russo-Ottoman dispute at this time Ainslie was
to write (10 November 1786)*^:
For my Part I foresee great Difficulties in settling this 
affair amicabl5r, unless the Porte, overawed into 
Concessions or that Russia should consent to retract Her 
claims, at all Events the Porte still continues to shew much 
Diffidence of France and a Dislike to have her Interference,
On 20 January 1787 the Russian ambassador at Istanbul, 
Bulgakow met the Re'is Efendi, Mehmed 'AtaVul^lah and gave him 
official notice of Catherine's projected visit to the Crimea, At 
the same time Bulgakow renewed his request that the Ottomans 
allow the appointment of a Russian consul at Varna and insisted 
also that the Porte take effective measures to prevent the 
Lezghis of Daghestan and also the Tatars in the Kuban from
52, See, J. L. van Regemorter, Commerce et Politique:
Preparation et Negociation du Traite Franco-Russe de 1787,
in Cahiers du Monde Russe et SoviMioue, IV, (1963), up, 230 - 
57.
53. Ainslie to Carmarthen, P, R. 0,, F, 0. 78/7, no. 25,
10 November 178o.
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R4committing further depredations against Russian territories.-'' 
The news that the Tsarina intended to travel to the Crimea 
aroused considerable apprehensions amongst the Turks. It is 
perhaps not surprising therefore that the Ottoman dignitaries 
even after the meeting of 22 January 1787 once more refused the 
demand of Bulgakow.
As yet there was no strong current of opinion among the 
Ottoman ministers in favour of a definite breach with Russia.
A document sent at this time from the Sultan to the Grand Vizir
offers indeed some details of interest on the situation of this
56 57
moment. The document inquires :
Ne seroit-il pas convenable d*arranger selon les engage- 
mens des traites les affaires en question par le moyen 
de l'ambassadeur de France, d’Angleterre ou par l*entre- 
mise de quelque autre ministre dfune autre puissance ?
On the other hand it does recommend that the fortresses on the
borders with Russia, and in particular Ochakov, be set in good
58condition and prepared for future eventualities.
54* Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/8, no. 2, 25
January 1787; no. 3? 10 February 1787*
55* Ainslie wrote of this event "how far the Ottoman Cabinet is
justifiable in abandoning the late passive system and again 
hazarding to incur the fatal consequences of a rupture with 
their powerful and more polished rival", Russia. See Ainslie 
to Carmarthen, F. 0. 78/8, no. 3, 10 February 1787.
56. The document is undated but it was included in a despatch of 
Bulgakov? to Catherine, see Sbornik, xlvii, pp* 179-82.
57* ibid. p. 196.
58. ibid. p. 197*
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It was at this juncture of affairs that the attitude of 
the British government towards the Ottoman Empire and its 
difficulties entered upon a course somewhat different from 
that which had "been followed heretofore. William Pitt and his 
ministers had of course long been aware of the negotiations in 
progress for a commercial agreement between Prance and Russia. 
This agreement was in fact to be signed in January 1787• The 
French success in these negotiations was most unwelcome to the 
British government — all the more since its own efforts to renew 
the Anglo-Russian commercial agreement of 1766 had met with 
failure. Even before the signing of the Franco-Russian agreement 
Pitt and his Foreign Minister Carmarthen had indicated to 
Ainslie a new line of conduct in a despatch dated 19 December
1786.^ This reached Ainslie on 3 February 1787*
The new instructions informed Ainslie that "the more immed­
iate object of attention, which naturally engages this Government 
is the real situation in which the Ottoman Empire finds itself
60respecting that of Russia." Carmarthen observed that France had 
offered "mediation" to the Turks and Russians and then urged on 
Ainslie:
59* Carmarthen to Ainslie, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/8, no. 8 
19 December 1786.
60. Carmarthen to Ainslie, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/8, no. 8
19 December 1786.
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the
necessity as well as propriety upon every occasion, of
endeavouring to combat the views of France as far as
possible with caution and discretion in order to.serve 
and promote the interests of England*
The Russian inclination to make use of the good offices of
France was, in Carmarthen1s view, a manoeuvre designed to hold
of a formal break until her armed forces should be in "a
situation to keep pace with the bold and determined language
she Catherine has thought proper to hold, and which she thought
would of course intimidate her Ottoman rival*” Carmarthen
declared that "this difference for the interest of England ought
certainly to be blown into a flame if possible*”^  Ainslie was
given to understand:
of your own sagacity and knowledge of persons upon the 
spot will easily point out to you how far the resolution 
of the present Divan can be encouraged so far as at least 
to hamper France if not actually break with Russia, 
without at the same time, committing England till things 
are ripe for our taking what we ought to do, on every 
possible occasion, a decided and effective part.
Ainslie should take care to remain on good terms with the
Russian ambassador Bulgakow and with the French ambassador
Choiseul-Gouffier* At the same time he was to note that ”the
members of the Divan must be as much flattered and caressed as
possible.” Carmarthen concluded by stating that it was ”by no
means the wish of England to create or even encourage a breach
of Public tranquillity, except where some restless and ambitious
6l* ibid*
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power renders it necessary for our own defence,'* and by
emphasising that, in his judgment, "a diversion of the attention
of Prance on the side of Turkey would now he of the most important
6 2service to England.”
The new line of conduct indicated for Ainslie by this
despatch requires some suppleness and indeed in implementing it,
the British ambassador was to pursue an ambiguous cause, laying
himself open to criticism by the foreign powers that he was
instrumental in provoking a new outbreak of Russo-Turkish
hostilities. Whatever his private reservations may have been
concerning this new policy, Sir Robert Ainslie lost no time in
seeking an audience with the Grand Vizir Yusuf Pa^a. The meeting
took place on 5 February 1787*^ Ainslie inquired of Yusuf Pa^a
whether or not^:
he was sure the Seraglio (65) would not leave him in Lurch, 
and resume their Pacific system - the unavoidable consequence 
of which must be a Change of Administration — that this Evil 
might still be avoided by timely concessions and operated 
without risk if he would secure the leading members of the 
Ulerna and the Cabinet especially when authorized by the Sultan 
and supported with the Credit of Hassan Bashaw. (66) His 
Highness thanked me for my friendly solicitude but told me
62. ibid.
63. Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F 0 0 o 78/8, no. 3> 
10 February 1787*
64* Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F. 0o 78/8, no. 3,
10 February 1787*
65. See glossary.
66. The Kapudan Hasan Paga, the admiral.
69.
that Peace or War depended absolutely upon the Deter­
minations of Russia. He said that the Sultan, the Ulema 
and the Cabinet were unanimous in their Resolution to abide 
by the Treaty (67) and to refuse all further Concessions; - 
that they were prepared to oppose their Enemies and sub­
mitted their Cause to the Will of God.
Ainslie noted in a despatch of 10 March that the Re*is Efendi
(Suleyman Feyzi), in discussion with the Russian ambassador
Bulgakov;, had offered ”to submit the contested Points to the
arbitration of two friendly courts, chosen by both Parties " t and
that Bulgakov; refused this offer, declaring that f,the Empress
would not submit Her Rights to the Decision of any Power upon 
68Earth.” Writing to London on 24 March 1787> Ainslie underlined
the bitterness which the Grand Vizir felt towards ”the haughti-
69ness and Injustice of Russia, now become unsupportable.”
Yusuf Pa^a indeed expressed his doubt as to whether or not it
would be possible to maintain the peace and indicated his
determination to prepare for war, ’’however sensible of his
70Danger and Disadvantages.” Ainslie observed in the same 
despatch that Bulgakov; had insinuated to the Grand Vizir that 
the difficulties existing between Istanbul and St. Petersburg 
might be resolved:
67. i.e., Ku9uk Kaynarca, signed in 1774*
68. Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/8, no. 5, 10 March 
1787.
69. Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/8, no. 6, 24 March 
1787.
70. ibid.
70.
if the Porte would appoint Plenipotentiaries to treat 
with the Russian ministers at Kerson? which was refused 
as equally unwarrantable and inexpedient.
Yusuf Pa^a was still hopeful that Russia might be brought to
accept the mediation of Great Britain and France or some other
power. It was ’’the sincere Desire of the Porte that Great
Britain should have the principal management of that important 
71Business.” The Grand Vizir informed Ainslie that should 
Russia be compliant he was willing to make an official applica­
tion to London for a British mediation - which Ainslie received
in an evasive manner, promising to communicate this desire of
72
the Porte to the British government. Ainslie in April of this
year felt able, on the basis of the information ’’from the Vizir,
and from equal good authority in the Seraglio",■ to assure the
73ministers at London’ :
that the Sultan is determined to reject every overture of 
mediation, in which Great Britain is not included. This,
My Lord, I can venture to say may be depended on, and that 
the Credit of France will not prevail under this Admini­
stration.
A little later Ainslie informed Carmarthen that the Grand Vizir 
to all appearance, was resolute in insisting on a formal
rj a
retraction of the Russian claims in the Caucasus. This
71. ibid.
72. ibid.
73. Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F. 0 o 78/8, no. 7* 7 April 
1787.
74. Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/8, no. 8, 25 April 
1787.
71.
retraction once granted, he would be prepared to renew the
75former treaties with Russia :
under the mediation of England with Prance or Prussia, 
but at all events Great Britain to be joined, in which 
case every arrangement is to take Place. This, My Lord, 
is strenuously urged by the Vizir, the Grand Admiral and 
all that Party, nay it is the prevailing opinion of the 
Seraglio, the Ulema and the Cabinet.
7 6
As noted earlier, Carmarthen had urged on Ainslie the "necessity
as well as propriety upon every occasion, of endeavouring to
combat the views of Prance as far as possible with caution and
discretion." The despatches sent by Ainslie to London during the
first half of 1787 contained a number of comments on the
situation of the French ambassador at the Porte, but little to
indicate what precise measures Ainslie took in order to thwart
the policies of Prance. Ainslie, writing to Carmarthen on 10
February 1787 , noted that he had sought, without success, "to
77discover the Vizir*s Sentiments with respect to Prance". He
observed also that Choiseul-Gouffier, with the support of the
Dutch ambassador, was still attempting to persuade the Turks
that their best course would be to accept the mediation of Prance
7ft
in their difficulties with Russia. On 24 March Ainslie informed 
Carmarthen that "His Highness [ i,e., the Grand Vizir] has very 
little confidence in the versatile Politicks of Prance".
75* ibid.
76. See above, p. 67.
77* Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., P. 0. 78/8, no. 3,
10 February 1787*
78. ibid.
He states also that Choiseul-Gouffier had received from
Versailles instructions ordering him "to use his utmost
Endeavours to restore the ancient Credit of France at this
Court", ample funds being made available to him to further this 
79intention. J Ainslie was to remark later, on 7 April 1787 > that
8o
"the credit of France will not prevail under this administration."
A subsequent despatch of Ainslie (25 April 1787) describes
Choiseul-Gouffier as "much out of Humour with me, because he
8lsupposes I obstruct his Operations". Ainslie in May 1787
alluded to the attitude of Choiseul-Gouffier, intimating that
the French ambassador believed it to be imperative that Great
Britain and also Prussia should be excluded from all future
82mediations, "because their views tend to widen the breach"
between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. Ainslie was a little more
explicit in his despatch of 25 June 1787* Here he remarked :
The Porte appears determined not to submit the Differences 
with Russia to the Management of France, jointly with 
Germany [i.e., Austria], and this Refusal is the more likely 
to continue, because the Ministers of both these Courts 
are personally disagreeable to the Porte. The French 
Ambassador continues to be prodigal in Money and Presents.
He could not fail in reestablishing the almost exclusive 
Influence of his Court, was it not for the rooted opinion 
that he is devoted to the Interest of Austria.
79* Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/8, no. 6, 24 March 1787
80. Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., p. 0. 78/8, no. 7, 7 April 1787.
81. Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., p. 0. 78/8, •no. 8, 25 April 1787
82. Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., p. 0. 78/8. no. 11, 25 May 1787.
83. Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., p. 0 . 78/8, no. 13, 25 June 1787
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Still later during a confidential discussion with the Grand
- 84Vizir, Ainslie was told by Yusuf Pa^a that t
the instances of French Politicks [are] always liable to 
vary, according to the Time and Place and as little to be 
depended on as the surface of an air Balloon.
Ainslie continued in the same despatch with the observation that:
in consequence of this conversation I thought it absolutely 
necessary, on several accounts to secure the services of 
the Reis Effendi, his Secretary, the Dragoman, and the 
Vizir’s private Treasurer who enjoys his Masters Confidence. 
Accordingly Messrs Pisani and Cruta [sic] (85) were employed on 
this Service, in which they succeeded to my Wishes. The 
Season of the Ramazan furnished the Pretext for sending an 
English Gold Watch and Chain of excellent Workmanship to 
the Minister, and a Gold Watch to each of the other three 
Gentlemen, costing in all two thousand one hundred Dollars 
which were received as Proofs of my Friendship.
Not long before the outbreak of war between Russia and the
Ottoman Empire Ainslie indeed was to declare - referring to the
ambassadors of Austria and France - that "these two Ministers
have lost all personal influence here, and that during the
86present administration they can be of little service to Russia” .
How far the diminished reputation of Choiseul-Gouffier at 
the Porte was due to the manoeuvres of Ainslie is not clear from 
the above fragment of evidence. A little extra illumination can 
be obtained from the despatches of the French ambassador sent to
84- Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F. 0• 78/8, no. 14* 
10 July 1787.
85* The embassy’s dragomans.
86. Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F. 0* 78/8, no. 15*
24 July 1787-
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Versailles. Writing to Prance on 10 February 1787 Choiseul-
Gouffier described Ainslie as seeking to persuade the Turks
that the Franco-Russian commercial entente concluded in
January of that year was in fact a Pranco-Russian alliance
directed against the Ottoman Empire.
M. le Ch. Ainslies dans une conference secrete avec le 
Grand Vizir lui a repete ces imputations absurdes, en lui 
ajoutant que vous veniez de conclure un Traite avec la 
Russie et ce ministre auquel il serait impossible de faire^ 
entendre que des liaisons de commerce ne sont pas un Traite 
d1alliance vous suppose peut-etre enir^s dans une 
confederation generale contre les Musulmans. Ma situation 
est cruelle.
The French ambassador in another despatch to Versailles (10 May
1787) makes more extended comment on Ainslie and his activities.
88 / / nChe. Ainslies... a veritablement excite les Turcs en meme
terns qu1 il offrait bassement ses services a M. de Bulgakov;,
mais ce ne sont pas des motifs politiques qui le font agir.
II a desire qu*il y eut quelques legeres hostilites
promtement suivies d'une mediation dans ltespoir dfen etre
charge et de recevoir les sommes considerables que l’Imp.
donne en pareil cas a ceux qui facilitent ses affaires. Je
ne doute pas que si le personnel de cet Ambassadeur etait
87* Choiseul-Gouffier to Vergennes, C. P. T., 175 (1787)? 10 
February 1787* Choiseul-Gouffier represents Ainslie as 
following this line of argument with the Turks even while, 
the commercial agreement between Prance and Russia was in 
negotiation. Cf. Choiseul-Gouffier to Vergennes, C. P. T«, 174 
(1786), 12 September 1786s "le Chev. Ainslies tourmente d*un 
desir universel de nuire, ne cesse de ^ ’inquieter sur les / $  
dispositions de la Cour de Prance et lui a deja presente le 
traite de Commerce qui se negocie a Petersburg comme une 
alliance qui ne tardera pas a se diriger contre eux.11 It is 
perhaps worth noting that the Russian ambassador, Bulgakov;, 
writing on 12 February 1787? depicts Ainslie as "incessantly 
whispering with the Butch, Prussian, Spanish and Swedish 
ministers." (see, Bulgakov; to Catherine, in Sbornik, xlYii; p.199) *
88. Choiseul-Gouffier to Montmorin (the new Foreign Minister),
C. P. T., 175 (1787), 10 May 1787.
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connu de M. Pitt il ne se hatat de lui substituer un 
plus digne representant de la nation Britanique.
The period preceding and following the outbreak of war 
between the Ottoman Empire and Russia in August 1787 saw 
accusations of serious nature raised against the conduct of 
Ainslie at the Porte, and also against that of the Prussian 
ambassador DieZ* These accusations depicted Ainslie as 
responsible in no small measure for the Ottoman decision to 
enter into a new conflict - an accusation which has been 
reiterated in a number of more recent historical studies re­
lating to these years. "Thus the German historian Gerhard i^riting 
in 1933 stated that Mvor allem Sir Robert Ainslie, der britische
89Gesandte am Goldenen Horn, habe die Turken zum Kriege getrieben."
Some time before the Ottoman declaration of war against 
Russia in August 1787? the conduct of Ainslie at Istanbul had 
become the subject of complaints sent from St. Petersburg to 
London. The British ambassador to Russia, Fitzherbert, writing 
in February 17875 informed Carmarthen the Secretary for Foreign
89. Cf. I). Gerhard, England und der Aufstieg Russlands (Munich- 
Berlin, 1933)? p. 196* text and note 21, referring to earlier 
literature expressing the same judgment: see also a Russian 
scholar Stanislavskaya put forward the same charges in an 
article of 1948. Cf. A. Stanislavskaya "Angliya i Russiya v 
gody vtoroi turetskoi voiny (1737-1791)"? in Vonrosy Ystorii, 
no. 11 (1948), pp. 26-49; and in addition, M. S. Anderson, 
Britain*s Discovery of Russia, 1553-1813 (London, 1958)? p# 144? 
idem, The Eastern Question (London, 1966), p. 17#
Affairs, that Bezberodko, the Russian Foreign Minister, and
also Potemkin had criticized the actions of Ainslie at the 
90
Porte. Later, in July 1787? Count Osterman made an official
complaint about Ainslie to Fitzherbert# There can be no doubt
that these criticisms of Ainslie derived from the despatches
which the Russian ambassador at Istanbul forwarded to St#
Petersburg# The letters of Bulgakow available for consultation
91do not enlighten us as to what Bulgakow wrote about Ainslie.
It is perhaps worth noting that in a despatch dated l/l2 
February 1787 he declared that Ainslie had passed beyond reason­
able restraint and was intriguing with the ambassadors of
92Holland, Prussia, Spain and Sweden. Ainslie, writing in August
1787? was to make, in relation to Bulgakow, a comment not
without interest, declaring: 11 The Russian Envoy does not even
attempt to dissimulate his nighly exclusive Connexions with the
French Mission, who actually guides him and manages all his
93affairs at the Porte." A passage from the despatches of the 
French ambassador to the Porte, Choiseul-Gouffier, would seem to
90. Stanislaviskaya, loc. cit., p# 30; see also a letter dated 
19 February 1787? by Fitzherbert, the British ambassador to 
St. Petersburg, inclined to put little trust to this adverse 
report about Ainslie, and also the letter which framed in 
general terms Carmarthen sent to Fitzherbert (Fitzherbert to 
Carmarthen, P. R. 0#, F. 0. 97/341? no. 1, 19 February 1787 
and Carmarthen to Fitzherbert, 6 April 1787)-
91# No complete edition of Bulgakow*s letters are available in 
print. Some of his letters and reports can be found, however, 
in Sbornik, xlvii (Petersburg, I885).
92. Bulgakow to Catherine, in Sbornik, xlvii,pd99?/ l/l2 February
1787.
93* Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F. 0# 78/8, no. 16, 9 August 
1787*
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be of relevance here. The ambassador, in a report to Versailles
dated 3 August 1787? observed that the Re1is Efendi, Suleyman
had intimated that Ainslie was advising the Turks to enter into
a new war with Russia, and, well aware that France favoured a
mediation of the difficulties existing between St, Petersburg
and Istanbul, was assuring the Ottoman ministers of the
9/
perfidious character of the French intentions. Perhaps the
most forceful fornulation of the charges raised against Ainslie
is to be found in the memoirs of Count de Segur, the French
9bambassador at St. Petersburg. The ambassador noted that the 
Prussian minister Diez* instigated by Ainslie, "increased the 
alarm and inquietude of the Divan to such a degree, that from 
this moment every disposition was made for an almost unavoidable
94* Choiseul-Gouffier to Montmorin, C. P. T., 176 (1787). no. 149
3 August 1787. Choiseul-Gouffier quotes also "Suleyman n'est 
point disconvenu des manoeuvres.. .a meme avoue qufil fi.e., 
Ainslie ]  conseillait la Guerre et supposait a la Cour de 
France les intentions les plus perfides."
95* 8. de Segur, Memoirs and Recollections written by himself, III 
(London, 1827), pp. 205, 207-8, 210-2.
rupture."96
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How then are these charges to he interpreted ? It will 
perhaps he appropriate to hegin with a hrief consideration of 
the various factors, hoth remote and proximate, which contri­
buted to bring about the new war. The more general factors are 
not difficult to discern - the southward advance of Russia, 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; towards the 
Black Sea; the alarm of the Ottomans, threatened with the 
destruction of their long sustained control over the territories 
bordering on that sea; the apprehensions, even resentment, on 
political and religious grounds felt amongst the Turks at the 
disappearance of the khanate of the Crimea; and, a matter of 
immediate moment, the fear arising from the recent activities
96. L. P. Segur, History of the Principal events of the Reign 
of Frederic William II, King of Prussia; and a political 
picture of Europe from 1786-1796,""! (London, l30l), p. 57• 
Segur obtained his information about affairs in Istanbul 
from the letters which Choiseul-Gouffier sent at this time.
On the fact that there was direct correspondence between 
Choiseul-Gouffier and Segur, see also the printed documents 
available in the Archives Nationales (Paris)s B7* Mar. 452, 
Numero LXXV, Nouvelles Extraordinaires de Divers Endroits: 
du Mardi 18 Septembre 17&7 - Extrait d'une lettre de 
Constantinople du 16 August 5lce ministre [i.e., Le Baron 
d'Herbert, Internonce de le Cour de VienneJ s’est donne, 
aussi que I1Ambassadeur de Prance, la rupture, qu*on pre— 
voyait deja lors du voyage de Plmperatrice a Chersons mais 
l1influence de l’Angleterre a prevalu: Et ce sont, dit-on, 
les conseils du Chevalier Ainslie, qui s'accordant avec le 
caractere du Grand-Vizir, ont attire cette Guerre a la Russie.
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of Russia in the Caucasus area.
As to the actual outbreak of the hostilities, the decision
to enter into the renewed warfare with Russia rested of course,
at Istanbul, with the influential dignitaries of the Porte, It
is difficult on the basis of the available documents to see
which of these dignitaries viewed with disfavour the decision
to declare war on Russia, The Sultan *Abd-ul-hamid I in an undated
Hatt-i humayun, the translation of which was included in a
despatch of the Russian ambassador Bulgakow written in Februaiy
1787, expressed himself in a manner favourable to a mediation of
97the difficulties between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, At a
later date, in July 1787) his influence would seem to have
hindered for a while the imprisonment of Bulgakow at the time
98when events were moving towards the outbreak of war. The value
of this evidence is slight and, whatever the personal attitude
of the Sultan, he in fact failed to halt the drift towards a new
conflict, fearing perhaps that too resolute an opposition to
personalities working in favour of war might prove disadvan-
99'tageous to himself and his throne.
97* Sbornik, xlvii, pp. 195-8,
98. ibid,, p. 204*
99* See, for example, Ahmed Cevdet, Ta* rlh, IV, pp. 26, 
Uzun<j;ar^ili, Gsmanli Tarihi, IV/l) p. 440.
/Mr- '
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It is possible also that the Beglikpi R5.sid Efendi viewed 
the decision in favour of war with doubt and dislike. Choiseul- 
Gouffier at least mentions him in December 1787 in terms of 
approval, referring to his "excellentes qualites", and 
Ainslie in January 1788 described him as "a thorough Frenchman” , 
a man perhaps inclined therefore to approve the policies which 
Choiseul-Gouffier had followed hitherto at Istanbul. In his 
efforts to avert further hostilities between the Ottomans and 
the Russians, the most influential of the Ottoman dignitaries 
active at this time was beyond doubt the Kapudan Pa^a, Hasan, 
who, however, had gone to Egypt in June 1786 and did not return 
until November 1787? being absent therefore during the months 
when war became imminent and at last actual fact. His actions at
the Porte after his return from Egypt, when he arranged for the
102
appointment of Ra?Id Efendi to the office of Refis-ul kuttab 
in place of the previous incumbent Suleyman Efendi, a known 
advocate of war, would suggest that he viewed with dissatis­
faction the previous conduct of affairs which, during his 
absence in Egypt, had brought the Ottoman Empire once more into 
conflict with Russia.
100. Choiseul-Gouffier to Montmorin, C. P. T., 176 (1787)? no. 29, 
28 December 1787*
101. Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/9, no. 1,
10 January 1788.
102. See glossary.
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The evidence defining which officials at the Porte inclined 
towards a peaceful solution is oblique and inconclusive. More 
cogent is the evidence indicating the dignitaries who favoured a 
declaration of war. Not the least important of these men was the 
Re1is Efendi of the moment, Suleyman Feyzullah Efendi, whose 
views on the situation existing a little before the outbreak of 
hostilities are given in a despatch of Ainslie dated 9 August 
1787# Here the Refis Efendi is said to have uttered the following 
words: ’’Things have gone so far that unless Justice is obtained 
for the just Demands of the Porte, I see very little Hopes of 
avoiding a Rupture with Russia, before many Months are elapsed.11 
Even more forthright is a comment which Choiseul-Gouffier made 
in December of the same year, describing Suleyman Efendi as 11 le 
plus ardent moteur de la Guerre.”^ ^  The geyH-ul-islam of this 
time Muftizade Ahmed Efendi, issued a f etva^ ^  approving the
103# Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., P. 0. 78/8, no. 16,9
August 1787* The same despatch represents Suleyman Efendi 
as stating that the Porte would not "purchase Peace on the 
dishonourable Terms held out by Russia, which committed the 
interests of the Empire, and of their Religion. He owned 
himself no Admirer of French Politicks, and said that the 
Trio composed of that ambassador [i.e., Choiseul-Gouffier], 
and the two Imperial Ministers [[i.e., Baron d*Herbert and 
Bulgakow], could have little personal Influence with the 
present Administration, whom they had done all in their 
Power to overset."
104# Choiseul-Gouffier to Montmorin, C. P. T*, 176 (1787), 
no. 29, 28 December 1787*
105* See glossary.
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decision to make war on R u s s i a . I t  is possible that this
approval was a reflection of his own personal sentiments in
relation to the difficulties between the Ottoman Empire and 
107Russia. On the other hand a remark of Choiseul-Gouffier 
indicates that his consent to the declaration of war was 
secured through arguments amounting to a misrepresentation of 
the prevailing situation. The French ambassador writes that 
"le Mufti a meme ose dire que pour obtenir son fetva, on lui 
avait fait un faux expose des ressources de l*Empire et des 
secours que promettaient certaines puissances etrangeres."^^ 
Of the Grand Vizir himself Yusuf Pa^a, the French ambassador 
was to write in a despatch to Versailles dated 3 August 1787
106. Cevdet, Tafrih, IV, 25; Uzunpar^ili, Osmanli Tarihi, IV/l, 
P. 505*
107* Ahmed •Azmi Efendi is described by one of the Ottoman 
historians as a man not devoid of intelligence and 
character. "Muftuzade Ahmed Efendi, fazil, mudekkik ve 
isinde hakqinas olup vakur ve hakim idi..., mevkifini 
muhafaza i<pin kavuk sallamasini bilenlerdendi(Cf. 
Uzunqar^ili, 0snnnli Tarihi, iv/ll, p. 504.
108. Choiseul-Gouffier io I.lontmorin, C. P. T., 176 (l787)> 
no. 25, 10 November 1787*
83.
r "1 109'that "[ilj veut absolument la guerre".  ^The sources offer
several comments on the relations existing between Ainslie and
those dignitaries who favoured the war. It must he admitted,
however, that these comments are to he found in sources
unfavourable to Ainslie. A despatch of the Russian ambassador
Bulgakow dated l/l2 February 1787 describes Yusuf Pa^a as over-
willing to listen to the advice of Ainslie, who flattered the
Grand Vizir with lavish praise.Choiseul-Gouffier, the
ambassador of France, writing on 3 August 1787> refers to^'*':
1*agitation perpetuelle du Ch. Ainslie qui dans la mfeme 
journ^e anime le vizir, le presse de faire la Guerre et 
court ensuite offrir bassement ses services a l^nvoye de 
Russie.
The same despatch contains a further passage of relevance here,
-  112 
declaring of the Grand Vizir, Yusuf Pa^a, that s
sa profonde ignorance et la fermete de son caractere qui
109. Choiseul-Gouffier to Montmorin, C. P* T., 176 (1787)* no. 14 
3 August 1787; cf. also the remark of Cevdet, Ta* rih, IV, p. 
indicating that under influence of public sentiment at 
Istanbul and of the attitude which the ambassadors of 
England and Prussia assumed, at this time, Yusuf Pa^a 
offered a firm resistance to the demands of Russia, even 
going so far as to claim the return of the Crimea to the 
Ottoman Empire - indeed this resolute attitude divided the 
dignitaries of the Porte into factions for and against war, 
the war-party being of course under his guidance and strong 
enough to overcome the pro-peace faction grouped around the 
Sultan.
110. Bulgakow to Catherine, in Sbornik, xlvii,p4199> no. Ill, 
l/l2 February 1787.
111. Choiseul-Gouffier to Montmorin, C. P. T., 176 (1787), no. 14 
3 August 1787.
112. ibid.
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jusqu* a present lfa bien servi l*ont entraine trop loin, 
les perfides conseils du Ch. Ainslie ont acheve de l'egarer 
et trop avance aujourd*hui pour reouler sans un danger 
certain, il sacrifie I'interet public a sa conservation 
personnelle et se decide pour le parti qui en reculant sa 
perte, lui permet encore lfesperance d*un succes.
A later despatch of Choiseul-Gouffier written on 25 August 1787
113adds yet another observation of interest :
nous ne pouvons plus douter Monsieur le Comte que ces deux 
Ministres n*ayent beaucoup influe sur les determinations 
violentes de la Porte, et le Grand Vizir dans un des 
muschav^r^s qui on precede la rupture, a dit formellement 
qu* il 6tait assure de Puissans secour. Cette assurance 
n*aurait cependant pu vaincre 1*opposition de piusieurs 
uhlema s*il n*y avait ajoute la veille de la derniere 
assemblee une somme de 80 mille Ducats de hollande 
distribues a ceux qufil avait ete impossible de persuader 
moins che rement♦
113. Choiseul-Gouffier to Montmorin, C. P* T., 176 (1787)? no. 19? 
25 August 1787; in attempting to determine how far the 
personal influence of Yusuf Pa^a contributed to the Ottoman 
decision in favour of war, due attention should be given to 
Ainslie*s despatch of 25 September 1787? reporting the 
substance of remarks which the Grand Vizir had made to him • 
and which indicated in fact that the Ottomans had but 
limited choice before them - i.e., either to yield without 
resistance to the Russian demands (and with the likelihood 
that further concessions would be asked of them in the not— 
too-distant future) or to go to v:ar in defence of Ottoman 
interests, however probable it was that recourse to arms 
would bring only ultimate defeat: ”at all Events the Porte 
is prepared for the worst - the Sword is drawn, nor can she 
now retract. Indeed her situation never can be worse, nor 
was it in her Choice to preserve the Peace, but by the 
cession of all the Provinces one after the other; at the 
caprice of a Woman ambitious of her neighbours; an assertion 
for the Truth of which, he {i.e., Yusuf PaqiaJ appealed to 
the just God and his Creatures.” (Ainslie to Carmarthen,
P. R. 0., P. 0. 78/8, no. 21, 25 September 1787)
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How far evidence of this kiiid should "be construed to mean 
that Ainslie gave active encouragement to that faction at the 
Porte which was resolved on war with Russia is somewhat difficult 
to determine, not least "because a large proportion of this 
evidence derives from sources anti-Ainslie in character; Ainslie*s 
attitude and conduct, during the months which preceded the advent 
of hostilities, must "be viewed in the light of the instructions 
sent to him from London on 19 December 1786 and received by him 
on 1st February 1787* The despatch of December enjoined on him 
two main duties. Of these duties, the first was that he should 
endeavour to counter the policies which Choiseul-Gouffier was 
pursuing at Istanbul in the name of France and which sought above 
all to bring the Turks to acceptance of mediation in their 
difficulties with Russia. The second charge laid on Ainslie 
urged that, in-pursuit of his anti-French objective, he should 
avoid all commitment of the British government to a serious 
intervention in the Ottoman—Russian confrontation. These 
instructions, while indicating in the positive sense the course 
that Ainslie was to follow at the Porte, represented at the same 
time a curb on his freedom of action. To oppose the aims of 
France meant in the prevailing context of affairs at Istanbul to 
hinder all approach towards effective mediation. One question can 
well be asked - though perhaps not answered - here: how far can 
an abstention from effective support of the principle of
86.
mediation be interpreted as an encouragement of the war-minded 
elements amongst the dignitaries at the Porte to enter into a 
new conflict ?
Even in 1786, and still more in 1787* Ainslie was under
repeated pressure from the Ottomans to undertake mediation
between the Ottomans and the Russians in the name of the British
government. The Grand Vizir Yusuf Pa^a made his request of
Ainslie on a number of occasions at this time."^^ Ainslie, of
course, was careful to inform Lord Carmarthen of the reiterated
115Ottoman request for mediation. * Moreover, in the face of the 
insistent queries of Yusuf Pa^a for news of the response from 
London, Ainslie was careful to underline for the Grand Vizir 
that a British acceptance, even if forthcoming, would not of 
itself be sufficient - a Russian acceptance, too, was essential 
for a formal and effective mediation to o c c u r . I t  is possible 
that Yusuf Pasa and his colleagues at times drew too much 
confidence from the words of Ainslie and even that Ainslie 
expressed himself on occasion with greater freedom than was 
perhaps desirable; for example, the ambassador of Prance,
114# See the remarks of Ainslie on this matter in his despatches: 
P. R. 0., P. 0. 78/7* no. 13, 10 June 1786; no. 16, 24 July 
1786; no. 18, 25 August 1786; and P. 0. 78/7* no. 6,
24 March 1787* no. 7* 7 April 1787#
115# Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., P. 0# 78/8, no. 15* 24 July 
1787 and no. 16, 9 August 1787#
116. ibid.
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Choiseul-Gouffier, was to observe not long before the outbreak
117of war that Ainslie :
pour faire sa cour au grand vizir et en obtenir quelques 
graces dont il fait un commerce public ne cesse d*exalter 
les forces reGoutables de l'Smpire et a ^te jusqu'a lui 
dire en presence d’une foule de t6moins que l*ann£e 
Ottomane manoeuvrait mieux qu*aucune escadre Anglaise.
At the same time the Ottomans sought from Ainslie reassurances
as to the attitude of the British government, should the Tsarina
Catherine II attempt to send a Russian squadron from the Baltic
to the Mediterranean, thus repeating the strategy which had been
undertaken in the conflict of 1768-74* Ainslie, acting on his
own initiative, was prompt to give the reassurance demanded of
130
him, and that in forthright terms ' :
117. Choiseul-Gouffier to Montmorin, C. P. T., 176 (1787)* no. 13* 
10 July 1787. The words of Choiseul-Gouffier should be 
considered, however, in conjunction with the subsequent 
statement which Ainslie included in his despatch to London 
dated 24 November 1787* and which runs as follows: ’’Permit 
me, My Lord, to repeat my most sincere acknowledgement for 
the very satisfactory manner in which Your Lordship has been 
pleased to contradict the insidious rumours circulated by 
those who in view to cover their own miscarriages, and in 
order to create injurious suspicions, have so awkwardly 
employed a miserable manoeuvre which, to this moment, subjects 
them to the ridicule of the Ottoman Cabinet. I am supposed to 
have held a language tending to encourage the Turks to think 
well of their own Force in comparison with that of Russia. It 
is true, My Lord, I ever thought it a duty incumbent on 
Foreign Ministers, to conduct themselves with discretion, and 
to avoid giving offence to the Courts where they reside. 
Consistently with this Rule, I have always spoken guardedly 
(particularly in publick) of the Ottoman Power, and of their 
Preparations carried on for upwards of fifteen months, both 
in Asia and Europe.” (see, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/8, no. 27,
24 November 1787)•
118. Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F„ 0. 78/8, no. 16, 9 August 
1787.
I answered that, in all cases Great Britain would strictly 
conform to the Laws of the most perfect neutrality: — that 
without knowing exactly either the Intention or Extent of 
our pretended armaments, I could venture to assure His 
Excellency [i.e., the Re*is Efendi Suleyman] that they in 
no Way regarded the Ottoman, or either of the Bordering 
Empires,
Statements of this kind perhaps encouraged the Ottomans to harden 
their attitudes towards Russia, ITone the less, if we can judge 
from his own words, Ainslie gave no war-inclined counsel to Yusuf 
Pa^a and his ministers at this time. Indeed, during the weeks 
just preceding the Turkish declaration of war, he was recommending 
to the Grand Vizir the advantages of restraint and moderation.
On 20 July 1737? while indicating that he had no formal author­
ization either from London or from St. Petersburg to act as 
mediator, Ainslie went so far as to declare to the Grand Vizir
in case I,was invited hy His Highness [i.e., Yusuf Pa^aJ, 
and By the Russian Minister Plenipotentiary [i.e., Bulgakow]. 
to a personal interference in their disputes, I should not 
hesitate in fulfilling the office of a mutual Friend to 
Both Courts; and forward, all in my Power the salutary 'dork 
of Peace; certain as I am, that this Conduct will meet, with 
my Royal Master*s Approbation.
Moreover, with war now threatening, Ainslie did not hesitate to
go Beyond his instructions of 19 December 1786, which Bade him
oppose the policies of France at the Porte; in the course of a
meeting with the Re*is Efendi held on 28 July 1787 he ventured
119* Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F# 0. 78/8, no. 15,24 July 
1787-
89.
to recommend that the Ottoman dignitaries should give some heed
to the counsel of Choiseul-Gouffier - a conversation that he
reported in his own despatch to London of 9 August 1787s "I took
the liberty to recommend Peace as the greatest of all Blessings,
and even advised due Attention to the Proposals made through the
120French Mission,"
It is worth noting that the British ambassador at Vienna,
Sir Robert Keith, wrote to London not long after the commencement 
of war, refuting the accusations made against Ainslie, On 29
August 1787 Keith addressed Lord Carmarthen in the following
. 121 terms :
Your Lordship will see what jealousy is entertained at 
Constantinople of the weight which Sir Robert Ainslie has 
acquired in the Ottoman Councils. I am sorry to find that 
the French Court lays hold of that pretext to insinuate 
here (and undoubtedly at Paris) that the haughty spirit of
the Turks is fomented by the King*s Ambassador. I am
perfectly convinced that the accusation is false, and I do
my utmost to give the lie to it, on every proper occasion.
I beg of Your Lordship to authorise me, without loss of 
time to hold a precise ministerial Language upon this 
Business in order to put a stop to all injurious suspicions.
Keith also assured the Austrian Chancellor Prince Kaunitz that
he considered the charge against Ainslie to be unfounded:
120. Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/8, no. 16,
9 August 1787.
121. Keith to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F. 0. 7/l4, no. 82, 29 August 
1787. See also despatch of Keith dated 1 September 1787* to 
his colleagues repeating his belief in the innocence of 
Ainslie.
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122I declared to Prince Kaunitz, in express terms on Friday 
last, that it was with real concern I heard the news of 
the unexpected Rupture. That an injurious Report had come 
to my Ears of the King1s Ambassador at Constantinople 
having fomented the haughty Spirit of the Turks. That I 
took upon me to assure Him, from the Knowledge I have of 
the instructions under which you [i.e., Ainslie] acted, 
and from the constant perusal of every one of your 
Dispatches to the King*s secretary of state, that that 
accusation from whatever quarter it came was absolutely 
false and groundless. Prince Kaunitz answered that He 
wished it might prove so. There our conversation ended.
The instructions to Ainslie formulated at London on 19 
December 1786 committed him to a line of conduct which made his 
position at Istanbul both delicate and, at least to some extent, 
ambiguous. Of these ambiguities the rival ambassadors and 
governments, as we have seen, took full advantage. The truth of 
the matter would seem to be that Pitt and his ministers, 
resentful of the fact that France had been able to win a new 
commercial agreement from Russia, and resenting also the fact 
that Russia had declined to renew with Great Britain the earlier 
commercial agreement of 1766, had determined that Ainslie should 
oppose the policies of France carried out at the Porte through 
her ambassador Choiseul-Gouffier. Such an interpretation must 
not, however, be urged too far - it does not, for example, 
warrant an inference that the authorities in London desired
122. Keith to Ainslie, P. R. 0., F. 0. 7/14, Confidential, 
4 September 1787*
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Ainslie, in opposing the attitudes of Choiseul-Gouffier, to
persuade the Turks to hegin a new war, A comment to he found in
a despatch of the French minister Montmorin to Choiseul-Gouffier,
123
dated 22 August 1787? is of relevance here :
II serait assez important M. de savoir si c,est par ordre 
de sa cour que M. le Ch. Ainslie travaille a porter les 
Turcs a la guerre et quels peuvent etre les motifs qu*il a 
donne aux personnes avec les quelles il a des rapports. A 
moins que l*Angleterre n’a^ / le dessin de mettre lfEurope en 
feu. Je ne vois pas ce qu’elle gagnerait a susciter une 
guerre a la Russie et dfun autre cote l'Imp. ' n'a pas 
hesoin d1employer un Ministre Anglais pour faire faire 
quelque fausse demarche aux Turcs.
Also of interest in this context is the later comment of the
United States ambassador to Versailles based on a conversation
that he had with the former ambassador of France, de Segur, in
the year 1791^2^s
The reason of England was (says Segur) that, being vexed 
with Russia for forming a treaty with France by which, 
among the other things, the principles of the armed 
neutrality are acknowledged, and for insisting on a like 
acknowledgement, in a proposed renewal of the treaty with 
England, she was in hopes of making a breach between France 
and her new ally, Russia, or her new ally the Turks.
123. Montmorin to Choiseul-Gouffier, C. P. T., 176 (1787)? 22 August 
1787; cf. also Archives Rationales, B7- Mar. 452? Supplement aux 
Nouvelles Extraordinaires de Divers Endroits, du Rumero LXXV, 
Extrait dfune lettre de Versailles du 10 Septembre; "L*opinion 
gen^rale est, que les-Anglais ont vivement excite le Ministere 
Ottoman a prendre cette resolution, afin de profiter de 
l*embarras de la Russie, et de lui dieter le Traite de Commerce, 
qufils veulent conclure avec elle. II est certain, que, si la 
Russie est attaquee, elle a grand besoin des Anglais, sur-tout 
pour ses Flottes, qui manquent d*officiers; et alors il faut 
bien qu1elle achete leur secours par quelque condescendances 
Ainsi raisonnent nos Speculateurs."
124. A. C. Morris, ed. The Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris 
(Minister of the United States to France), I (London,1899)? 
p. 373.
C H A P T E R  III
92
The Triple Alliance 
and the Turco - Prussian treaty (1788 - 1790)•
The diplomatic situation at Istanbul was to become more 
complex after the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war when new 
factors affecting the situation emerged, amongst which the 
influence of Prussia was not least important, A complex of 
events was to issue from that power1s new involvement in eastern 
Europe and the Ottoman Empire - events which through the influence 
of Ewart, the British ambassador in Berlin, were to draw in 
Britain involuntarily and to result in fresh instructions to 
Ainslie which afforded him the opportunity of an active role.
Presages of these events occurred during the autumn of 1737? when 
it became clear that Austria would soon be involved in hostilities 
against the Turks,
The Prussian minister Count Hertzberg wrote to Diez, the 
Prussian ambassador at the Porte, in November 1737> outlining 
certain ideas he had conceived in relation to the Ottoman Empire,*
1, Hertzberg to Diez, 20 November 1787? mentioned in J. W. Zinkeisen, 
Geschichte des osmanichen Reiches in Buropa, VI (Gotha, 1859)? 
p, 674; cf, W, Kalinka, "La Politique Prussienne en Orient a la 
fin du oiecle Dernier", in Revue des Deux Mondes, Ix (1883), p, 606,
The substance of these ideas can be summarized in a few words*
The Ottomans should cede to Austria the principalities of 
Moldavia and Wallachia, and to Russia the Crimea (already 
surrendered in 1783) and also Ochakov and Bessarabia* Prussia, 
Prance and the other powers of Europe would now guarantee the 
continued existence of the Ottoman state, south of the rivers 
Danube and Una, Furthermore, Russia should be induced to renounce 
all claims to control over the Kuban and Georgia and to refrain 
from intervention in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, 
Hertzberg was to elaborate his views in further despatches sent 
to Diez in the spring of 1738, Instructions dated 25 March urged 
Diez to do his utmost to hinder the Turks from making a sudden 
peace, and to secure from the Ottomans an acceptance of Prussian 
mediation.^
Still more explicit was the guidance offered to Diez in 
instructions dated 3 April 1788,^ The basic idea of Hertzberg 
was that Austria, in return for her acquisition of Moldavia and 
VJallachia, should cede a portion of her own territories, i,e,, 
Galicia, to Poland - a cession which, so Hertzberg believed, 
would enable Prussia to obtain for herself from Poland the two
2, Cf, Zinkeisen, op. cit,, VI, pp. 679-80; Kalinka, loc. cit., 
p. 667.
3. ibid*, p. 668; Zinkeisen, on. cit., VI, pp. 680-1.
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important towns of Danzig and Thorn, together with their 
dependent territories. This sequence of territorial exchanges 
represented indeed the foundation of his entire scheme.
Diez tried now to secure the approval and co-operation of 
the Porte in furtherance of the Prussian design. He was soon 
constrained, however, to inform Berlin that, so far as he could 
see, no effective progress would he made unless and until 
Prussia declared her readiness to assume a more positive 
attitude towards the Porte, i.e., to enter into an alliance 
with the Porte. The government at Berlin was not unwilling to 
accept a close involvement with the Turks - i.e., to move 
forward from mediation to alliance. None the less this willing­
ness to envisage a formal alliance with the Ottomans was subject 
to certain limitations.
Initially, Hertzberg seems to have envisaged the proposed 
commitment to the Ottomans as being merely defensive in 
character^ but was later to enlarge his conception of the 
alliance. The attack on Russia of the restless Swedish king, 
Gustavus III, in order to recover the lost trans Baltic
4. Hertzberg to Diez, 23 May 1789 mentioned in Zinkeisen, op. cit.,
VI, p. 762.
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territories of Sweden, led in July 1789 to the signing of a 
Turco-Swedish alliance. The slow progress of Diez*s negotiations 
with the Porte during 1788-89 now enabled Hertzberg to take 
cognizance of these new developments in elaborating a more 
ambitious policy towards the Ottomans. This policy was reflected 
in fresh instructions dated 18 September 1789 which empowered 
Diez to offer the Turks an offensive-defensive alliance, with a 
promise of Prussian direct participation in the war from the 
spring of 1790.^ The conflict went ill for the Turks in 1789? 
especially the campaign against the Russian forces. Hertzberg 
therefore urged Diez again and again at this time to bring his 
negotiations with the Porte to a successful conclusion. It was 
not for the side of Hertzberg alone now that Diez came under 
pressure. The Ottoman ministers sought to exact from Prussia 
the utmost possible advantage in favour of the Ottoman cause.^
Diez was at last able to secure an alliance between Prussia 
and the Porte, but only at the cost of going beyond the 
intentions of Hertzberg. This alliance, concluded on 31 January 
1790, imposed on Prussia the obligation which the government at 
Berlin was not unwilling to accept, i.e., war against Austria,
5. Cf. Zinkeisen, op. cit., VI, pp. 735-40.
6# iBid. 1 VI, pp. 727 ff.
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but also obliged her to fight Russia (a burden which those same
ministers found to be far less welcome). It also involved a
further obligation, that Prussia should give her armed support
to the Turks until even the Crimea was restored to Ottoman rule -
a prospect which had little chance of realization. Hertzberg,
writing on 12 March 1790, demanded of Diez on what grounds he
had ventured to involve Prussia in hostilities both against
Austria and Russia and to commit her to maintain the conflict
until the Ottoman reconquest of the Crimea, declaring that
Prussia was prepared for war with Austria but not with Russia
and stating that the restoration of the Crimea to the Ottomans
7
was an impossible enterprise. All that Hertzberg could now 
foresee was that the ratification of the alliance (due to be 
completed within five months) might perhaps be drawn out until 
a more favourable turn of events came to lighten the prospect 
for Prussia. An event of this order was indeed soon to occur.
The death of the Emperor Joseph II on 20 February 179C brought 
about a considerable change in the general context of the affair.
Another influence also of great importance made itself felt 
during the months when Diez was striving to give effect to 
Hertzberg1s scheme. The source of this influence was Joseph Ewart,
7. ibid., VI, pp. 753-54.
the British ambassador at Berlin. Ewart had risen to prominence 
through his role in the Dutch crisis in 1787* Holland had then 
been beset by internal dissention, in which one faction was pro- 
French (the so-called "Patriots") while the other (centring 
around the Stadtholder) inclined towards Great Britain for
g
assistance. Ewart, acting in accordance with the aspiration 
already expressed at London and exploiting the internal situation, 
had done much to secure in September 1787 a Prussian intervention 
in Holland, to avoid a possible French interference. This 
sequence of events led in August 1788 to the creation of the 
Triple Alliance embracing Great Britain, Holland and Prussia, 
and directed primarily against France. To Great Britain, always 
sensitive about the situation in Holland, the entente with 
Prussia at this time was a political and diplomatic advantage 
of a high order. Her continuing apprehension as to the aims of 
France, her sense of the benefit to be drawn and her reluctance 
to impair the entente go far to explain the careful consideration 
bestowed on Ewart’s representations and advice from Berlin. As 
to Ewart himself, his role in the Dutch affair had brought no 
small personal prestige and, no doubt, a firm conviction of the 
essential importance to England of the Prussian alliance and 
also perhaps of the need for a measure of compliance
8. See above p.
9towards the aspirations cf the Prussian government.
In a despatch dated 15 January 1788 Ewart informed London
of the scheme which Hertzberg had devised for an intervention
in the affairs of Eastern Europe. Ewart underlined to Pitt and
his ministers that Prussia, though prepared to see Russia gain
some territories at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, would
not allow Austria to make a similar acquisition, unless an
equivalent reward fell to herself, i.e., at the expense of
Poland.Somewhat less than two months later Ewart made known
to the British government the desire of Hertzberg that a close
co-operation should be established at Istanbul between Diez
and Ainslie, the Prussian and British ambassadors serving there.^
And indeed Ewart, without formal authorization from London, sent
a letter (6 April 1788) to Ainslie with the Prussian officer 
12
Von Goetz, then about to leave Berlin in order to join Diez at 
the Porte - a letter explaining that there should be, if possible 
no end to the war unless with the "joint mediation"^ of Prussia
9# Cf. A. U. Ward and G. P. Gooch, The Cambridge History of 
British Foreign Policy, I (London, 1922), pp. 176-82.
10. Ewart to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F. 0. 64/l3, no. 5> 15 January 
1788.
11. Ewart to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F. 0. 64/13, no. 16, 4 March 
1788.
12. Ewart to Ainslie, 6 April 1788* This letter can be found among 
Ewart Papers located in Edinburg University Library. Cf., Ewart 
to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F. 0. 64/l3, no. 23, 8 April 1788.
13• Ewart to Ainslie, 6 April 1788, in Swart Papers.
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and England, and also urging that Ainslie should co-operate 
with Diez to gain this objective.
Ewart was careful to inform London that in fact he had
communicated to Ainslie a despatch written to the Foreign
Secretary, Carmarthen, two days after the letter to Ainslie,
i.e., on 8 April 1788.^ Meanwhile, however, before the arrival
of this despatch from Ewart, Carmarthen had sent instructions
(dated 2 April 1788) to Ewart , ^  indicating that, while Pitt
and his ministers would be willing to see Ainslie co-operate
with Diez, their wish was to avoid all involvement in circum-
16stances which might lead to the extension cf hostilities :
With respect to the manner of making use of any influence 
which either court [i.e., London and Berlin] possesses at 
the Porte. It will be unquestionably His Majesty*s wish to 
enter sincerely and unreservedly into such a concerts but 
if QtheJ Proposal was meant to extend to any measures of 
actual Hostility under the present Circumstances against 
the two Imperial Courts, in order to form a Diversion in 
favour of the Turks, you must discourage such an idea to 
the utmost of Your Power*
In the present moment, our line seems to be that, of a 
strict neutrality that with respect to the Affairs of 
Turky it seems to be the interest of Prussia and Great 
Britain to promote an accommodation on reasonable Grounds 
and without too great sacrifices from the Porte.
14. Ewart to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F. 0. 64/13, no. 23, 8 April 
1788.
15* Carmarthen to Ewart, P. R. 0., F. 0. 64/l3, Secret and 
Confidential, no. 5, 2 April 1788.
16. ibid.
Ewart continued to set 'before the British government the advan­
tages of a joint Prussian-English mediation in the conflict 
between Russia and the Ottoman Empire* He was of course under 
pressure from Hertzberg to bring England to a more effective 
co-operation with Prussia* Reporting a discussion held with 
Hertzberg, Ewart made it clear in January 1789 that the Prussian 
minister laid claim to such a co-operation under the terms of 
the Triple Alliance concluded in August 1788 between England, 
Holland and Prussia, and therefore desired the British government 
to ensure that Ainslie supported at Istanbul the efforts of Diez*
The advice that Ewart sent to London was no more explicit
l8
than in his despatch to Carmarthen dated 28 May 1789* He now 
informed his government that Prussia had. resolved to enter into 
an alliance with the Ottoman Empire. Even if the aims of the 
Sultan were victorious, the ministers at Berlin would still 
strive for a mediation designed to safeguard the interests not 
of the Turks alone, but also of England and Prussia. Should the 
Turks be driven in defeat south of the Danube line, Prussia 
would be prepared to come to their assistance, using her strength 
to check Austria (no mention is made of the employment of
17- Ewart to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., P. 0. 64/l5» no. 5> 28 January 
1789-
18. Ewart to Leeds, P. R. 0., F. 0. 64/l5» Secret, no. 32,
28 Hay 1789.
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Prussian arms against Russia)# Ewart assured the British
government that Prussia, while eager to secure from London a
gezieral approval of her schemes, did not envisage the
involvement of Britain in whatever hostilities might arise from
19the further prosecution of the Prussian design. To reinforce 
his presentation of the Prussian scheme, Ewart referred in this 
despatch to a passage from the instruction which Carmarthen had 
written to him on 14 May 1788, quoting the actual words of 
Carmarthen"^:
there will he a favourable opening for the joint Mediation 
of His Majesty and the King of Prussia, and possibly if a 
Peace were to be made under their influence, a subsequent 
Guaranty of the Dominions of the Porte might make a part of 
the proposed System, and the Porte itself be included in the 
general Defensive Alliance. With this view, it would 
certainly be much to be wished that the Porte should be 
enabled to reject any Terms, which would materially weaken 
its future Means of Defence: or at least, that any accession 
of Strength to its Rivals should, if possible, be counter­
balanced by some proper equivalent to the King of Prussia.
Ewart also referred once more in the despatch of 28 May 1789 to
the obligations which England, Prussia and also Holland had
assumed towards one another under the terms of the Triple
Alliance negotiated in August 1788. Also in this despatch he
told Carmarthen that he had sent to Ainslie at Istanbul full
details about the latest instructions sent to Diez and
19* ibid.
20. ibid., see also Carmarthen to Ewart, P. R. 0., P. 0. 64/13, 
no. 8, 14 May 1788.
acquainting him with the Prussian intentions to make, at need,
21a formal "entente” with the Porte,
Carmarthen hastened now to curh somewhat the activities
of Ewart, which may have seemed to him over-zealous. Writing to
22
Ewart on 24 June 1789? he characterized the scheme of Hertzherg
as extending far "beyond the spirit of our treaty of Alliance,
which is purely of a defensive Nature", adding that Great Britain
under the provisions of the Triple Alliance, was in no wises
bound to support a system of an offensive Nature, the great 
end of which appears to be Aggrandisement rather than 
security, and which, from its very Nature, is liable to 
provoke fresh Hostilities instead of contributing to the 
Restoration of general Tranquillity,
He urged Ewart to avoid all danger that England might find
herself engaged in a war "on account of Turkey, either directly
or indirectly" - Ewart was to be "particularly careful, in Your
Language to prevent any intention of that Nature being imputed
to us." Carmarthen was indeed more concerned to impose an
23
attitude of restraint, since :
21. Ewart to Leeds, P. R. 0., P. 0. 64/l5> Secret, no. 32^28 May 
1789-
22. Leeds to Ewart, P. R. 0., P. 0. 64/15, no. 10, 24 June 1789#
23. ibid.
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I observe in one of Your Dispatches, you state the 
continuance of the northern war ( 24) as in some Degree 
advantageous, as it would he a powerful Diversion,_in case 
the Allies should take Part in the Turkish war. This I 
must again observe to you is an object by no means in our 
view.
As to a possible guarantee in the future of the Ottoman
territories, Carmarthen thought that it would be inappropriate
to envisage such a commitment to active negotiations before an
25
end of the Ottoman-Russian war had been set in train.
The war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia had begun on
14 August 1787* Carmarthen wrote to Ainslie on 9 October,
defining the attitude which the ambassador was to observe in
relation to the conflict, Ainslie, in respect of a possible
26
mediation in the war, was to adhere to :
the answer you have already given Ti.e., to the TurksJ, 
with great Discretion, namely, thax Great Britain can by 
no means interfere in that Dispute, or offer any Mediation ' 
upon it, or even interfere any such Mediation, but upon the 
common application of both Powers.
Ainslie, on 10 October, - almost at the same moment - was writing
27
to Carmarthen in London. He assured the English minister that 
the Grand Vizir Yusuf Pa^a, had declared himself unwilling to 
accept a mediation unless Great Britain acted as one of its
24* Russo-Swedish war which began in July 1788.
25. Leeds to Ewart, P. R. 0,, P. 0. 64/15? no. 10, 24 June 1789*
26. Carmarthen to Ainslie, P. R. 0., P. 0. 78/8, no. 3,9 October 
1787.
27# Ainslie to Carmarthen, F. R. 0., P. 0. 78/8, no. 22,
10 October 1787.
members. The French ambassador Choiseul-Gcuffier was still
seeking to secure for Prance an official invitation to mediate
between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. According to Ainslie,
Choiseul-Gouffier was also seeking to weaken the English
influence at the Porte. Ainslie believed that the French
ambassador was attempting to persuade the Turks that England,
as she had done during the years 1768-1774, might well give
assistance once more to Russia, should the Tsarina decide to
send a naval squadron from the Baltic to the Mediterranean. It
is not clear how far Choiseul-Gouffier went in this endeavour,
but he did at least suggest to the Kapudan, Hasan Pasa, that
the Turks obtain from Ainslie a formal written assurance of
2 8England*s intentions. The Kapudan Pa?a at once hastened to 
make the request of Ainslie - a request which the English 
ambassador declined to comply with by submitting a written 
statement, while assuring the Kapudan Pa^a of his readiness to 
renew the verbal declaration that he had made to the Ottoman mini 
ster on a number of occasions. Ainslie indeed, even before this 
moment, had characterized the attitude of Choiseul-Gouffier over 
the question of a possible naval aid from England to Russia as 
a manoeuvre intended Mto destroy our Influence, — to alarm the
28. Choiseul-Gouffier to Montmorin, C. P. T., 176 (1787), no. 29, 
28 December 1787*
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Divan - and to favour their Endeavours for a Restoration of
Peace, or at least, of procuring a Cessation of Hostilities 
29with Russia’1 •
The influence of Ainslie at the Porte was called into 
question to some extent at this time through the existence of 
sharp differences of opinion and attitude amongst the Ottoman 
dignitaries. Not long after the outbreak of war the Kauudan, 
Hasan Pa^a, had returned from Cairo to Istanbul. It would seem 
that, arriving at Istanbul in November 1787? he viewed without 
enthusiasm and even with open disfavour the decision to enter 
upon a new conflict with Russia.^
A brief interval of friction now ensued amongst the high 
officials of the Porte, during the course of which the Re*is 
Efendi, Suleyman, an advocate of the war, lost his appointment 
in favour of Ra^id Efendi. At the time Choiseul-Gouffier, making
29. Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/8, no. 28,
10 December 1787*
30. Cf. W. Eton, A Survey of the Turkish Empire (London, 1799)? 
p.446 ("Among the Turks themselves it [i.e., the War] was 
regarded, by every man of information, as rash and impolitic; 
and the great Captain - pasha, Gazi - Hassan, was in the 
highest degree offended at the proceeding. The declaration of 
war took place while he was absent in Egypt.")5 see also Dedem 
von de Gelder, Memoires du general von de Dedem de Gelder, 
1774-1825, ed., Elisabeth Lecky (Paris, 1900); I* H. 
Uzunparsili*s article "Hasan Pasa" in Islam Ansiklooedisi 
(Istanbul, 1950), p.322.
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use of his own contacts in the Ottoman Court, was seeking to
"bring about the dismissal of the Grand Vizir, Yusuf Pa^a.^
These developments might indeed have injured the influence of
32
Ainslie at the Porte, Such an outcome, however, was not to 
occur, Ainslie himself summarized the end result of these 
frictions in a despatch that he wrote to Lord Carmarthen on 25 
January 1788s
All the Intrigues to overturn the Vizir have only served 
to advance his Credit, now greater than ever in the 
Seraglio, in the Corps of the Ulema, and with the Public,
In the same proportion, the Capitan Bashaw, who grasped at 
Influence, has lost Ground. He has even been advised by 
the Sultan to limit his Attention to the important Concerns 
of the Naval Department; for some Time at least, he will 
interfere little in Politicks of the Porte; who now seem 
invariably fixed on the Recovery of the Crimea... I am not 
a little embarrassed how to act in the present delicate 
situation between the Vizir and the Capitan Bashaw. They 
certainly are not Enemies; but the latter, who is as
31# Cf. Choiseul-Gouffier to Montmorin, C. P. T., 176 (1787),
no. 27, 10 December 1787; no. 29, 28 December 1787; 178 (1788), 
no., 2, 25 January 1788? no. 3, 11 February 1788.
32. Cf. Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F* 0. 73/9? no. 1,
10 January 1788: "The old stoiy of my Influence has been 
received, in so much that the Sultan, v;ho truly esteems his 
Vizir, told him - fYour Friend though certainly a worthy man 
is nevertheless a Foreign Agent, and may have an Interest to 
deceive you.* He was answered, that I had inveriably recommended 
Peace, nay had advised attention to the Proposals through France 
for preventing a War."
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ambitious as covetous, aims at universal influence and has 
of late fomented dangerous Councils.^
The course of events was further complicated when, during 
the winter of 1787-88, it became clear that Austria might enter 
the war on the side of Russia in accordance with the terms of 
the agreement made between the Emperor Joseph II and the Tsarina
A
Catherine II in 1781. The prospect was sufficient to alarm the
dignitaries of the Porte and to heighten the differences of
attitude and interest existing amongst them. A despatch of
Choiseul-Gouffier written on 10 November 1787 threw some light
35on the situation :
/ /
on attend ici, avec une vive inquietude, la decision de
33. Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., P. 0. 78/9» no. 3, 25 
January 1788. Another factor tending no doubt to secure the 
continuance of English influence amongst the Ottomans was 
the readiness of Ainslie to facilitate the flow of munitions 
of war from the English merchants to the armed forces of the 
Sultan, Cf., e.g., his despatch dated 25 September 1787, 
where the ambassador writes about "the Execution of a 
Commission given by the Porte to our merchants, amounting to 
a million of Piastres for Ropes, anchors, nails, Tin, Gun 
Powder, Iron, Cannon and Balls, Marters and Shells, and if 
possible, three Ships, to serve as Frigates. HeQi.e., Yusuf 
Pa^a ][ assured me, and I am convinced with Truth, that the 
Preference had been solicited both by the French and Swedes, 
which he reserved for us, from his sincere Wish to augment, 
as much as possible, the Friendship and Intercourse between 
the two nations - a Disposition I did not fail to encourage 
all in my Power." (P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/8, no. 27, 25 September 
1787).
34. See on this agreement: Isabel de Madariaga, "The Secret 
Austro-Russian Trea.ty of 1781" in The Slavonic Review XXXVIII 
(1959-1960), pp. 114-45.
35* Choiseul-Gouffier to Montmorin, C. P. T., 176 (1787), no. 25, 
10 November 1787*
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l’Empereur £i.e., Joseph II]. Deja les Ministres Ottomans, 
revenu de leur premihre ivresse, commenoent a redouter les 
suites de l'incendie qu’ils ont allume, et chacun d*eux 
cherche a se justifier en rejettant sur ses confreres le 
"blame dfune precipitation dont ils ne font cependant encore 
qu^entrevoir le danger. Le Reis Effendi £ i.e., Suleyman 
Feyzi] pour separer sa cause, s'il est possible, de celle 
du Grand Vizir feint de se jeter dans mes "bras, maudit 
lfambassadeur d'Angleterre, ses intrigues, ses mensonges et 
lfaveuglement de Yusuf Pasha [i.e., the Grand Vizir]. Les 
Gens de loi a aui j’ai fait parvenir le resultat des 
Demarches de M. de Segur, se plaignent hautement qu*on n'en 
ait pas attendu le succes; et le Mufti £i.e., Ahmed Azmi 
Efendi] a m§me ose dire que pour obtenir son Fetva, on lui 
avait fait un faux expose des ressources de l’Empire et des 
secours que promettaient certaines Puissances etrangeres.
None the less the prevailing sentiment at the Porte was for a
continuation of the war whether or not Austria entered it.
Ainslie, writing to Carmarthen on 24 November 1787? defined the
intentions of the Porte in the following words — "the Porte
professes great Respect for the Imperial Courts and even resolves
to give no just Cause of Offense; she declares that, in case of
an unprovoked Rupture, she will trust to the Justice of her Cause,
and defend Herself as well as she can”. The judgment ascribed
to the Kapudan Pasa, Hasan, in a despatch of Choiseul-Gouffier
"3 »7
(28 December 1737), can perhaps be taken as a guide to the
36. Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/8, no. 27, 24
November 1787 5 Ainslie on 10 January 1788, wrote once more to
Carmarthen in similar terms: "No just cause of Complaint must 
be given to the Emperor £ ± .e., Joseph 113 but if He attacks, 
The Porte must defend Her Rights and trust to Providence for
Success over all Enemies. In short, Peace is made now to depend
on the Evacuation of the Crimea and it is most probable this 
will prove the permanent Resolution." (see P. R. 0., F. 0.
78/9, no. 1, 10 January 1788).
37. Choiseul-Gouffier to Montmorin, C. P. T., 176 (1787), no. 29,
28 December 1787-
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feeling then dominant amongst the Ottoman officials. Choiseul- 
Gouffier indicated in this despatch the verdict of Hasan Pasa 
on the readiness of Yusuf Pa^a to "begin a conflict with Russia 
"qu'il n’avait que trop ecoute des conseils au moins inutiles,
✓ ✓ N A
que puisqu’il avait declare a la Guerre son unique ohjet devoit
etre de la commencer", (i.e., pursue it with vigour). Ainslie
was to define the views of the Kapudan Paga in not dissimilar
terms. He informed London in,a despatch dated 10 January 1788
that "the Kapudan Pashaw sees great Danger in retreating, and
still advises perseverance in a War undertaken with Justice and
39founded on motives of Religion."
The situation at the Porte was to undergo a further - and 
important - change with the continuing deployment of Prussian 
ambitions at Istanbul during the course of 1788. As noted 
earlier,^ Evrart, the English ambassador at Berlin, wrote to 
Ainslie on 6 April 1788 informing him of the schemes of the 
Prussian minister Hertzberg. Ewart, after referring in this 
letter to "the general intimate cooperation established between 
Great Britain and Prussia", defined the main object in view as 
"to induce the Porte to accept no proposal whatever £jfor the
38. ibid.
39* Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/9, no. 1, 10 January 
1788.
40. See above p. 1?.
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termination of warj, without the concurrence of the two Courts."
At the same time Ewart indicated to Ainslie that Prussia would
assume a posture, sufficient perhaps to prevent Austria from
turning her force against the Turks and indeed would he willing
to resort at need to "an armed mediation" on behalf of the
Ottomans. He also informed Ainslie that Diez was to receive
instructions enjoining him to take Ainslie into his confidence,
the objective of the other two Courts at London and Berlin being
41to secure to themselves a joint mediation in the war.
On 16 May 1788, Lord Carmarthen, already aware that Ewart 
had written directly to Ainslie, sent new instructions to 
Istanbul.^ Carmarthen recommended now that Ainslie should 
establish a more confidential contact with Diez than he had 
enjoyed hitherto. At the same time Lord Carmarthen indicated that 
the British government was not unfavourable towards the idea of 
a joint mediation of Prussia and Britain. He was careful, 
however, to urge on Ainslie the need for considerable restraint. 
Carmarthen seems to have viewed with some reserve the motives 
and objectives hidden behind the schemes of the Prussian minister 
Hertzberg. He informed Ainslie therefore that the British
41. Ewart to Ainslie, Ewart Papers, 6 April 1788.
42. Carmarthen to Ainslie, P. R. 0., P. 0. 78/9, no. 6, 16 May 
1788; cf. Rose, op. cit., pp. 494-5.
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government had no wish to he committed to the ambitions of 
Prussia beyond the bounds of a joint mediation. The entire 
passage is of particular interest in view of the subsequent
. 43
course of events :
My chief motive for writing to day is to inform Your 
Excellency of His Majesty’s pleasure that you should 
endeavour to establish the most confidential intercourse 
with the Prussian Minister at the Porte, at the same time  ^
that you conduct yourself with your wanted caution in j O  
respect to such plans as he may wish you to assist him in 
beyond the general object of a joint mediation of this 
Court and that of Berlin with a view to terminate the 
present hostilities. I have good reason to suppose that 
the Prussian Minister has instructions respecting different 
modes of carrying on the war which he is orderd to 
communicate to the Ottoman Ministers and perhaps some 
eventual stipulation to recommend as conditions of Peace 
which it may not be necessary or expedient for us to 
discuss at present, and on which it would be imprudent for 
this Country to be at all committed. The admitting 
England and Prussia as mediators is a very desirable object 
and Your Excellency will not fail to encourage it as far as 
possible in the minds of the Turkish Ministers.
The difference in content between Carmarthen’s instructions 
to Ewart (dated 14 May 1788)^ and his instructions to Ainslie 
(dated 16 May 1788) is notable. A possible explanation is not far 
to seek. Carmarthen, in view of the great importance which the 
British government attached to the Prussian connection, had no 
wish to give offence to the court at Berlin - no doubt he sought 
therefore to frame his advice to Ewart in terms not unfriendly
43* Carmarthen to Ainslie, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/9, no. 6, 16 May 1778. 
44* See above, a quotation from this document p. /Oj.
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to the desires of Prussia. No such prudent restraint was 
required of him when he communicated with Ainslie at Istanbul - 
he might well feel himself free to express his own sense of 
unease at the possible implications of the Hertzberg scheme and 
to warn Ainslie of the need for caution in his envisaged co­
operation with Diez, the Prussian ambassador at the Porte. 
Ainslie, answering Carmarthen’s despatch on 1 July 1788, assured 
the Foreign Minister that he would improve his connection with
Diez to "the most confidential Intercourse" and do his best to
45promote "a Cessation of Hostilities." J Early in August 1788, 
Ainslie was to inform Lord Carmarthen that, through Von Goetz 
(travelling under the assumed name of Schmit), there had come 
to him "a very explicit letter from Mr. Ewart", adding that he 
would fulfil the request of Ewart "to the Extent of my 
Instructions."^
The fall of Ochakov, in December 1788, brought the campaign 
of that year to an unfavourable close for the Ottomans. To the 
Prussian authorities in Berlin it seemed that this serious 
reverse might well induce amongst the ministers of the Sultan a 
more compliant frame of mind. It was their hope that Diez would 
now press forward-with increased vigour in his efforts to secure
45. Ainslie to Carmarthen/ P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/9, no. 22, 1 July 
1788.
46. Ains lie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F. 0, 78/9, no* 29, 8 August 
1788.
for Prussia a role of mediator in the conflict between the
47Ottoman Empire and Russia, Not until 9 February 1789 was Diez 
able to secure a formal audience with the Ottoman ministers at 
the Porte, an audience the importance of which was underlined 
by the presence not only of the Re* is Efendi, Ra^Id, and of the 
Beglikgi, but also of the Kapudan Pa^a, Hasan, representing the 
Sultan and of the Kazi-yasker of Anatolia,, *Aziz Efendi, 
representing the 1 ulema. The discussion centred around two main 
points: whether Diez should receive permission to go to the 
Grand Vizir Yusuf Pa^a, then in winter quarters with the Ottoman 
army at Rus^uk on the Danube; and whether the Porte should 
undertake not to make peace without the mediation of Prussia,
The Re*is Efendi, Ra^Id, informed Diez that the office of media­
tion would not be assigned to Prussia unless that state entered 
into a formal alliance with the Porte, He also informed Diez 
that such an alliance must include a Prussian acceptance of the 
Ottoman conditions for peace: amongst them, the return of the 
Crimea to the Ottoman Empire; the return also of the conquests 
which the Austrians and Russians had made at the expense of the 
Turks during the present war; the exclusion of Austria and
Russia from the navigation of the Black Sea; and the inclusion
48of Sweden in the projected peace. Diez had received from Berlin
47* Zdnkeisen, on. cit., VI, p. 704*
48. ibid., pp. 710-11.
no instructions empowering him to commit- Prussia to such a 
course, and he therefore declared himself unahle to make an 
agreement of this kind with the Porte. The most that he was 
able to obtain after further negotiations in a conference held 
on 16 February was the following vague and unprofitable 
solutions: the Porte was willing to promise not to end the war 
without the mediation of Prussia; but should another European 
state offer to the Ottoman Empire advantageous terms for an
end of hostilities, then the Porte should be free, at need, to
49exploit such an offer in its own best interest. The Porte, in
fact, as yet a third meeting with the Ottoman ministers made
made clear on 20 March, was prepared at this time to offer
Prussia not an obligatory, but only a provisional, role of 
50mediation. It had become evident that the Porte would allow 
Prussia no decisive voice in the negotiation for the future 
peace, unless Prussia entered a formal alliance, offensive as 
well as defensive, with the Ottoman Empire against Austria, and 
Russia.^
*
Choiseul-Gouffier was to observe in a despatch dated 1 
January 1789 that uLfAmbassadeur d’Angleterre et celui de
49* ibid., pp. 713-71^ 
50. ibid., pp. 715-17* 
51* ibid., p. 718.
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Holland© agissent a la suite de l'envoye de Prusse et aussi
vivement que lui leur Dragomans se concertent tout soir et matin
pour assieger les Ministres de la Porte, tandis que leur emissaires
vont exciter secretement les gens de loi [/i.e., the 'ulema]
His words would seem, however, to over-estimate the degree of
co-operation existing between Ainslie and Diez* Even before the
fall of Ochakov in December 1788 Ainslie, when writing to London,
had been less than enthusiastic in his observations about Diez.
On 15 September 1788 he noted for the benefit of Carmarthen that :
^DiezJ went so far as to saj' peevishly, that my Court took 
no other Part in the present war than wishing to secure the 
mediation for Peace in Conjunction with the Court of Berlin, 
which sufficiently accounts for his remaining reserved 
respecting all other Business, although He continues to 
affect a great Intimacy, in which I also find my Accounts*
A later despatch of Ainslie dated 22 October 1788 also refers to
Diez in terms which are a curious combination of compliment and
54criticism* Ainslie now informed Lord Carmarthen that : '
a particular Intimacy, and on my Part, a very cordial 
Regard has long existed between me and the Prussian minister 
who independent of an extravagant share of national Pride, 
and personal Reserve, which I have no doubt will be removed 
by Experience, is a most worthy, agreeable and veiy well 
informed Gentleman.
Ainslie noted in a later despatch to London of 15 February that
52* Choiseul-Gouffier to Montmorin, C* P. T*, 179 (1789), no. 11,
1 January 1789*
53# Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0*, F* 0* 78/9» no. 35? 15 
September 1788.
54. Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0*, F. 0. 78/9, no. 40, 22 
October 1788.
Diez had failed to acquaint him with the substance of his
discussions with the dignitaries of the Porte, held on 9
February 1789* Ainslie observed that so far as he could discover
the discussion between Diez and the Ottoman officials had
examined the possible establishment of a Prussian-Ottoman alliance
which Poland and Sweden would later be asked to join. He added,
however, that the Sultan 1Abd-ul-hamid I had been inclined to
urge the inclusion of England and Holland (co-members with
Prussia in the Triple Alliance of August 1788) in the projected
"entente11 A further despatch of Ainslie dated 22 February 1789
makes it clear that Diez did not communicate to him the result
of his second meeting with the officials of the Porte held on
16 February 1789* Ainslie remarks that "as before [Diez] has not
56communed with me upon the subject of the Meeting", noting also
that Diez had held a similar reserve towards the Dutch ambassador
R7
(i.e., the third member of the Triple Alliance of 1788). None
the less in order not to prejudice the eventual attainment of
that joint Anglo-Prassian mediation which had been recommended
to his attention in the instructions prepared for him from
58London on 16 May 1788, Ainslie was careful to give no hint in
55. Ainslie to Carmarthen P. H. 0., F. 0. 78/10, no. 7, 15 
February 1789*
56. Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/lO, no. 8, 22 
February 1789-
57® ibid,
58. See above pp. !10 — 11®
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public of the lack of effective co-operation existing between 
Diez and himself# Ainslie was of course mindful of the need for
restraint and caution which the instructions of 16 May 1788 had
n 59enjoined on him# Writing on 22 January 1789 he was to declare :
the Prussian Envoy has Pursuits which he endeavours to hide 
from me, which I shall if possible discover without exposing 
either of them, but I shall at all Events be particularly 
watchful in order that my Court shall not be committed by 
any Steps or even the most distant Insinuations beyond the 
Letter and Sense of my Instruction.
The sequence of moves and counter-moves among the ambassadors 
at the Porte was frustrated owing to the current serious friction 
among the officials and dignitaries surrounding the Sultan. 
Choiseul-Gouffier was to declare in a despatch dated 14 January 
1789 that "Jamais la Cour Ottomane n*avait et£ divisee en autant 
de partis, qui cherchant tous a s'emparer de 1*esprit du 
Souverain, le faisaient sans cesse varier dans ses resolutions#"^ 
The ill success of the Ottoman compaign in the Black Sea during 
the course of 1788 - operation involving both the Crimea, the 
importance of the Ochakow fortress - heightened the rivalries 
already existing amongst the dignitaries at the Porte. Hasan Pa^a, 
the Kapudan, returned to Istanbul in November 1788 with no
59. Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/lO, no. 4? 22 
January 1789*
60. Choiseul-Gouffier to Montmorin, C. P. T., 179 (1789)? no. 2,
14 January 1789*
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positive result achieved from his naval operations against the
forces of the Tsarina. His lack of success would seem indeed to
have diminished his credit at Istanbul. He was reluctant to have
contact with the Christian ambassadors, even with his friend
Ainslie, who was moved to describe this reluctance as ,fa certain
61Proof that he does not enjoy his former Credit." A letter to
the Kapudan Pa^a from the Grand Vizir Yusuf Pa^ »a, then absent
from Istanbul as ser! asker (i.e., commander-in-chief) of the
Ottoman armed forces on the Danube, indicates that the Seyh-ul-
islam and the Sadir *azam Ka1im—iriakam of the moment had sought
to obtain from the Sultan an order deposing Hasan Pasa from 
62office. Ainslie referred again to the tensions amongst the
6 3
Ottoman officials in a despatch dated 15 February 1789 s
I shall continue to pay Court to all the Ottoman Ministers, 
but particularly to the Kaimacam now strictly connected 
with the Grand Admiral, who actually avowes his Enmity to 
my worthy Friend the Vizir whom He accuses of reprehensible 
Negligence, particularly for the defence of Oczakow, which 
last, he attributes to a design of ruining his own 
Reputation.
The British ambassador indeed described Hasan Pa^a as being 
engaged during these first months of 1789 in an attempt,
61. Ainslie to Carmarthen,.?. R. 0., F. 0. 78/9? no. 47?
15 December 1788.
62. Yusuf Pa^a to Hasan Pa^a, X Cumada E 1203/29 January 1789?
I. H. Uzunpar^ili*s article "Tarihde Vesikaciligin Ehemm.iy- 
etine dair Kucuk bir Misal, in Belleten, II (1938), pp. 373-78.
63* Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/10, no. 7?
15 February 1789*
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ultimately unsuccessful, to bring about the dismissal of Yusuf 
Pa^a^^:
The Captain Pashav: has failed in his attempt to overthrow 
the Vizir, personally supported by the soldiery who cannot 
bear his competition on account of his violence and 
averice. To that course may in a great measure be 
attributed the failure of the expedition against the Crimea 
last summer, and the loss of Oczakow by the absolute 
Refusal of the command of the troops collected on the coast 
of Asia to serve under his Command and the Destruction of 
the Camp at Ismail.
The true situation underlying the intrigues of the Ottoman
dignitaries is perhaps to be found in a despatch which Ainslie
wrote to Carmarthen on 8 March 1789* Ainslie underlines in this
despatch the emergence of his friend the Grand Vizir as victor
over his rivals, the downfall of the chief author of intrigue,
and also the involvement of the French ambassador Choiseul-
Gouffier, intent now as before to fulfil the instructions sent
6s
to him from Versailles
66Yesterday, my Lord, the Kaimacham Seid Mehemmed Pashaw,
64* Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/IO, no. 9? 1 March 
1789; see also, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/lO, no. 8, 22 February 
1789> where the British ambassador also refers to the fact 
that the Grand Vizir stands "very high in the opinion of the 
Sultan and of the Troops in general."
65. Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/10, no. 10,
8 March 1789*
66. It would seem that Ainslie has made a mistake here. The 
Ottoman sources indicate that the ka! im—niakam dismissed at 
this juncture was in fact named Mustafa (cf., Edib, Ta*rib, 
in Istanbul University Library MS., No. 3320, f. 45 a—b); 
see also Cevdet, Taf rib, IV, p. 221 (following most probably 
the Chronicle of Edib), Edib, however, does not mention a 
Kapu Kethudasi named Safid Beg in connection with this 
dismissal, Edib, Tajrih, f. 45* "b*
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was deposed, and "banished to Limnos. He is succeeded by 
the Kiaja 67 Bey Kagi Salih Aga, now created Pashaw of 
three Tails, and Ibrahim Effendi made Kiaja Bey. These two 
last are Creatures of the Grand Vizir’s who, it is now clear, 
has regained all his former influence* The deposed minister 
is accused, probably with great reason, of having fomented 
the misintelligence between the Vizir, and the Grand Admiral, 
in view to ruin them both, and occupy the first Place; also 
of having delayed the preparations, and the Funds for the 
pay of the Troops; in short of having, to the utmost of his 
power, stimulated a general discontent, in order to attain 
his ends. The French are in a scrape with the Vizir’s 
Friends, being accused, and not without cause, of having 
seconded the Caimacam, who in Fact consulted that Ambassador, 
and to the utmost favoured the Interest of his Court. The 
truth however is, that the Ottoman Minister was well-paid for 
his Partiality, and the Ambassador had no other Choice.
The Sultan Abd-ul-hamid I died on 7 April 1789* Little is
said about him in the sources relating to the years now under
review. The few brief and scattered references to him suggest
that he was not confident about the outcome of the war against
Austria and Russia. His lack of confidence was increased as a
result of the fall of Ochakov to the Russians in December 1788,
and is well revealed in a letter he wrote to the Grand Vizir
Yusuf Pa^a, which underlined his doubt over the capacities of
68
the Ottoman ministers charged with the conduct of the war.
67# See glossary.
68. Cf. Uzunt^ar^ili, on. cit., IV/l, pp. 541-2; see also
Bulgakow to Catherine, in Sbornik, xlvii, pp. 163, 166, no. 
100, l/l2 June 1736? p. 174, no. 105, l/22 September 1786; 
p. 204, no. 113, 22 July/2 August 1787«
Le- _l a
Par different was the attitude of the new Sultan Selim III
who now ascended the throne, Ainslie, writing on 7 April 1789,
"believed that the change of sovereign might well result "in
prolonging the war, and prosecuting it with redoubled efforts,
69
in order to try the Fortune of the new Sultan." Selim III in
70the first weeks of his reign even proposed s
to transfer His Residence to Adrianople, from whence he 
could better direct the Military operations, assist the 
Armies with necessaries, and in case of need visit the 
Gamps. This spirited advice was admired by all, but 
strongly combatted by the Mufty, and the Creatures of the 
Valide, who with great reason trembles at the dangers to 
which Youth, Inexperience, and a great share of personal 
courage, must needs expose her only Son,
Choiseul-Gouffier emphasized the enthusiasm of the new Sultan,
attributing to Selim III the belief that nothing was impossible
for the Muslims fighting on his behalf: "avec le souverain tout
I1Empire est change." Choiseul-Gouffier noted also that when the
Re1is Efendi, Rasid pointed out the difficulties of war against
two powerful empires (i.e., Austria and Russia), Selim III "lui
a brusquement repondu, tout cela' etait vrai le mois dernier,
7 T_
mais oubliez-vous que c'est moi qui regne aujourd1hui."
During the winter of 1788-89, when friction was strong
amongst the Ottoman ministers, Ainslie was concerned to maintain
69# Ainslie to Carmarthen, P"! R.~"oT,~P. 0. 78/10, no. 15, 7 April 1789# 
70. Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R* 0., P. 0. 78/lO, no.23, 22 May 1789* 
71* Choiseul-Gouffier to Montmorin, C. P. T*, 179 (1789), no.19,
8 May 1789*
his own influence at the Porte* The credit of his old friend
the Kapudan, Hasan Pa^a, being called into question for a time,
Ainslie did not fail to seek favour with those officials who
opposed the Grand Vizir, Yusuf Pa^a, and above all with the
Kafim-makam Mustafa, a figure whose great importance is reflected
in Ainslie1 s comments noted above (p.ii?)* Other factors, too,
no doubt helped to sustain the influence of Ainslie# As noted
above, the Grand Vizir Yusuf Pa^a in September 1787 (i* ©•* soon
after the beginning of the hostilities against Russia) had
invited the English merchants to supply the Porte with various
72
munitions of war# This invitation from the Grand Vizir had not
remained unanswered# The English merchants trading in the Levant
now transmitted to the Turks considerable supplies of war
material, e#g#, of gunpowder. A Board of Trade document of
August 1790 indicated the amount of gunpowder exported from
England during the years 1780-90, the total for 1789 rising to
73the notable figure of 614, 300 lbs. It is also perhaps worth 
noting that the Turkish Archives contain several memoranda 
which Ainslie submitted to the Porte - memoranda claiming the
72# See above p# [ 0 1 »
73. See, P# R. 0., 3*T; Custom House, 11 August 1790. The super­
scription on this document contains no reference to"the 
Ottoman Empire. None the less, two considerations support 
the inference that it does in fact refer to that empire:
(a) the fact that the document is included amongst other 
papers relating to the Levant Trade; (b) the presence, at 
the foot of the document, of a note declaring that "during 
these years Salt Petre was exported to Turkey#'1
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payment of various monies due to an English merchant named 
Humphrey, who had supplied the Turks with munitions of war.^
At the same time the English merchants sold a number of warships 
to the Porte - an English vessel of war, two French frigates
captured in the recent conflict with France, and an American
75 —sloop# Also in January 1789 the Grand Vizir Yusuf Pa^a urged
the Kapudan Pa?a to use some of his personal resources for the
V 6
purchase of the war vessels, and indeed the Kapudan Paga now
contributed towards the purchase price which the English
77merchants demanded of the Porte#
The accession of the new Sultan, Selim III, induced 
Choiseul-Gouffier to urge once more on the Turks an acceptance 
of French mediation with a view to terminating the war# Writing 
to Versailles on 8 May 1789, Choiseul-Gouffier described how
74* Cf#, (l) Ba^bakanlik Arsivi: Cevdet Hariciye, no# 7277 >
7 Receb 1204/23 March 17905 (2) B. A; Ali Emiri, Selim III,
no. 1364, 25 Muharrem 1204/15 October 1790; ("3) B# A.: Ali 
Emiri, Selim III, no. 7071. 12 Rebil II 1204/19 December 1790, 
each of these documents bears Ainslie*s seal#
75* Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0#, F# 0# 78/10, no# 9, 10 March
17895 no. 11, 15 March 1789* Choiseul-Gouffier, writing in
January 1789, had described the proposed role of warships to 
the Turks as being, for Ainslie, "un moyen de se faire 
valoir." (Choiseul-Gouffier to Montmorin, C# P. T#, 179 
(1789), no. 14, 29 January 1789)
76# Yusuf Pa^a to Hasan Pa?a, loc# cit., in note 62, above#
77* The role of the Kapudan Pasa in this matter is also mentioned 
in two other Turkish documents. Cf., B. A.; (l) Hatt-i 
Huma.yun, 448, 13 Cumada II 1203/10 March 1789; and also (2)
B» A # £ Hatt-i Huma.yun, 673» undated#
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the Re1is Efendi, Ra^id, suggested that he should seek, to turn
Selim III from continuing the hostilities with Austria and
Russia, underlining that the Crimea — the reconquest of which
was a major aim of the Turks - was now in fact definitively
lost to Russia, And indeed, two days later, on 10 May 1789?
Choiseul-Gouffier submitted to the Porte a memorandum which
emphasized how for the armed strength of the Ottomans, both on
land and sea, was inferior to the task of recovering the former
7
territories of the Khan of the Crimea, A despatch of Ainslie,
slightly earlier in date (22 April 1789)? relates at some
length the endeavours of Choiseul-Gouffier and his allies to
undermine the influence of England at the Porte. Ainslie refers
79in this despatch to s
the insidious manoeuvres of the Bourbon Ministers, who in 
order to ruin our Credit, and in View to forward the 
Politicks of the Imperial Courts (calculated to intimidate 
the Turks) have not ceased to represent Great Britain on 
the Eve of contracting Engagements most inimical to the 
Interest of this Empire. Since the accession of the present 
Sultan they accuse the Grand Vizir [i.e., Yusuf Pa^al of 
having allowed himself to be suborned, or deceived by me to 
undertake a War altogether unnecessary, at the Time in its 
consequence the most unfortunate for the Porte, and in fact, 
useful only to Ourselves. No money or Intrigues have been 
Spared to propagate a Belief, that the contradictory Acts 
of ceding the Crimea and, afterwards stimulating the present 
War, both fatal to the Empire, and on that Account opposed
78. Choiseul-Gouffier to Montmorin, C. P. T., 179 (1789)? no. 19? 
8 May 1789* Note remise par l1ambassadeur de France, le 10 
Mai 1789.
79* Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/lO, no. 18, 22 
April 1789*
by France, were operated by Our Influence* In short We 
are held out as the evil Genius of this People, even by 
many of the principal Greeks and Armenians hired for that 
Purpose•
The manoeuvres of Choiseul-Gouffier even led Ainslie, on 1 June
1789, to inform Ewart, that "if France and Spain are empowered
to offer reasonable Terms of Peace the Future arrangement [i.e.,
the ending of the war] will be transacted under their Mediation.
A few days later on 8 June 1789* mindful of how little progress
had been made thus far towards the achievement of Prussian and
British aims at the Porte, Ainslie sought to define for the Duke
of Leeds (i.e., the former Earl of Carmarthen) the attitude of
the Ottoman dignitaries. He described the Ottomans ass
well informed of their obligations to the allied Courts 
]i.e., the states united in the Triple Alliance of 1788} , 
but they suppose the advantage reciprocal, nay that 
hitherto they have fought our Battles without Fee or 
Rewards - And, independent of their apprehension of being 
left in the Lurch, they claim a Right of making the most 
of their situation,
adding that "The French flatter them with the Hope of an
advantageous Peace .f'^
Ainslie alluded in his despatch of 1 June to another factor
80. Ainslie to Ewart, P. R. 0., F. 0. 26l/6, 1 June 1789* A copy
of this letter was also sent to the Duke of leeds (i.e., the
former Earl of Carmarthen) and is to be found in P. R. 0.,
F. 0. 78/10
81. Ainslie to Leeds, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/lC, no. 25, 8 June 1789
This letter was communicated also to Ewart at Berlin.
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82which no doubt strengthened the attitude of the Turks:
the want of concert between the British and Prussian 
Missions has not escaped the notice of the Porte, and that 
this circumstance esteemed of the greatest Importance, has 
not only affected the Influence of Prussia, but cannot fail 
to assist the Views of Our Rivals, who are incessantly 
employed in circulating Doubts respecting the real Purposes 
and ulterior Intentions of that Court, The Divan has more 
than once testified much Surprise at my Silence on matters 
proposed (without my knowledge) by the Prussian Envoy, 
which to avoid doing Harm, I have hitherto dissumulated.
The failure to achieve an effective Anglo-Prussian co-operation
at the Porte is often mentioned in the despatches of Ainslie at
83:this time. It seemed to him that Diez had
all along persisted in a System of Reserve respecting his 
Pursuits at the Porte, including the Business of his 
repeated Conferences with the Ottoman Ministers, which was 
not only embarrassing to our avowed Plan, but to me 
appeared a Deviation from the intimate Connection so 
happily subsisting between Our Courts,
Diez is also described as "a Man of Low Education and inordinate
Pride, but this shall not put me out of my way or prevent me
Qa
adhering to my Instructions." Ainslie was to observe, moreover, 
that "Mr, Dietz’s general Conduct with His Majesty’s Mission, 
seems to indicate something more than a mere Desire to be thought
82, Ainslie to Ewart, P. R. 0,, F, 0, 26l/6, 1 June 1789, a copy 
of this letter is also to be found in P. R, 0,, F, 0. 78/lO; 
see also Ainslie to Leeds, P, R, 0,, 78/10, no, 24, 1 June 
1789; and no, 25, 8 June 1789*
83# Ainslie to Ewart, P, R, 0., F, 0, 78/lO, 1 June 1789* Cf.,
P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/10, no. 25; 8 June 1789.
84. Ainslie to Leeds, P, R. 0,, F. 0, 78/10, no. 30, 14 July
1789; Cf., Zinkeisen, op. cit., VI, p. 689 for the unfavour­
able opinion of Diez on Ainslie (A despatch of Diez dating 
from 22 May 1789).
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the leading or principal Agent of the Allied Powers in this
Residence, which I have neither a Wish nor hitherto an Interest
05to dispute." The continuing lack of co-operation between Diez 
and Ainslie acted to the disadvantage of Diez at Berlin. 
Extracts from the despatches of Ainslie to the British govern­
ment had been sent from London to Ewart, the British ambassador 
at Berlin. Carmarthen told Ewart on 17 February 1709 that he 
was sending to him^:
extracts of the Dispatches which I have lately received 
from Sir Robert Ainslie, as they contain some particulars 
which may be of use to you in your conversations with the 
Prussian Ministers, and they enable you [toj convince them 
that the King’s Ambassador at the Porte has shown the 
greatest Desire to act with Monsieur Dietz on the Footing 
of the most unreserved confidence, though it does not
85. Ainslie to Leeds, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/10, no. 32, 22 July 
1789; cf., also the judgment of Von Gotze on Diez, quoted in 
&inkeisen, op. cit., VI, p. 733 note 2s "La trop grande idee, 
qu’il a de son esprit et de sestalens, le retient souvent 
d’agreer et de vouloir concevoir une idee, qui ne vient pas - 
directement de lui ce que je laisse toujours faire tant que 
l’interet du Roi nfy souffre pas directement, pour ne pas 
l’aigrir; car il est deja pique, que le Roi n’entre pas dans 
toutes ses idees." Choiseul-Gouffier, the French ambassador 
at the Porte^ had noted earlier of Diez that "il a des formes
absolument a lui, et un genre d1arrogant auquel il est
difficle que personne veuille se preter." Choiseul-Gouffier 
to Montmorin, C. P. T., 179 (1789)? no. 7? 20 February 1789*
86. Carmarthen to Ewart, P. R. 0., F. 0. 64/15? no. 3? 17
February 1789? see also Ewart to Carmarthen: "The extracts 
of Sir Robert Ainslie*s Dispatches, which Your Lordship has 
been pleased to communicate to me, will be of great use in 
enabling me to explain to this Court some essential circum­
stances, respecting the situation of affairs at Constantin­
ople which have not been exactly stated here and consequently 
not well understood." (P. R. 0., F. 0. 64/lp? no.11, 3 March 
1789).
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appear that Sir Robert Ainslie has always experienced the 
same inclination on the Part of the Prussian Minister.
Ewart, late in August 1739, informed Ainslie that^:
in conformity to the unbounded Confidence that prevails 
between the Courts of London and Berlin he ^i.e., Ewart] 
had furnished to the Prussian Ministers an Extract of all 
my Letters, - that he had seen all Mr. Dietz*s dispatches 
which only manifested his extravagant Vanity without 
containing any interesting Intelligence whatever, - and 
that his misconduct, as also his Behaviour towards me, 
continued to be highly disapproved
A letter — also dated 22 October 1789 - from Ainslie to Ewart
reveals the somewhat dubious situation of Diez at Istanbul.
Ainslie indicates to Ewart in this letter that France and her
allies have endeavoured to discredit Prussia in the eyes of the
Ottoman dignitaries, representing the court of Berlin as always
’’ready to sacrifice them [i.e., the TurkJ to the Interest of 
88the moment." Indeed, the manoeuvres designed to weaken the
influence of Prussia at the Porte had been extended even to the
transmission, to the Turks, of "such parts of the late King's
89jiosthumous Works as answer their Purpose." Ainslie notes that
87* Ainslie to Leeds, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/10, no. 39> 22 October 
1789? referring to a letter of Ewart to Ainslie dated 29 
August 1789 (Ainslie received this letter at Istanbul on 12 
October 1789)* is also worth noting that Ainslie was 
careful to enclose in his letter of 22 October copies of his 
recent correspondence with Diez, for the consideration of 
the Duke of Leeds.
88. Ainslie to Ewart, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/10, 22 October 1789*
89* ibid. The "posthumous works" here mentioned refer no doubt 
to the writings of Frederick the Great, who had died at the 
end of 1786. A posthumous edition of his works was in fact 
published at Berlin in 1788: Oeuvres Posthumes de Fr£d£ric II, 
Roi de Pmsse 13 volumes, (Berlin, 1788)
the extracts from the "posthumous works” had been sent to
Istanbul from Vienna* And he adds that the extracts, with the
appropriate comments attached to them had, indeed, been conveyed
into the Seraglio* The same letter from Ainslie to Ewart, of 22
October, offers some indication of the attitude prevalent
amongst the Ottoman ministers in relation to Diez* After noting 
rthat "Mons * Diez's unbounded confidence in his own ability to
90be superior to all opposition”' had led him into numerous 
blunders, Ainslie attempted to analyse for Ev/art the main 
current of opinion amongst the Ottoman officials. He underlined 
first, the suspicion at the Porte that serious differences of 
aim and judgment divided the members of the Triple Alliance 
[i.e., Great Britain, Prussia and the United Provinces] 5 second, 
that "the Cabinet of Berlin and the Diet of Poland endeavour, 
all in their Power to prolong a War in which the Turks have 
hitherto fought their Battles"; third, the belief of some at 
least amongst the Ottoman ministers that it might now be best 
for the Turks to make peace with Austria and Russia, unless the 
states of the Triple Alliance should declare forthwith their 
readiness to oppose in a direct and practical manner the
91ambitions of the Emperor Joseph and of the Tsarina Catherine.
90. Ainslie to Ewart, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/10, 22 October 1789*
91. ibid., Ainslie enclosed in this letter - as he had done in his 
despatch of the same date sent to Leeds - all copies of his 
recent correspondence with Diez. Ainslie sent also with his 
letter of 22 October 1789 to the Duke of Leeds a copy of his 
letter to Ewart of the same date.
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The position of Diez was therefore fraught with difficulties,
all the more since he was subjected to increasing pressure from
Berlin. Hertzberg, anxious to achieve some positive advance
towards the realization of his scheme, had written to Diez on
26 May 1789, giving him new instructions. The Prussian minister
authorized Diez to offer to the Turks a defensive alliance with
Prussia - with the further assurance that, should the armies of
Russia cross southward over the rivers Danube and Una, Prussia
92would undertake an armed intervention in aid of the Porte.
The position of Diez, though he was furnished with an enlarged
freedom of manoeuvre, did not in fact relieve him of his
anxieties, for towards the end of August the Ottomans, through
the French ambassador, Choiseul-Gouffier, received full details
of the instructions which Herzberg had formulated for Diez on
26 May 1789, so that the Porte was forewarned about the intentions
of Prussia.. The Ottomans were also resolved> not least through the
diplomatic skill of the Re* is Efendi, Ra^Td, to draw the maximum
advantage from this knowledge, i.e., to drive Diez if possible
into a two-fold commitments first, to an armed intervention (i.e.,
an offensive alliance) on behalf of the Porte; and second to a
formal involvement in the restoration of the Crimea to Ottoman 
93rule. Diez, now under strong pressure both from the Prussian
92. Diez received this letter about the middle of July 1789 
(cf., Zinkeisen, op.cit., VI, p. 730).
93* Cf., Zinkeisen, op. cit., VI, pp. 735-40.
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and the Ottoman authorities, turned in his moment of need to 
Sir Robert Ainslie. He asked the British ambassador, on 2 
October 1789> to support his own endeavours to secure from the 
Porte a definite engagement that a mediation in the war, should 
it ever come about, would be entrusted to the members of the 
Triple Alliance. Diez also sought to obtain from Ainslie 
precise details as to the extent and nature of the instructions 
which he had received from London - a request that Diez 
("better acquainted with Chicanery than Civility", as Ainslie 
observes) reiterated with such insistence as to awaken a measure 
of ill-humour in the British ambassador, who was not in fact 
prepared, to reveal the orders which the authorities at London 
had transmitted to him. In the course of this same meeting with 
Diez, Ainslie recommended that the states united in the Triple
94
Alliance of August 1788 should make a joint representation to 
the Porte. Diez, however, preferred that each member of the 
Triple Alliance should undertake a separate and private approach 
to the Ottoman ministers, an attitude which led Ainslie to 
underline once more his conviction that Diez wished, if possible 
to retain for himself a major share of the credit which would
94* Ainslie to Leeds, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/lO, no. 38, 8 October 
1789* Diez also made a similar approach at this time to the 
Dutch ambassador, Dedem, at Istanbul, and with same purpose 
in view that he had expounded to Ainslie.
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ensue from successful negotiations.
Ainslie, at the interview with Diez on 2 October, assured 
the Prussian ambassador that he would use his influence at the 
Porte on behalf of Prussia. After a consultation with the Dutch 
ambassador, he submitted to the Ottoman authorities a note 
(dated 10 October 1789) asking for clarification as to the
» 96
views of the Porte about an eventual mediation. Moreover,
Ainslie sought to reinforce his present approach to the Ottoman
ministers through the use of private rather than public methods
of communications "I even found Means to transmit my Opinion
into the Seraglio, and to interest the Valide and the new
Sultan in the Glory and Security of his future Reign, so clearly
98dependant on the present Measures.11 Ainslie indeed summarized
95. ibid., (enclosed with this despatch were copies of Diezfs 
letter to Ainslie, dated 3 October 1789? and of Ainslie*s 
written answer, dated 4 October 1789)•
96. Ainslie to Leeds, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/lO, no. 39? 22 October 
1789? (Ainslie enclosed with this letter his own note dated
10 October 1789).
97* The valide Sultan, i.e., the mother of the ruling Selim III - 
a personage, therefore, of exhalted rank and great influence.
98. Ainslie to Ewart, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/10, 22 October 1789; 
see also Ainslie to Leeds, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/lO, no. 39?
22 October 1789* "I have formed a connection in the Seraglio 
upon which I believe we may depend, and I am certain that 
my verbal Representations reached the Sultan, and I can not 
doubt did Influence his Refusal to adopt the precipitate 
Measures proposed by the Bourbon Ministers, supported by 
the most extensive Corruption." Ainslie gives no exact 
indications as to the nature of his contact inside the 
Seraglio. It is very probable, however, that he is referring
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in a few brief and forceful words the purpose of his inter­
vention at the Portes "In short it was high Time that we should
99interfere for the support of Diets*s sinking Credit" amongst 
the Ottoman dignitaries. Ainslie - to judge from his own words ■ 
was able to bring some degree of relief to Diez. He noted in a 
despatch to London (8 December 1789) that his endeavours, both
here to the Sultan’s chief physician, a certain Dr. Gobis. 
Ainslie mentioned him in an earlier despatch of 7 April 
17892 "A Konsr. Gobis, Physician of the Seraglio intimately 
known to the reigning Sultan and his Mother is likely to 
enjoy great Favour. Fortunately I have great Influence with 
the Doctor, and made him a Present of a Coach about six 
Weeks ago." (Ainslie to Carmarthen, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/lO, 
no. 15, 7 April 1789) Dr, Gobis is also mentioned in a list 
of Ainslie*s expenses and disbursements dating from 7 March 
17892 "a coach to the principal Physician of the Seraglio - 
three hundred and fifty Piasters." (Ainslie to Carmarthen,
P. R. 0., P. 0. 78/10, no. 20, 8 May 1789* list of expenses)
99. Ainslie to Ewart, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/10, 22 October 1789.
It is appropriate to note that Ainslie was careful to ensure 
that London had full information about his own actions at 
Istanbul. To achieve this end - and thus, to win, so he 
hoped, the approval of the English government - Ainslie sent 
to the Duke of Leeds copies of the letters that he had 
received from Diez and also of the letters which he himself 
wrote to Diez. At the same time he forwarded to Ewart at 
Berlin copies of the same correspondence. Ainslie seems to 
have begun this practice with his despatch of 8 October 
1789 to the Duke of Leeds; and he continued thereafter to 
send various letters and documents to Leeds and Ewart as 
occasion arose. On this despatch of information to London 
and Berlin (F. 0. 78/10, Ainslie to Leeds, no. 38^  8 October 
1789) see, for example, Ainslie to Leeds, no. 39> 22 October 
17892 "As my constant endeavours in the present Business 
have been to forward the common Cause, and to conciliate 
my Conduct with my Instructions to the Sense of which I 
have scrupulously adhered. I hope to be honoured with 
Your Grace’s Approbation."
at the Porte and in the Seraglio, had contributed to thwart 
the still continuing intrigues of Choiseul-Gouffier and, at 
the same time, to dispose of "the apprehensions conceived by 
many Members of the Divan respecting the interested Views, and 
the uncertain Systems of the Prussian Ministers* Politicks.
As for Diez himself, Ainslie still felt that the Prussian 
ambassador was reluctant to countenance an effective co-opera­
tion between himself and the British and Dutch ambassadors.
Writing to London on 22 November 1789? Ainslie declared himself
- -  101 unable :
[to] assign the Cause of such repeated and striking 
Variance between his conduct [i.e., of DiesJ and the 
instructions, under which, I am informed, he was to act. 
But I cannot think his Behaviour to the ambassadors of 
Great Britain and Holland will find an Apologist, when it 
is equally inconsistent with Civility and Reason - no more 
than his Pretext that it is our Duty to forward, and 
consequently to engage Our Court to maintain all his 
speculations nay such of his Transactions which he does 
not deign to communicate.
The intervention of Ainslie - and also of the Dutch and Swedish 
102representatives - helped no doubt to push forward the 
negotiations between Diez and the Ottoman ministers. This
100. Ainslie to Leeds, P. R. 0., P. 0. 78/10, no. 42, 8 December 
1789* The words in inverted commas, 11 the Prussian Ministers' 
referred no doubt to Hertzberg.
101. Ainslie to Leeds, P. R. 0., F0. 78/10, no. 41* 22 November
1789.
102. Holland was of course allied with England and Prussia in 
1788; while Sweden was at this time allied to the Ottoman
Empire and, like the Turks, engaged in war with Russia.
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intervention-, however, did not ease the pressures which still 
heset Diez, He had also to meet the insistence of the Porte, now 
resolute to extract the maximum possible advantage from Prussia 
and, with this aim in view, to force Diez beyond the strict 
limit of his instructions from Berlin (dated 26 May and 18 
S e p t e m b e r ) D i e z  yielded at last to the demands made of him, 
concluding a formal alliance with the Porte at the end of January 
1790 - an alliance unwelcome at Berlin on two main grounds: first, 
that it committed Prussia to the employment of her armed forces 
against both Austria and Russia; and second, that it involved her 
in support of the Ottoman desire to recover control of the Crimea.
One phase in the long chain of manoeuvre and negotiation 
had now in fact come into an end. Diez - under the guidance of 
Kertsberg at Berlin - -had moved from mediation to an alliance 
at first limited and defensive in character, thence to an 
alliance avowedly offensive in nature and, finally, to an
103. Cf., Zinkeisen, op. cit., VI, pp. 726-40.
104* Hews of this agreement arrived on 10 March 1790. Ewart, 
writing to the Duke of Leeds next day, enclosed with his 
letter an extract from a despatch which Diez had sent to 
Berlin, justifying to the Prussian government the terms 
of the alliance concluded with the Turks. In his letter 
to London Ewart observes of Diez that "He has certainly 
exceeded his instructions in several respects, and 
particularly in the Stipulation of the first Article, 
that Prussia should attack Russia and Austria." (Ewart 
to Leeds, P. 0. 64/l7> no, 21, 11 March 1790)
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agreement which exceeded his instructions. Ainslie had remained 
throughout the negotiations within the strict limit of his 
instructions from London, "but - after a long period of friction 
and frustration between himself and the Prussian ambassador - 
had used his influence at the Porte, and not without effect, 
to bring Diez nearer to the fulfilment of his negotiations with 
the Porte. The situation created by the offer of the Prussian 
alliance in January 1790) was fraught with grave possibilities. 
It was, however, a situation destined to have only a momentary 
existence.
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C H A P T E R  IV
The Reichenbach Convention (July 1790)•
Diez had concluded the alliance "between Prussia and the 
Ottoman Empire on 31 January. ^ Within a month, the context of 
affairs arising from this agreement was altered "by the death, 
on 20 February, of Joseph II, Emperor of Austria. Even before 
learning of this event, the British government had taken a firm 
line against the complications which might arise from an 
entente between Berlin and Istanbul.
Writing to Ewart, the British ambassador at Berlin, on 26
2
February 1790, the Duke of Leeds stated that :
offensive operations |^i.e., against Austria or Russia3 
which Prussia may feel it her interest to adopt, would go 
beyond the line which this country [[i.e., EnglandJ has 
uniformly laid down, and from which it does not appear 
that the present circumstances should induce her to depart.
Leeds also declared, however, that should the members of the
Triple Alliance be able, through their mediation, to bring the
1. Diez was recalled from his post as ambassador at the Porte 
even before the conclusion of the alliance. The decision to 
recall him was taken at Berlin in December 1789* Diez in 
fact left Istanbul in May 1790*
2. Leeds to Ewart, P. R. 0., F. 0. 64/17* no. 4? 26 February 
1790. See also Rose, op. cit., p. '320.
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states involved in the war on the Danube to accept a peace 
settlement on the basis of the status quo, then Great Britain 
would be willing to encourage the inclusion in the Triple 
Alliance of the Ottoman Empire, and also of Poland and Sweden, 
thus guaranteeing to them the terms embraced within the treaties 
of pacification. This was a clear indication, therefore, that 
Great Britain would not afford to Prussia an unqualified support 
for the schemes cherished at the court of Berlin.
The news of Joseph II's death reached his heir and 
successor, Leopold II, at Florence on 25 February 1790. The 
following day, the new Emperor of Austria held a secret inter­
view with Lord Hervey, the British ambassador at the Tuscan 
court. Leopold II indicated his readiness to bring to an end 
the current hostilities between Austria and the Ottoman Empire; 
his wish to avoid a conflict with Prussia; and his desire that 
Great Britain might undertake the role of mediator in these 
matters.3
Soon after receiving this information from Florence, the 
Duke of Leeds wrote to Ewart on 19 March and informed him that 
the new Emperor of Austria seemed to be "sincerely desirous to
3. Lord Hervey to Leeds, P. R* 0., F. 0. 528/3* no. 6, 
28 February 1790.
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conclude Peace upon fair terms; having no object of ambition
or aggrandisement in view, and wishing to avoid any measure
which can give umbrage to other Powers." There was now, so the
Duke inclined to believe, a good prospect of a peace ''accomplished
on the Terms proposed by the Allies, I mean, the Status quo, or 
4
nearly such."
On 30 March, the Duke of Leeds sent a further, and a much
more forthright, despatch to Ewart. Declaring the readiness of
the British government to mediate if not between the Porte and
both Austria and Russia, then at least between the Porte and
Austria the Duke of Leeds informed Ewart that:
the Status Quo appears to be the only and natural Idea 
which can be proposed as the General Basis of Pacification. 
Such an Idea however does not necessarily preclude any 
reasonable modifications of it, should any such come in
question in the course of the Negotiation.
To this statement of principle, the Duke added, however, a firm
disapproval of those Prussian aspirations which had found
5
expression in the schemes of Hertzberg :
it will however be proper to state explicitly that, at all 
events, the Idea of proposing Sacrifices on the Part of 
the Porte, by re-establishing with Austria the Limits of
4. Leeds to Ewart, P. R. 0., P. 0. 64/l7j no. 6, 19 March 1790* 
This despatch was received in Berlin on 3 April 1790, see 
Ewart to Leeds, P. R. 0., F. 0. 64/l7> no. 25, 3 April 1790*
5# Leeds to Ewart, P. R. 0., F. 0. 64/17, no. 8, 30 March 1790.
This despatch reached Berlin on 11 April 1790, see,Ewart to
Leeds, V . R. 0., F. 0. 64/17, no. 27, 18 April 1790.
-the Peace of Fassarowitz, and by making cessions of some 
sort or other to Russia, on condition that Austria shall 
agree to relinquish Gallicia [to Poland) and it seems 
totally inconsistent with the Essential object (which 
eveiy day renders more pressing) of re-establishing the 
General Tranquillity, Nothing but the most extensive 
necessity could undoubtedly bring Austria to agree to 
such a Proposal and that court would certainly first try 
the Event of a concert* There appears indeed to be so 
little justice in insisting upon such an arrangement, 
between Powers not engaged in the war, as a condition of 
the Peace between those who are Parties to it, and it is 
so evidently contrary to our Defensive System, that, on 
the Principles already repeatedly stated, it would be 
impossible for this Country to give any Expectation of 
supporting Prussia in a contest begun on such grounds.
At the same time, Austria was making an official approach to
Prussia - an approach designed to resolve the current difficultie
existing between the two states* The Emperor Leopold II wrote a
letter to Frederick William on 25 March 1790* which reached
Berlin on 2 April^ A little more than a week later (i.e., 11
April), Ewart received from London Leeds’s despatch of 30 March,
copies of which he handed over to the Prussian authorities on
the following day, 12 April. It was, therefore, with a full
knowledge of the British government’s attitude that Frederick
William and his ministers, on 15 April, answered the letters
which had come from Vienna on 25 March 1790* Prussia, on 15
April, accepted the amicable approach of Austria and indicated
her readiness to enter into negotiations.
6. See, Ewart to Leeds, P. R. 0,, F. 0. 64/l7> no, 27 j 18 April 
1790.
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At Berlin the desire to realize the scheme of Hertzberg, 
at least in its main features, was still not yet extinct on 
11 May 1790* Hertzherg himself submitted to the Austrian 
ambassador as a basis for the imminent negotiations between 
Prussia and Austria (a) the ending of the Turkish war through 
the restoration of the status quo ante bellum, the members of 
the Triple Alliance acting as mediators — a solution which 
Hertzbcrg characterized as "dur et humiliant pour les deux 
cours de Vienne et de Petersbourg"5 and (b) the establishment 
of peace through that interchange of territories, involving 
Wallachia, Moldavia, Galicia, Danzig and Thorn, which had
g
formed the core of the Hertzberg scheme.
The Emperor Leopold II, writing to Frederick William of
Prussia on 25 May, made known the reaction of Austria to the
9
Prussian proposals. Leopold II declared his preference for a 
peace negotiated on the basis of the status quo. At the same
7* L. P. J. Van de Spiegel, Resume des Negociations, qui
accompagnerent la Revolution des Pays-bas autrichiens, avec 
des pieces justificatives,(Amsterdam,1841) p* 239* The 
truth was that Prussia had little inclination for a peace 
settlement on the basis of the status quo, for such a solution 
would per force make it difficult for Prussia to acquire 
Danzig and Thorn, either through the Hertzberg scheme or some 
similar arrangement; cf., Ewart to Leeds, P. R. 0., F. 0. 
64/18, no. 45j 24 June 1790: "His Prussian Majesty and His 
Minister are very averse to the Reestablishment of the status 
quo."
8. ibid., pp. 239-43*
9* ibid., pp. 243-48.
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time, he stated that Austria was obliged to reject all solutions
which involved Austria in the loss of Galicia, observing in
forthright terms that "La Prusse y gagnerait seule, et son gain
seroit paye aux depens de lfAutriche. ^  On 2 June 1790 Frederick
William wrote to Leopold II hoping that he might induce the
Emperor to cede Galicia to Poland and thus enable Prussia to
11secure Danzig and Thorn. His arguments in this regard were
renewed in a further document addressed to Leopold II, dated 17 
12June. But this continued effort to achieve the objectives of
the Hertzberg scheme met with no success. Already on 17 June
Leopold II had written to Frederick William, indicating firmly
that he wished to achieve a peace settlement on the basis of the
status quo ante bellum and rejecting no less firmly the idea
that Galicia might be surrendered to Poland^:
S. M. A. s*est formellement declares disposee a donner les 
mains a la paix sur la base du status quo, propose par 
l*Angleterre, ... quraucune puissance, et la Prusse moins 
qu*aucune autre, n*a le droit d'exiger de I’Autriche de 
rendre un partie de la Gallicie a la Pologne.
It was now on 20 June at Sch&nwalte, where Prussian troops 
had been gathered close to the frontier of Bohemia, that 
Frederick William signed the ratification of the alliance
10. ibid., pp. 246.
11. ibid., pp. 250-54.
12. This document is to be found in Spiegel, op. cit., p. 286.
13. ibid., p. 257.
143.
concluded between Prussia and the Ottoman Empire in January 
1790* It must he pointed out that the ambiguous and delicate 
nature of this move can be seen in the fact that the actual 
ratification was in terms far different from the words and 
intentions embodied in the agreement of January 1790* The 
danger that Prussia might through this alliance be involved in 
a conflict with Russia was avoided by the addition of a limiting 
phrase: Prussia would fulfil the terms of the agreement "autant 
qu*il sera en notre pouvoir et que les circonstances le per- 
mettront." Moreover the ratification did not mention the return 
of the Crimea to the Turks which the Porte, in fact, had not 
lost in the current war.^
It is difficult to define the reasons which led Frederick 
William to make this ratification of the Prussian-Ottoman 
alliance. His action perhaps was undertaken as a response to 
the attitude of Leopold II. For Austria was unwilling to yield 
Galicia to Poland, preferring a solution on the basis of the 
status quo. But might not Prussia draw advantage even from this 
actual preference of Austria ? Prussia, faced with the possible 
failure of her own territorial ambitions, could not insist on a 
strict interpretation of the status quo, thus ensuring that
14# Zinkeisen, op. cit., VI, p. 731.
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Austria also obtain no territorial advantages from the pre­
vailing situation. Prussia, however, when it came to actual 
negotiation with the Turks, would still be free to suggest 
that she use her influence at the Porte (consolidated there 
since the recent ratification) to secure territorial advantages 
for Austria - in return for which favour Austria would be 
expected of course to adopt a more compliant attitude over 
Galicia. And, indeed, a divergence of view was visible over the
exact interpretation of the term status quo. Frederick William,
15writing to Leopold II at the beginning of June,  ^ had referred 
to "le retablissement du status quo pl6nier ou lirnite, tel que 
je lfai propose."Hertzberg was later to insist on the same
conception during the negotiations of the Convention of
✓ 17Reichenbach, "le status quo plenier avant la presente guerre."
On the other hand, as noted earlier, Leeds had written to 
Ewart on 30 March 1790, indicating that the British government
15. Frederick William to Leopold, dated 2 June 1790, text to be 
found in Spiegel, op. cit., pp. 251-54.
16. ibid., p. 251. The "limited return to the status quo" 
mentioned here is a reference to the proposals for a 
territorial exchange involving Gadicia which Frederick 
William had proposed in an earlier letter to Leopold II 
dated 10-U May 1790.
17. Hertzberg to the Austrian negotiators at Reichenbach, 15 
July 1790, in Spiegel, op. cit., pp. 288-90; Ewart also 
mentioned the Prussian insistence on "the strict status quo" 
(Ewart to Leeds, P. R. 0., F. 0. 64/18, no. 51> Reichenbach, 
16 July 1790).
145.
would approve a return either to the exact status quo ante
l8bellum or to an approximate version of it* In other words, a
somewhat less than literal interpretation of the term would he
admissible* On the same date, Leeds had sent a similar despatch
19to the British ambassador at Vienna, Sir Robert Keith. This 
had reached him on 14 April, and he was not slow to make its 
message known to the Austrian authorities.
It was not improbable, therefore, that Austria might seek 
to exploit the declared attitude of the British government in 
order to avoid a complete renunciation of all territorial 
advantage* For a successful manoeuvre along these lines would 
diminish whatever hope remained to Prussia at this particular 
moment of realizing her own territorial ambitions.
At the same time it cannot be excluded that other factors 
might well have influenced the decision of Frederick William 
to send Istanbul the ratification of the Ottoman-Prussian 
alliance. For on 5 May the Prussian ambassador at Istanbul had 
written to Berlin, stating that during the direct peace 
discussions then in progress between the Turks and the Russians
18. See above, pp*
19* Leeds to Keith, P. R. 0., F* 0. 7 / l 9 ,  no. 7> 30 March 1790; 
Keith to Leeds, P. R. 0., F* 0* 7/l9> no. 47 > 17 April 1790 
no. 50, 24 April 1790.
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at the front, Prince Potemkin, acting in the name of Catherine,
had offered to the Porte a settlement of the conflict on terms
representing virtually a return to the status quo before the 
20war. A sudden Turkish withdrawal from the war against Russia - 
and this at a time when Austria was also moving towards peace - 
would have nullified the hopes of Prussia for a favourable 
territorial adjustment involving Danzig and Thorn. There is 
also a further point of relevance in that the time interval laid 
down in the alliance between Prussia and the Porte, for an 
exchange of ratification, a time interval in fact of five months, 
was now almost at an end.
The envoys of Prussia and the Austrian Empire now met for 
the purpose of direct negotiation at the village of Reichenbach 
on 27 June 1790* The first two sessions were held on this and 
the following day. At first, it would seem, Frederick William, 
fearing that the British ambassador to Berlin, Ewart, might 
urge the views of the British government so forcefully as to 
eliminate from discussion all mention of Galicia and to restrict 
the interchange of ideas to the solution of the status quo,
20. This despatch reached Berlin probably in the early days of 
June. Ewart transmitted a copy of Knobelsdorff1s despatch 
to London with his own communication to London dated 11 
June 1790 (see, P. R. 0., F.O. 64/18).
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managed to exclude him from the deliberations. Ewart and also
the Dutch ambassador brought pressure to bear on Frederick
William and urged that England and Holland, as members with
Prussia of the Triple Alliance and also as states invited to
undertake the role of mediation, should be represented at the
Reichenbach talks. The King of Prussia was now constrained to
yield to this demand. And Ewart, indeed, during the subsequent
meeting of the Conference urged firmly on Prussia and on
Austria the appropriateness of a peace settlement founded on a
21
return to the status quo.
The conference ended its deliberations on 27 July with the 
signing of the Convention of Reichenbach. This convention laid 
down as the basis of the future settlement between Austria and
the Ottoman Empire a restoration of peace "sur la base du status
/ 22 
quo strict, tel qu’il a ete avant la guerre actuelle.11 However
the convention also included a clause allowing the Emperor
Leopold II :
de faire, dans le cours des prochaines negotiations de paix 
avec la Porte Ottomane, ouelques modifications concilia- 
toires, pour la surete de Ses frontieres, S. M. Prussienne
21. Ewart to Leeds, P. R. 0., F. 0. 64/18, no. 46, Breslaw,
27 June 1790; see also his no. 48, Reichenbach.1 July 1790? 
no. 50? Reichenbach, 8 July 17905 no. 51» Reichenbach,
16 July 1790> no. 52, Reichenbach, 18 July 1790? no. 54 
Reichenbach, 22 July 1790*
22, Spiegel, op. cit., p. 298.
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entend que ces modifications soient absolument volontaires 
et dependantes du bon gre de la Porte Ottomane et de la 
mediation de 3. M. et de Ses allies,
v/ith the proviso "que si S. M. le roi de Eongrie et de Boheme
en retire quelques acquisitions ou autres avantages, Elle en
donnera un equivalent proportionne a S. K. Prussienne
Sir Robert Ainslie, throughout the long months extending 
from the Prusso-Turkish alliance of January 1790 to the signing 
of the Convention of Reichenbach at the end of July 1790 > had 
had but a limited role to play.
Once it had become aware that the nev; Emperor of Austria 
was inclined towards peace, the British government sent to 
Ainslie a despatch dated 16 March 1790 which instructed him to 
discover the attitude of the Ottoman ministers towards the 
possible negotiation of a peace settlement, either on the 
status q u o  terms or on terms involving no more than a moderate 
adjustment of the status quo ante bellum. Ainslie was authorized 
in the same despatch to make clear to the Turks that Great 
Britain and the allies would be most willing to undertake a 
role of mediation.^ This despatch reached Ainslie at Istanbul 
on 1 May 1790*
23. ibid., p. 299*
24* Leeds to Ainslie, P. R. 0., P. 0. 78/ll, no. 3> 16 March 1790.
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The British ambassador hastened to make contact with the
He*is Efendi, Ra^Id, hut only to receive from a message to the
fact that matters had gone too far for the Porte "to act
independent of Her Allies", hut no approach had been made from
the side of Austria and that negotiations therefore at that
25
time were out of the question. A month later, in June, Ainslie
was still seeking to discover what terms the Porte regarded as
necessary for an acceptable proposal for peace with Austria,
2 6although he had very little success.
Meanwhile the Ottoman ministers were becoming anxious that 
no ratification of the alliance with Prussia had been received 
as yet from Berlin. Finally, on 20 June 1790, "the Re*is Efendi, 
RS^Td, sought Ainslie*s advice on the matter. The British 
ambassador strove to reassure the Ottomans, urging them to
27have confidence in the good intentions of the Prussian Court.
The term- of five months (February to June) allotted to 
the exchange of the ratification was now at last at an end. On 
20 June, the Re*is Efendi went so far as to inform Ainslie that 
"the Court of Berlin having neglected to comply with the
25. Ainslie to Leeds, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/ll, no. 10, 8 May 1790.
26. Ainslie to Leeds, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/ll, no. 12, 8 June 1790? 
no. 13, 22 June 1790.
27. Ainslie to Leeds, T. R. 0., F. 0. 78/ll, no. 13, 22 June 1790.
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Stipulations of the Treaty, it was now determined to transact
all Matters relating to that Business with the Interposition of
28the English and Dutch Ambassadors.’1 Ainslie at once communi­
cated this news to Von Knobelsdorff, the Prussian ambassador.
who was able to reassure the Turks, and allay for the moment
29
their apprehensions of the attitude of Prussia.
None the less, the Re* is Efendi on 12 July, asked Ainslie 
once more why a ratification of the treaty with Prussia had not 
arrived from Berlin; and Ainslie, acting in conjunction with 
the Dutch ambassador, urged yet again on the Ottomans the need
30to have faith in the good intentions of the Prussian government.
A little later, the Prussian ambassador, on 25 July, communicated 
to the Re*is Efendi the news that Frederick William was at 
Schommlte, near the Austrian frontier, at the head of the 
Prussian army. Ra^id Efendi once more contacted Ainslie, and 
received from him his private assurance that the Porte would do 
well to have full confidence in the conduct and the intentions 
of Prussia. At the same time the Re*is Efendi also assured the 
Prussian ambassador, Von Knobelsdorff, that the Porte reposed
28. Ainslie to Leeds, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/11, no. 15, 3 July 1790.
29. ibid.
30. Ainslie to Leeds, P. R. 0., F. 0. 73/ll, no. 17? 22 July 1790. 
See also the enclosure with this letter, a note given to the 
Porte by Ainslie and the Dutch ambassador F. G. Van Dedem, 
dated 14 July 1790.
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"unlimited Confidence in His Court
There wa,s still, however, a certain residual uneasiness
amongst the Ottoman dignitaries which was to he dispelled only-
on 27 August when Von Knobelsdorff informed them that he had
received safely at last from Frederick William the ratification
32of the Prusso-Turkish alliance. It vias also towards the end 
of August that the news of the Convention of Reichenbach 
between Austria and Prussia reached Istanbul#
At the same time Ainslie received, on 26 August, additional 
instructions from London, in the form of despatches of 30 March 
and 8 June 1790.*^ These two despatches had been forwarded to 
Vienna, the British ambassador at Vienna, Sir Robert Keith, 
being ordered to hold back these documents, and to send them to 
Ainslie at Istanbul only when the negotiations at Reichenbach 
had been brought to a successful conclusion,^ The Convention 
of Reichenbach was signed on 27 July 1790* On 2 August Sir 
Robert Keith forwarded the two despatches to Istanbul, Ainslie
31. Ainslie to Leeds, P. R, 0,, F. 0. 78/ll, no,l8, 30 July 1790.
32. Ainslie to Leeds, P. R. 0,, F. 0. 78/ll, no.21, 29 August 1790* 
The ratification had reached Von Knobelsdorff at Istanbul
on 22 August 1790*
33* Ainslie to Leeds, P. R. 0,, F. 0, 78/llj no.21, 29 August 1790.
34. Leeds to Keith, P. R. 0., F. 0. 7/l9» no.7, 30 March 1790 and 
no.13, 8 June 1790. Cf., Leeds to Ainslie, P. R. 0., F. 0. 
78/11, no.4> 30 March 1790 and no.8, 8 June 1790.
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receiving them on 26 August*
The tenor of these despatches is quite clear. Ainslie was 
to assure the Ottomans that Great Britain favoured the end of 
hostilities Between the Porte and Austria and the negotiation 
of peace on the basis of the status quo ante helium or at least 
on terms approximate to it. Ainslie therefore was now to urge 
on the Ottoman ministers the need to consider forthwith the 
appointment of plenipotentiaries for the projected peace with 
Austria.^
Sir Robert Keith also sent his own observations with the 
two despatches to Ainslie, recommending him to make it clear to 
the Turks that the Reichenbach Convention concerned only the 
question of relations between Austria and the Ottoman Empire.^ 
These developments at Istanbul in the last days of August 1790 
now set before Ainslie the prospect of a more active role than 
he had been able to fulfil in recent months.
35. Keith to Ainslie, P. R. 0., P. 0. 78/ll, 2 August 1790.
36. ihid.
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C H A P T E R  V
The Ottoman struggle with Austria and Russia;
the final phase and the peace treaties (1791 ~ 1792)»
The Convention of Reichenbach concluded at the end of July 
1790 bad resolved the immediate questions in dispute between 
Prussia and Austria. This Convention now left Austria free to 
bring to an end her conflict with the Ottoman Empire. It also 
laid down that the peace to be made between the Austrians and 
the Turks should rest on the principle of the status quo ante . 
bellum or at least on terms approximate to that condition. It 
was also envisaged that the three states constituting the 
Triple Alliance of 1788 (i.e., Prussia, Holland and England) 
would assume the role of mediation in the negotiations preceding 
the peace settlement.
The Convention of Reichenbach was not, however, the sole 
factor defining the situation of Prussia. Frederick William had, 
in June 1790, ratified the alliance made between Prussia and the 
Ottoman Empire in January of that same year. It is true that the 
ratification itself was so framed as to avoid a commitment of 
Prussia to support the Ottoman Empire in its desire to regain 
from Russia control of the Crimea; and it was also framed in
such a manner as to free Prussia, at need, from any obligation
to wage war against Russia on behalf of the Porte. None the
less the fact remained that Prussia had entered into a formal
alliance with the Ottoman Empire - an alliance, moreover, which
it was still possible to construe as offensive rather than
defensive in character and which might yet cause trouble between
the courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg. It is understandable,
therefore, that Prussia should seek to learn in some detail what
the attitude of her partners in the Triple Alliance would be, if
difficulties did in fact arise between Prussia and Russia. On 4
August 1790 Frederick William observed to> Ewart, the British
ambassador at Berlin, that it ”remained to be considered what
measures ought to be adopted to induce Huissia to agree to the
same terms of Pacification Q..e., the CoEm^tion of Reichenbach^
He added also that^s
should this not be the case, and should [he] be obliged to 
enforce His Demand Qi.e., compliance with the Reichenbach 
Convention], some cooperation by Sea, might become necessary, 
in which case He relied on His Majesty*s friendship and 
assistance, in support of their cominton interests and in 
order to effectuate a general Peace* on such equitable terms
The objective underlying the request. of F’rederick William "for
some cooperation” is indicated clearly ira a note which the
Prussian ministers Finckenstein and Hertsberg addressed to Ewart
1. Ewart to Leeds, P. R. 0., F. 0. 64/18* no. 59? 5 August 1790*
See also on this theme Ewart to Leeds* no. 57? 28 July 1790$
no* 6l, 8 August 17905 no. 64, 1 September 1790$ no. 71? 26 
September 1790*
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on 26 September 1790. The two ministers informed Ewart that the
2
King of Prussia would he :
bien aise de savoir d’une maniere positive les intentions 
de Sa Majeste Britannique, sur quelle assistance et sur 
quel envoi de vaisseaiuc dans la Baltique Elle pourrait 
Compter au printems prochain# C’est apres avoir cette 
assurance precise que le Roi voudrait se concerter avec 
Sa Majeste Britannique sur les Formes d*une declaration 
&nergique et commune a faire a la Cour de Russie
- a passage which underlines the strong desire of Frederick 
William to secure the visible and evident support of George III, 
before allowing himself to run the risk of a serious confronta­
tion with Catherine 11.^
The response evoked from London reflected the continuing 
importance which Pitt and his ministers set on the alliance 
between Great Britain and Prussia (and therefore their inclina­
tion to meet, at least in some measure, the wishes of Frederick 
William) and also a certain apprehension about the possible 
involvement of England in new difficulties with Russia.
The Duke of Leeds, writing to Ewart on 14 August 1790> 
stated that the government at London viewed with favour an 
approach to the court of St. Petersburg, urging that Russia
2. Finckenstein fjCarl Wilhelm, Count von^J and Hertzberg to 
Ewart, P. R. 0., F. 0. 64/18, 26 September 1790#
3* See, Jackson to Leeds, B. M. Egerton MSS., 3501> Private,
28 August 1790.
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accept (as Austria proposed to do) a peace settlement on the 
"basis of the status quo ante helium or not far remote from it* 
The Duke indicated also that the British ambassador at St* 
Petersburg would be instructed to support the representations 
of the Prussian ambassador there5^  and that orders would be
R
given at London for gathering together a naval squadron* At 
the same time the Duke pointed out that various difficulties 
might make it impossible for Great Britain in fact to send that 
squadron into the Baltic: "His Majesty cannot ansv/er for being 
able actually to send a Squadron into the Baltic."
Ewart, on grounds of ill-health, returned from Berlin to 
London in October 1790. He continued throughout the winter of 
1790-91 to emphasize to Pitt and his colleagues the vital 
importance of the Prussian alliance to Great Britain. Ewart 
also pointed out the complications which might arise with 
Prussia from the reluctance of the British government - a 
reluctance maintained throughout these months - to meet the 
desire of Frederick YJilliam for the presence of a British naval 
squadron in the Baltic. His attitude is well exemplified in a
4. See, Leeds to Whitworth, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/12A, 17 August 
1790.
5# Leeds to Ewart, P. R. 0., F. 0. 64/18, Secret, no. 23,
14 August 1790*
6. ibid*
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letter which he wrote to Pitt on 15 January 1791* Here Ewart 
stresses the impatient wish of Frederick William that Pitt send 
a naval force into the Baltic, adding that the King of Prussia 
was becoming more and more distrustful of Great Britain on 
account of rumours then current that the English ministers 
would never order a naval squadron to sail into the Baltic Sea
g
on behalf of Prussia# To Ewart, as this letter makes clear, 
effective co-operation between Britain and Prussia was of major 
importance# For him, not to support such a co-operation meant 
that "all our influence at Berlin and in the North, in general, 
would soon be of no avail, would make it impossible to maintain
9
the present system long and still more so to extend it#,f
Ewart, to his emphasis on the vital importance of the 
Prussian connection for Great Britain, added considerations of 
a different order# The effectiveness of the Triple Alliance 
rested, in his judgment, on the continuing dominance of Prussia 
in the affairs of central and eastern Europe# A threat of the 
most formidable nature now threatened that dominance - a threat 
arising from the southwards advance of Russia towards the Black 
Sea. Ewart argued that in order to maintain the effectiveness
7. Ewart to Pitt, Ewart Papers , 15 January 1791* 
8# ibid.
9* i.e., the political alignment set up in 1788.
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of Prussia as a power of the first importance and, therefore,
as a member of the Triple Alliance, it would be essential to
check the ambition of Russia (and, indeed, of Austria) to win
new territories at the expense of the Ottoman Empire and also
of Poland. Failure to halt these ambitions - above all, in the
case of Russia - might well lead to a most unwelcome and even
fatal diminution in the status and strength of Prussia. Nowhere
does Ewart express his general argument more forcefully than in
a memorandum which he submitted to Pitt late in 1790^*
it is conceived that, in eveiy case of Turkey or Poland 
being attacked, the Allies would be obliged to interfere, 
both on account of Prussia, and of the common interests of 
the two Maritime Powers to preserve peace, and prevent any 
changes from happening in the present state of things.^The 
situation of the King of Prussia makes it absolutely 
necessary for Him, to oppose every attempt made by the two 
Imperial Courts, conjointly or separately, to encroach 
upon Poland or Turkey, as has been sufficiently proved by 
recent transactions, which have obliged Him to contract 
defensive engagements with those two Powers, and His 
resources as an Ally, as well as His general political 
consequence depend on their being confirmed. For, it is 
evident that had the two Imperial Courts succeeded in 
executing their plans of aggrandisement, no proportion 
would have remained between their resources and those of 
Prussia, which would have become an inferior and subordinate 
Power; and it is no less certain that had Russia been 
allowed to acquire the direction of Poland (as she had so 
nearly done two years ago by the. conclusion of an offensive 
and defensive Alliance) Prussia being entirely open on that 
side, could no longer have secured her own frontier, and 
would have been rendered an useless and even burthensome 
Ally. It follows, from this reasoning, that in proportion 
as the Prussian connection is of importance to Great Britain
10. This document is undated, but it can perhaps be assigned to 
November 1790. See, P. R. 0., P. R. 0. 30/8/332, part 2.
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and. Holland, they are interested in maintaining the 
guarantee of Poland and Turkey, for which purpose a 
defensive casus foederis applying to a naval support 
would he chiefly necessary, as Prussia can protect them 
sufficiently by land; hut it is certain that unless this 
is done, there is no security even for Constantinople, 
while Russia is in possession of the Crimea*
Ewart, on several occasions, reduced his comments on the
southwards advance of Russia to a narrower focus, considering
now about the importance of Ochakov, an Ottoman fortress
located at the mouth of the river Dniestr and destined to have
a prominent role in the course of the Russo-Turkish war of
1787-92. Of this fortress Ewart, writing to Pitt on 16 January
17919 will observe that^^s
The possession of Oczakow is allowed by everybody to be 
very essential for enabling the Turks to maintain a 
defensive frontier against Russia; and it is equally 
admitted that its being retained by the latter along with 
the Crimea furnishes every advantage for carrying on 
offensive operations against the remaining Ottoman 
dominions in Europe, Constantinople not excepted.
He returned to this theme in a subsequent letter to Pitt dated
11 February 1791 > describing as fallacious the Dutch claim that
the cession of Ochakov and its dependent territories to Russia
would mean, for the Ottomans, little more than the loss of a
"desert tract of ground between two rivers [i,e., the Dniestr
11, Ewart to Pitt, Ewart Papers , Bath, 16 January 1791*
12, Ewart to Pitt, Ewart Papers , Eath, 11 February 1791*
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Ewart explained his views about Ochakov with no less vigour
when he sought to counter the opinion of Lord Auckland, the
British ambassador at The Hague. Auckland, addressing himself to
Pitt on 29 January 1791? declared that the progress of Russia 
13would be :
little advanced by the possession of Oczakow. If the Turks 
proceed to fortify the banks of the Dniester, or if they 
restore only their fortifications on the banks of the 
Danube upon a better system of defence, I am assured that, 
in any future war, they would have at least as good means 
of resistance as in the case of the present disastrous war.
On 12 February 1791 Ewart set before Lord Auckland his own
judgment of the Ochakov situation:
all the military men whom I "have consulted insist that the 
possession of Oczakow is essential for enabling the Turks 
to maintain a defensive frontier against Russia, since its 
being retained by the latter, along with the Crimea, would 
furnish every advantage for carrying on offensive operations, 
against the remaining Ottoman dominions in Europe, Constan­
tinople not excepted.
Ewart, having delivered himself of this verdict, proceeded at
once in the same letter to link the fate of Ochakov with the
14future of Prussia, indicating to Auckland that :
Without, however examining at length your Lordship’s 
observation, that the political existence and safety of
13. Auckland to Pitt, H. M» C., Dropmore MSS., II, p. 22,
29 January 1791? see also Auckland to Pitt, 2 February 1791? 
ibid., pp. 23-25.
14# Ewart to Auckland, Ewart Papers, Bath, 12 February 1791*
The arguments advanced by Swart are repeated - and not merely 
repeated, but often amplified and elaborated - in other 
sources dating from this time. These repetitions and ampli­
fications can be found in the pamphlet literature published in
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the Turks would probably not be diminished if they were 
obliged to have their barrier on the western borders of 
the Dniester, or even of the Danube, I only ask what would 
become of Prussia, if the two Imperial Courts either 
separately or conjointly were allowed to make any farther 
acquisitions, or to put themselves in a situation to do so 
when they might think proper ?
Unable to decide between the opinions of Auckland and Ewart, 
Pitt continued to investigate the importance of Ochakov. As he 
did so the crisis continued to develop and reached its culmina­
tion in March 1791**^
Meanwhile Frederick William’s impatience grew with every 
day that a final decision failed to arrive from Britain. Doubt 
less the Ottoman envoy who had been in Berlin since February,
London during these years. See, for example, A. Brough, A 
View of the Importance of the Trade between Great Britain 
and Russia (London,1789)?Captain David Sutherland, A Tour 
up the Straits, from Gibraltar to Constantinople (2nd edition, 
London,179Q)? An Address to the Peoule of England, upon the 
Subject of the intended War with Russia (London, 179l)? 
Considerations on the Approach of War, and the Conduct of his 
Majesty’s Ministers (London, 179l)* Por a detailed study of 
this pamphlet literature see, M. S. Anderson, Britain’s 
Discovery of Russia 1553-1815 (London, 1958), pp. I5O-I85.
15. For detailed studies of the government crisis in London
during this period see, The Political Memoranda of Francis, 
Fifth Duke of Leeds, ed.. 0. Browning (Camden Society;
London, 1384)? PP* 148-74; G. B. Hertz, British Imperialism 
in the Eighteenth Century (London, 1908), pp. 153-209? J. H. 
Rose, William Pitt and National Revival (London, 
pp. 598-607? 608-32; R. H. Lord, The Second Partition of 
Poland (London, 1915)? PP* 164-77? 184—91? E. G. Barnes,
George III and William Pitt, 1783-1806 (London, 1939), 
pp. 229-39? Anderson, The Discovery, pp. 154-85? A. Cunning­
ham, "The Oczakow Debate", in Middle Eastern Studies, I
(1964-65), pp. 209-34.
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was urging Prussia to declare war against Russia.^ Eventually
the decision came from Frederick William himself. The Prussian
ambassador in London on 11 March 1791 presented his King’s
letter to the British government. Frederick William urged
"England to consider vjhether the best course of action would
not be that of inducing Russia by means of superior forces,
both naval and military, to follow the example of the Emperor";
17but he made it clear that :
in case England cannot resolve on so vigorous a course of 
action, the cession of Oczakoff would be its natural out­
come. It seems to me incontestable that Russia by the 
possession of that place gains over Turkey a superiority 
which may be very prejudicial to the interests even of 
England. As the decisive moment is drawing near, I wait a 
definitive declaration on this subject.
Pitt and the Foreign Secretary, Leeds, responded positively:
on 27 March an ultimatum was sent off to St. Petersburg by which
Catherine was asked to make clear her resolution within ten days.
Failure to do so would be considered by Britain a declaration
18
of war. The next day George Ill’s message, in which he asked
for the augmentation of the British navy, was presented to both
Houses. The opposition to Pitt from the House of Commons and
from public opinion was so strong that he soon had to abandon
19his original plan. Leeds, however, insisting on firmness,
16. See below p. 175*
17* Quoted in Rose, op. cit., p. 608.
Leeds Memoranda, p. Ip2; Rose, ibid., 609-10.
19* For details see, Anderson, The Discovery, p. 156 ff.
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resigned a few days later, on 21 April 1791> and 'was replaced
20ly Lord Grenville.
Thereafter the course of affairs took a different line.
Ewart had, on 20 April, been instructed to leave for Berlin in
order to explain to Frederick Vfilliam the difficulties with
which the British government was confronted. At the same time
he was to urge the King to join Britain in a new plan to he
proposed to Catherine, i.e., on a modification of the strict 
21status quo. His arrival at Berlin on 29 April was welcomed by
the King. Frederick William agreed now not to insist on Russia
making peace with the Ottoman Empire on the strict status quo,
but to be satisfied with a modified version of it. Hertzberg,
too, who always preferred diplomacy to force, equally welcomed 
22the new plan. The Tsarina now was to be induced to make peace 
in exchange for Ochakov and its district as far as the Dniestr. 
In May of the same year, William Fawkener was sent off as 
special envoy to Catherine to persuade her to adopt the new 
proposals. This endeavour, pursued throughout the summer, came 
to nothing; Catherine refused to co-operate with the Allied 
Powers and wanted to settle her affairs with the Turks on
20* Leeds Memoranda, p. 173#
21. Rose, op. cit., p. 619; Anderson, The Discovery, p. 157*
22. Rose, op. cit., p. 619*
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23
absolute principles. The Sultan was, indeed, reluctant to 
give in, hut nevertheless a few months later, seeing himself 
isolated, he consented to make concessions.
Pitt, offering an alliance to the Emperor and also wishing 
to end the long and interrupted negotiations at Sistova, sent 
Lord Elgin to Florence - requesting him to conclude his negotia­
tions with the Ottomans in accordance with the Reichenbach 
Convention.^ Frederick William, too, pressed the Emperor to 
adopt the same course. Finally on 4 August 1791 > with the Allied
Powers1 mediation, a treaty was concluded between Austria and
25
the Ottomans, at Sistova.
The instructions received by Ainslie towards the end of 
2 6August, 1790, were now to enable him to play a more active 
role than he had done in the previous months. As has been noted 
before, his major tasks were to urge the Porte to seek an 
immediate armistice and at the same time to hasten the appoint­
ment of the plenipotentiaries for the projected peace with 
Austria. To achieve this end, a joint action was no doubt needed
23. ibid., pp. 621-24; Anderson, The Discovery, p. 157*
24* Rose, op. cit., pp. 619-20.
25* See, Le Bon. Charles de Martens, Recueil des Principaux
Traitds conclus par les Puissances de lyEurope, denuis 1761 
jusqufd present 1791-1795* V (2nd edition, Gottingue,1826),
PP- 249-59.
26. See abovej*p. /^7-
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with, the Dutch and the Prussian ambassadors - a joint action which 
would enable them to overcome certain difficulties which might 
occur on the Ottoman side - in order that negotiations at the 
congress might begin.
Von Knobelsdorff, too, had received his instructions, and
in order to report the long delayed ratification of the Prusso-
Ottoman treaty and also to press the Turks for an immediate
27
armistice, on 27 August 1790 met the Re*is Efendi. He made it 
clear to the Re*is Efendi that the Sultan should not attempt to 
raise the Crimean question, as any such attempt would be pre­
mature, and, in any case, contrary to the Reichenbach Convention. 
The Porte should make a separate armistice with Austria, which
would agree to the status quo ante bellum. The Re*is Efendi,
28however, refused any discussion on the new proposals.
Von Knobelsdorff, having obtained no formal answer from the 
Re*is Efendi, at once sought Ainslie*s assistance in order to 
press the Porte on these matters. Ainslie, now acting with full 
power, did not hesitate to comply with the request and on 28 
August, in conjunction with the Dutch ambassador, submitted a
27# Ainslie to Leeds, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/ll, no. 21, 29 August 
1790; cf., Zinkeisen, op. cit., VI, pp. 798-800.
28. Ainslie, however, informed Leeds that the Re*is Efendi: nfairly 
confessed that the Porte had already been too often deceived, 
to admit of unbounded confidence in the views of Prussia.”
(see, Ainslie to Leeds, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/ll, no. 21, 29 
August 1790)
memorial to the Porte, ' Both ambassadors emphasized that their 
courts would have "lfhonneur de presser la conclusion immediate 
de 1*armistice". They also pointed out that this agreement was 
considered by their courts "comme ^galement agreable a la Grande 
Bretagne, a la Prusse, a lfAutriche, et a la Hollande", adding 
that the armistice was: "le point essentiel, qui doit n^cessaire 
ment preceder le Congres des plenipotentiaires", ^
The response of the Porte was not long in coming. A week
later, on 6 September 1790, "the Porte invited Ainslie and the
Dutch ambassador to a meeting, with the Ottoman officials, at
the Sultan*s summer k i o s k . T h e r e  the Re*is Efendi declared
that the Porte had agreed to an immediate armistice with Austria
and that the preparations had already started for the appoint-
32
ment of plenipotentiaries. As we have seen, the Reichenbach 
Convention had been concluded without the Turks being consulted. 
Nevertheless the outcome of it was so favourable to them that 
they had not hesitated to comply with it. As Ainslie informed 
the Duke of Leeds in his despatch of 8 September 1790s ’’the
29. Ainslie to Leeds, P. R. 0., P. 0. 78/ll, no. 21, 29 August
1790.
30. The joint memorial, dated Pera, 28 August 1790, is found in 
(P. R. 0., P. 0. 73/11)
31. Ainslie to Leeds, P. R. 0., P. 0. 73/ll, no. 23, 8 September
1790. At this meeting the Ka^i*asker of Rumeli and the 
Beglikpi were also present.
32. ibid.
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Turks, naturally haughty, suspicious and vindictive, could not 
deny their obligation to Prussia nor hide their disapprobation 
of an arrangement concluded without their knowledge and concurr­
ence".'^ In another despatch dated 16 September, however, he 
emphasized: "It is beyond doubt that this Ministry, the Ulema 
and the Publick in general, are heartily tired of the war,"^
It is hardly surprising that the Sultan was so ready to 
make peace with Austria. The Convention of Reichenbach, although 
it did not promise anything in regard, to Russia or the return 
of the Crimea, at least offered the Sultan the recovery of all 
the territories he had lost to Austria during the present war. 
Furthermore he would now find himself free on the Austrian 
side and would be able to concentrate all his forces on Russia, 
his most formidable enemy. The Sultan certainly found it wise 
to comply with the policies of the Allied Courts, for he was 
still expecting Prussia to join him against Russia. After all, 
although Frederick William had not agreed to fight the Russians 
for the recovery of the Crimea, he was still bound by the 
treaty which promised a return to the status quo ante bellum.
The Sultan, indeed, ordered the Grand Vizir, ^erif Hasan Pa^a, 
to sign an armistice with Austria without delay. The Grand 
Vizir, too, was disposed to peace, as he had no faith in his
33. ibid.
34* Ainslie to Leeds, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/11, no. 24> 16 September
1790.
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35armies’ ability to continue the war. Thus, on 17 September 
1790, the armistice was signed by the Prince de Saxe Cobourg 
and ^erif Hasan Pa^a at Georgiova.^
Soon after the conclusion of the Reichenbach Convention 
in July 1790, Sweden believing that she would receive no 
assistance from the Triple Alliance, made peace with Russia,
37
on 14 August 1790* Gustavus III now wanted his ally Selim III 
to make peace with Russia and promised that he would obtain 
the most advantageous terms from Catherine * Therefore in order 
to persuade the Sultan, the Swedish ambassador, acting in 
co-operation with the Spanish ambassador, submitted, on 26
O Q
September 1790, a long memorial to the Porte. It urged that 
the Sultan should not listen to the Allied Powers* promises 
and that he should entrust his interests to the hands of
39* Hukaleme Mazbatasi, I (Istanbul, 1853-1856), pp. 26-29,
44-5> Cevdet, Ta,1 rib* V, pp. 55~82; cf., Uzuncar^ili, op. 
cit., 570.
36. See, Geo. Fred, de Martens, Recueil de Traites... des 
Puissances et etats de 1*Europe tant dans leur raunort 
mutuel nue dans colui envers les Puissances et etats dans 
d ’autres parties du globe Uepuis.1761 jusau’a present, 1785- 
1790 inclusive, IV (2nd edition; Gottingue, ... 1818), pp.466-
71; Leopold Leumann and Adolphe de Plason, Recueil des 
Traites et Conventions conclus par l’Autriche avec les 
Puissances e t range re s d e pui s 17 63 jusou* a no s jours, I
Tl eipsic, 1855), pp. 431-35.
37* Lord, op. cit., pp. 166-67; Stanislaviskaya, loc. cit., 
pp. 46-7; Anderson, The Discovery, p. 149*
38. Ainslie sent a copy of this memorial to London (see, Ainslie 
to Leeds, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/ll, no. 26, 7 October 1790).
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Gustavus III* This turn of affairs had obviously caused 
uneasiness to Ainslie, who felt himself obliged at this 
juncture to combat the intrigues of the rival ministers*
■jo
Ainslie informed Leeds in a despatch dated 7 October 1790 that
The Cabal, now openly assisted by the Swedes, did not 
cease to assert in public and in the Seraglio, that even 
the Maritime Powers were inimical to the Demands formed 
against Russia and disapproved the Measures of Prussia 
[jL.e*, that Prussia should declare war against Russia in 
favour of the Turks]; that JjfcheJ interference at Reichen­
bach had been combined to favour the Interests of Austria 
with whom they meditated an alliance; and that this 
Disposition will soon appear manifest at the Congress, 
their Ministers are destined to officiate as Plenipotent­
iaries*
Ainslie believed that the intrigues of the rival ministers
were in fact aimed not only against the Allied Powers but also
against his personal influence* His apprehension, however, soon
dissolved when the Sultan refused to make peace with Russia.
The Sultan at the same time ordered the Retis Efendi to inform
the divan not to discuss any peace proposal in regard to Russia.
Ainslie on 7 October informed Leeds that the Sultan even "Had
transmitted orders to the Vizir by which he is directed to
decline whatever Proposal for peace (with Russia) without the
40direct interference of Prussia*" Ainslie thought it was high
39* Ainslie to Leeds, P. R. 0*, F* 0. 78/il, no* 26, 7 October
1790.
40. ibid*
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time again to act in a more vigorous way in support of the 
Prussian policy in the Ottoman Empire. In order to remove 
doubts in the minds of the Ottoman officials created by the 
Swedish ambassador, and at the same time to support the Sultan*s 
determination, on 1 October 1790, in a note to the Porte, he 
refuted the Spanish and the Swedish ambassadors* accusations 
against the Allied Powers. His despatch of 7 October is relevant 
here:
I could not, consistently with my instructions hesitate a 
moment in taking the necessary Steps for securing the 
mediation, and opposing, particularly at this moment the 
dangerous Intrigues of the Bourbon faction headed by Spain, 
accordingly I used my utmost Influence in justifying the 
Intentions and Conduct of Prussia with Regard to the Porte: 
I reprobated the Idea of weakening, at least for the 
present, a connection, which even after the defection of 
Sweden, overawed Russia into Sentiments of Moderation: and 
I insisted on the Propriety of fulfilling every Engagement; 
particularly those which relate to future Mediation.
He did not doubt that "my Efforts have material Influence in
defeating the extensive and I must suppose dangerous Intrigues
of Spain, and in averting the Consequences of the Defection of
Sweden, whose credit is now absolutely null."^
The Porte, perhaps with the idea of seeing how far Ainslie 
really was disposed towards their policy, now took a new step. 
On the day that Ainslie submitted the above-mentioned note, the
41. ibid.
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Ap
dragoman of the Porte brought an official invitation - asking 
him whether or not he was ready to take upon himself the office 
of plenipotentiary of the British government* The dragoman, at 
the same time transmitted a letter of the Grand Vizir ^erif 
Hasan Pasa addressed to Ainslie (dated 23 September 1790) 
requesting him to be present at the camp and then to proceed to 
the place where the ensuing congress was to be held.^ Ainslie, 
at this critical moment of affairs, found it difficult not to 
comply with the Porte*s request* Ke also thought it would be 
more appropriate to respond to the Porte in order to demonstrate 
Britain’s good intentions towards the Ottomans; furthermore, the 
latter should not leave any room for a manoeuvre of the other 
ambassadors. In his despatch dated 7 October 1790, Ainslie 
explained to Leeds the reason why he had accepted such an 
invitation. He declared that "in virtue of my Pull Power I was 
ready to co-operate in anything wanted." Moreover, he was ready 
"to proceed at a Moment’s Warning to the Place of Congress and 
there wait His Majesty’s o r d e r s . W r i t i n g  two days later, on 
9 October, Ainslie believed that "In this critical and for every 
reason unfortunate crisis, I think it my Duty to encourage as
42. The same invitation was also made to the Dutch ambassador. 
43# Ainslie sent a copy of the Grand Vizir’s letter to London 
(see enclosure to his letter to Leeds, P. R. 0., P. 0.
78/ll, no. 26, 7 October 1790)*
44* Ainslie to Leeds, P. R. 0., P. 0. 78/ll, no. 26, 7 October
1790.
much as possible and. without committing my Court, the persever­
ance of the Turks in their Engagements with Prussia,1' Finally, 
he pointed out to Leeds that the rival ambassadors were trying
"to ruin our Influence to precipitate a Peace with Russia and
45possibly to unite their Forces against the allied Courts,"
Leeds received the despatch of 7 October on 12 November
461790# He at once instructed Ainslie that s
there is not the slightest Intention of sending Your 
Excellency from Constantinople to assist, as His Majesty*s 
Plenipotentiary, at the Congress, and in case a Contrary 
opinion should have gone forth, Your Excellency is directed 
to contradict it, in most explicit Terms,
45* Ainslie to Leeds, P, R, 0., F. 0. 78/ll, no, 27, 9 October
1790# It is, perhaps, worthwhile to quote here at some length 
this despatch where he clearly defined his policy to Leeds: 
"Since the Epoch of the Treaty of Berlin I have co-operated 
with the Prussian and the Butch Ministers in securing the 
exclusive Mediation for future Peace, and I hope I may be 
permitted to say, my Success in both pursuits is evinced by . 
the great Enemies it has procured me.
"Since the Convention of Reichenbach, I have consistently 
with Your Grace*s lav/s, and His Majesty* s benevolent Intent­
ions.,. incessantly pressed whatever tended to the Completion 
of the separate Peace with Austria; and finally since the 
unexpected Swedish Arrangement concluded thro* the Mediation 
of Spain, have done all in my Power... to counteract the 
impertinent allegations of our Rivals, and not to lose the 
fruits of all my past Trouble, and at the same time those of 
our acquired Influence, that I did not hesitate in accepting 
the Invitation of the Grand Vizir, and in declaring my 
readiness to proceed directly (if judged necessary) to the 
Camp and there wait Your Grace*s Instructions."
46. Leeds to Ainslie, P. R. 0., F, 0. 78/ll, 12 November 1790*
It was a common practice at the Ottoman Porte for the Sultan 
to make considerable gifts of money to the foreign pleni­
potentiaries at the conclusion of a peace treaty. Thus,
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The fact was that, on 15 October, the Duke had already appointed
47Sir Robert Keith as plenipotentiary to the congress, Keith, on
26 October 1790, informed Ainslie of the fact that "His Majesty’s
Commission1’ was entrusted to him.^ Ainslie, who received Keith’s
letter on 30 November, though disappointed, the same day informed
49the Porte of Keith’s appointment. Following the Sultan’s pro­
posal, the congress was to take place at Sistova, a small town 
in Bulgaria, on the Danube, as he was unwilling to send his
plenipotentiaries to the lands of a Christian power, on the
50ground that this would have been an insult to his dignity.
Ainslie by not being employed at the Sistova Congress had 
lost, an estimated figure of nearly thirty thousand pounds 
in presents (see, B. M. Add. MSS., 38229). Of., D. 3,
Horn, The British Diplomatic Service, 1669-1789 (Oxford,
1961), pp. 57-8, where the author considers this sum ”a 
gross over-estimated.” al
47* Leeds to Keith, P. R. 0., F. 0. 7/22, no. 23, 15 October
1790.
48. Keith to Ainslie, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/ll, Vienna, 27 October -
1790.
49* Ainslie to Leeds, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/ll, no. 37, 8 December
1790. On this occasion (8 December), Ainslie wrote to Keith;
"I heartily wish you the most distinguished publick success, 
with all personal satisfaction. Be assured My dear Sir, I 
feel no ways awkward in paying this Compliment to a Minister 
of your superior merit, for after all I know the respect due 
to our Royal Master’s Choice, and even admitting that fourteen 
years Residence in Turkey, might justify my hopes, yet I am 
still convinced that I shall be the only Loser by that Choice 
having fallen upon you.” . .
50. See, Mukaleme Mazbatasi, I, pp. 47-95 Uzunpar^ili, Osmanli 
Tarihi, iv/l, pp. 570-71. Although in a recent work it is 
stated that Ainslie “encouraged the Ottomans to insist on one 
of their own cities” , neither the Turkish sources nor Ainslie*s 
despatches confirm such an allegation, Cf., Stanford J. Shaw, 
Between Old and New, The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selirn III, 
1789-1807 (Cambridge, Massachusetts', 1971)» p. 57*
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The two sides, the Austrians and the Ottomans, met under
the mediation of the Allied Powers [jl.e., Prussia, Britain and
Holland] on 31 December 1790, at Sistova. ^  According to the
Reichenbach Convention the Sultan*s dominions were to be
52guaranteed by the Allied Powers. The Ottoman and the Austrian
plenipotentiaries wanted to know whether the Allied Powers were
now ready to accept that the negotiations should continue on
53the same principles. Lucchesini, the Prussian plenipotentiary,
supported the Austrians and the Ottomans. But Keith insisted
54that his court promised no such basis for negotiations. Indeed,
after the Reichenbach Convention, Leeds, writing to Keith in
August 1790, had already made it clear that^;
with respect to the Guaranty of the Definitive Treaty, 
it will be impossible for His Majesty to decide positively 
on that Point till the precise terms on which it is to be 
concluded shall be settled at the proposed congress.
Throughout the negotiations, therefore, Keith made it clear that,
Britain would not become a guaranteeing power until after the
51. The details of the Sistova negotiations can be found in, Mrs. 
Gillespie Smyth, ed. Memoir'ZJs and Correspondence of Sir Robert
A  ■  I -  ■ ■  .1 ■ 1 j .i ■ ■  ■  ■ imj., ^  ■■ 1 ■ ■  ■ ■  1 ■  r.  .  . ■  ■  ■ .
Keith, II (London, 1849)> PP* 335-447; Mukaleme Mazbatasi, I, 
pp. 96-212; see also Burenstam, Les Kegociations de paix 
entre l’Autriche et la Turquie ^ Schistova (Decembre 1790 - 
Aoftt 1791), in Revue d*Kistoirc Diplomatique, Douzieme Armee 
(Paris, I898), pp. 225-56.
52. Cf., Spiegel, op. cit., pp. 297-300. _
53. Memoirs of Keith, II, pp. 335-50; Mukaleme Mazbatasi, I
pp. 96, 107-8, 125-30.
54. Memoirs of Keith. II, pp. 316-18, 340-49, 375-76.
55- Leeds to Keith, P. R. 0., P. 0. 7/21, no. 18, 16 August 1790,
see also no. 23, 15 October 1790.
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conclusion cf the treaty between the Ottoman Empire and Austria, 
Later Austria started to show signs of unwillingness to comply 
with the terms of the Convention of Reichenbach, the congress, 
therefore, could not continue and in February 1791 > "the negotia­
tions were broken off by the Austrian plenipotentiaries. They 
were not resumed until June 1791.
Meanwhile, the Sultan, in order to discover why Frederick
Vfilliam did not declare war against Russia, sent Ahmed Azmi
5 6Efendi as special envoy to Berlin, He also continued to
strengthen his forces on the Russian frontiers for the coming
campaigns. But the Grand Vizir, $ e r i f  Hasan Pa^ a,, knowing the
limited capacities of his forces and their lack of discipline,
57advised the Sultan to make peace with Russia, continuing to
urge this policy until his execution in February 1791* The
Sultan replaced him by the former Grand Vizir, Yusuf Pa?a, the
58most ardent of the supporters of the war with Russia. The 
Sultan’s mother, like Serif Hasan Pa^a, favoured peace. Ainslie
56. Cevdet, Taf rib* IV, pp. 72-80; cf., Faik Re^it Unat, Osmanli 
Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri (Ankara, 1968), pp. 149—54*
Ahmed Azmi Efendi*s account, which is to be found in Cevdet, 
Ta* rib? V, pp. 346-69, contains no reference to the political 
events which occasioned his mission to Berlin.
57* Cevdet, Ta* rlfo, V, pp. 81-2; Uzunpar^ili, Osmanli Tarihi, 
IV/l, pp. 577-78.
58. ibid., pp. 578-82; Cevdet, Ta* rifr, V, pp. 102-4.
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in a despatch dated 22 January 1791* thus described the 
situation at Istanbul: "The Valide is at the head of a Party, 
who in conjunction with the Bourbon Paction and the other Russian 
agents, do all in their Power to depreciate the Prussian Alliance, 
and to clap up a Peace with Russia*" He, none the less, referred 
in the same despatch to the Sultan’s determination "to fulfil 
his Engagements, and refuse whatever Proposal may be made inde-
Ainslie, indeed, sought to encourage the Sultan to be more 
confident that the Allied Powers* supported his policy* When, on 
15 January 1791* "the Re*is Efendi Rasid, asked Ainslie what the 
attitude of Britain was towards the Russian court, he openly 
declared that:
His Majesty in conjunction with his Allies, have made the 
most serious Representations to the Empress upon the 
dangerous tendency of the present war, and of persisting 
in refusing their offered Mediation for restoring 
Tranquillity*
At the same time he gave it as his private opinion that "the 
Ulterior Resolution of My Court would be guided by the Deter­
mination (which could not long be retarded) In early May 1791*
pendent of the Allied Courts
59whom He chiefly confides*"
59* Ainslie to Leeds, P* R* 0*, P. 0* 78/l2A,.no* 2, 22 January
1791.
60* ibid.
on receiving through Keith the news of George III1s message to
Parliament regarding the augmentation of the navy,^ Ainslie
took a further step: in a despatch dated 8 May 1791 he informed 
6 2
Leeds that he had told the Refis Efendi that "His Majesty’s 
resolution to augment his naval Force, sufficiently indicated 
an Intention to do whatever is necessary to forward the views 
of Great Britain and Her A l l i e s . A i n s l i e  was convinced that 
this step was "necessary for removing doubts circulated here 
respecting the perfect understanding Between Great Britain and 
Prussia", and he now informed Leeds that as a result "the Sultan 
has prohibited His Ministers from opening any Negotiation what­
ever for Peace, [ji.e., to he concluded with RussiaJ hut in 
conjunction with his Ally the King of P r u s s i a . W h i l e  Ainslie 
and Von Knohelsdorff were assuring the Porte that the Allied 
Povjers would force Russia to make peace on the strict status 
quo, events had developed in London in a rather negative way, 
and soon Ainslie was to he instructed to adopt a new line of 
policy•
Ewart, having obtained from Frederick William a promise of
61. Since November 1790 Ainslie had received, in fact, no
instructions from London.
62. Leeds resigned on 21 April 1791* see above p.l^3-
63. Ainslie to Leeds, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/12A, no. 9* 8 May 1791*
64* ibid.
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co-operation, i.e., that Prussia would persuade the Turks to
6s
make concessions to Russia, informed Ainslie on 5 May 1791 of 
the new course of events.^ Ainslie received Ewart*s letter on 
9 June. Lord Grenville also now wrote to Ainslie, sending new 
instructions in a despatch dated 20 May 1791* Ke emphasized to
frj
Ainslie that :
the Conclusion of a separate Peace "between Russia and the 
Porte, on the ground of the Modification of the Status Quo 
mentioned to you bjr Mr. Ewart, or of such other Modifica­
tion as may he agreed upon, short of the unqualified 
Cession of Oczakow and of the whole District as far as 
Dniester is a point which is certainly extremely desirable 
with a view to the present circumstance and it is probable 
that the consent of the Turks to such an agreement, may be 
the more readily given, but on account of the recent 
success of Russia, and from the Expectation and assurance 
which you may now feel yourself authorized to put out to 
them, of a Disposition in the Two Allied Courts and in the 
Court of Madrid to join in a Guaranty to them of their 
remaining Possession subsequent to the Conclusion of a 
Peace on these Terms, you will therefore exert yourself to 
this effect, in concert with the Prussian Minister.
Ainslie received the instruction on 9 June 1791 anJ at 
once communicated with Von Knobelsdorff, who was already informed 
of the new plan. Both of them without losing time requested a
65. See above, p. 3-
66. Ewart to Ainslie, P. R. 0., P. 0. 64/21, 5 May 1791* Ewart 
sent also to Ainslie copies of the instructions which he had 
received from Grenville, dated 20 April and 26 April 1791* 
See also Ewart to Grenville, P. R. 0., P. 0. 64/21, no.2,
6 May 1791.
67. Grenville to Ainslie, P. R. 0., P. 0. 78/12A, no. 2, 20 May
1791.
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68meeting of the Porte, and this was granted for 11 June.
Ainslie opened the conference by informing the Reris Efendi of 
the recent changes that had occurred in the European states and 
their effect on the Allied Courts* policy. He stressed that 
Denmark and Spain opposed any intention by the Allied Courts 
to employ force in compelling Russia to make peace with the 
Ottomans on the strict status q u o  ante bellum. Ainslie now 
requested the Porte to co-operate with the A.llied Powers by 
sacrificing some territories to Russia, and pointed out that 
the Allied Powers would guarantee the remaining territories of 
the Ottoman Empire. He, indeed, emphasized that William 
Fawkener had left for St. Petersburg to urge Catherine to make 
an immediate peace. Von Knobelsdorff, too, argued the same
69
points and requested the Sultan to end the war with Russia.
The observations of Von Knobelsdorff are, perhaps, relevant 
here70:
L*ambassadeur d*Angleterre, qui m*a toujours dans cette 
conference assiste avec tout le zele et le feu possible, 
son experience et le grand usage des affaires lui fourniss- 
ant des Ressources inepuisables fit observer qu’une Guerre 
ouverte ne pouvait pas leur procurer des plus grands 
avantages que la position armee dans la quelle se trouvait
68. Ainslie to Grenville, P. R. 0., F. 0. 7S/12A, no. 14>
14 June 1791*
69# ibid.
70. Knobelsdorff to Frederick William (undated, in P. R. 0., F.O. 
78/12A).
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V. M# et le Roi Son Maitre, puisqu'elle occupoit les deux 
Tiers de l’Armee Russe, et tenoit enchaine sa Flotte dans 
la Mer Baltique,
Meanwhile, the Turkish envoy to Berlin, having discussed
the recent development of affairs with Ewart, promised that he
71would recommend the Porte to comply with the new proposals.
But in fact the attitude at Istanbul had changed; and Ainslie
had difficulties in persuading the officials of the Porte to
make concessions to Russia, Writing to Keith on 14 June 1791j
he reported: "I have it from undoubted authority, that the
Mufti has declared against any concessions of territory whatever,
72
and even against a suspension of hostilities with Russia," A
month later, Ainslie still had had no success in persuading the
Ottomans to make peace with Russia, In a despatch dated 14 July
he again informed Keith that the Sultan was not "disposed to
make important concessions to Russia, whom he esteems unable to
maintain her conquests in Turkey and much more than himself,
73perplexed and embarrassed, by the continuation of the war,"
In the same despatch he declared that "the- Ottoman Cabinet, the
71. Ewart to Grenville, P. R. 0., F. 0. 64/21, no, 7? 13 May
1791.
72. Ainslie to Keith, P* R. 0., F. 0. 7$/l2A, 14 June 1791*
Ainslie sent copies of this despatch to Grenville and
Ewart. He continued the sa,me practice in future, reporting 
his activities to all the British ministers concerned.
73. Ainslie to Keith, P. R. 0., P. 0. 78/12A, 14 July ,1791.
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ulemah, and the camp, all approve the sultan1s determination to
reject, as inexpedient whatever modifications of the strict
status quo ante helium for the hasis of reconciliation with 
74Russia*" At the same time, writing to Ewart on 14 July 1791*
Ainslie described his unsuccessful endeavours to induce the
Turks to adopt the new plan; "I am sorry to say that the Porte
is by no means inclined to make concessions to Russia: nay it is
already determined to prosecute the campaign; from which much is
75expected, and nothing apprehended*"  ^Ainslie, indeed, in more
V 6
forthright words, gave it as his private opinion that :
In short this Court was originally encouraged by us, by 
the Swedes, by the Poles, and underhand by the Austrians 
to expect that the strict status quo would be the basis of 
the future peace with Russia, and I can perceive no 
symptom of a disposition to relinquish Oczakow.
Ainslie believed that unless the Russians were to obtain a
distinct advantage over the Ottoman armies, there was no real
chance that any intervention, from whatever quarter it might
come, would make the Turks sign a peace with the Russians on
77the basis of the new proposals.
None the less, Ainslie on 8 July 1791 was informing Gren­
ville that*^:
74* ibid.
75- Ainslie to Ewart, P. R. 0., P. 0. 26l/7, 14 July 1791*
76. ibid.
77- Ainslie to Grenville, P* R. 0., F. 0. 78/12A, no.17* 14 July 1791-
78. Ainslie to Grenville, P. R. 0., F. 0. J & / 1 2 A , no.16, 8 July 1791*
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the Grand question of the Seraglio, at the Porte, and in 
the Divan is, will His Prussian Majesty consistently with 
His Engagements, and repeated Promises, declare war 
against Russia, and will the guaranteeing Courts resent 
the notorious infractions of the Reichenbach Convention ?"
Ainslie assured Grenvilley however, that he had done his utmost,
with the co-operation of Von Knobelsdorff, to answer these
questions in accordance with their instructions. But he found it
embarrassing to give a satisfactory answer to the question which
the officials of the Porte evidently had in their minds: "How
far the Porte can, and ought to trust for the present, and in
future, to our Guaranty of their Possessions, subsequent to the
79Peace now proposed by us, with Russia ?" It would seem that 
Ainslie came to the conclusion that he had no alternative but 
to await new instructions for his guidance in the following 
weeks; his contacts with the officials of the Porte became less 
frequent•
During this period the Russian armies won new victories 
over the Ottomans, and this development made it increasingly 
difficult for Britain and Prussia to insist on the negotiation 
of modified terms with Catherine.
Grenville now took a new step, and on 29 July 1791* sent
79- ibid.
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further instructions to Ainslie, urging him to use his "utmost
endeavours to convince the Ministers of the Porte how much it is
for their interest to enter into direct negotiations with the
Russians for the termination of the War." Grenville, however,
recommended Ainslie^:
to he particularly cautious not to use, without express 
instructions... any expressions either in written memorials, 
or minutes of conferences, or even in conversation with 
the Turkish Ministers, which can he construed to pledge 
His Majesty in any Manner, with respect to the line of 
conduct which He may think proper to pursue in the event of 
the failure of the negotiations at Petersburg.
These negotiations were, indeed, fruitless so that Grenville in
the light of these developments, two weeks later, i.e., on 19 
01
August 1791* sent another despatch to Ainslie which curbed all 
his activities.
Ainslie was informed that in view of "the inability of the
Turks to resist the progress of the Russian arms", Britain
could not take any:
further step with a view to the attainment of more favour­
able terms than those which are now offered by Russia £i.e•, 
the absolute cession of the territories as far as the 
DniestrJ or even with a view to press these terms upon the 
Empress, supposing that the refusal of the Porte at the 
present moment should lead to further success on the part 
of the Russians.
80. Grenville to Ainslie, P. R. 0., P. 0. 78/12A, no. 4* 29 July
1791.
81. Grenville to Ainslie, P. R. 0., P. 0. 78/12A, no. 5* 19 
August 1791 and no. 6, 19 August 1791*
184.
Furthermore, Ainslie was urged to point out to the Porte "how
materially the Turks have been assisted by considerable diversion
of the Ruusian force which has been occasioned by the Armaments
of His Majesty and the'King of Prussia in the present year", and
to stress that his Britannic Majesty:
feels it therefore a mark of His friendship towards the 
Porte to point out the necessity of closing with the 
present offers, in order to prevent the risk of further 
losses £andj without involving His own subjects in the 
expences and disadvantages of war.
Grenville also instructed Ainslie "to be particularly careful to
abstain from giving assurances on the subject of a guaranty of
the possession £sic^J of the Porte subsequent to the conclusion
82of the Peace" between Russia and the Ottoman Empire.
At the same time, in another despatch bearing the same 
date, Grenville instructed. Ainslie not to feel himself there­
after "at liberty" to co-operate with the Prussian ambassador; 
he nevertheless recommended Ainslie to be careful as far as 
possible to avoid "any public step which may mark any difference
O 0
of opinion between you" and Von Knobelsdorff.
Ainslie received these despatches on 8 and 19 September 1791*
82. Grenville to Ainslie, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/12A, no. 5* 19 August
1791.
83. Grenville to Ainslie, P. R* 0., F. 0. 78/12A, no. 6, 19 August
1791.
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He, in accordance with the instructions given, contacted the
Porte and recommended that peace should he made without delay
to avoid the consequences of Catherine*s ambition. But the
Porte received "with great coolness" his advice and no answer
thus had been given to his representations0In a despatch dated
8 September he wrote of "the Disappointment of this People...
can hardly be exaggerated, no more than the 111 Humour of the
Sultan, who always maintained the Validity of the Prussian 
84-Promises", to declare war against Russia.
Ainslie, with the idea of persuading the Turks, sought the 
Prussian and the Dutch ambassadors* assistance, but was told 
that they had no intention of intervening between the Ottomans 
and the Russians, believing that their intervention would only 
"discredit" them at the Porte, as Prussia had no positive offer
o c
to make to the Sultan. Hence, the relations between Ainslie
and the ambassadors of the Triple Alliance became increasingly
reserved. He, however, continued in his endeavour to bring the
Turks to an early settlement with Russia. On 8 October 1791?
86he declared that :
84. Ainslie to Grenville, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/12A, no. 22, 
8 September 1791*
85. Ainslie to Grenville, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/12A, no. 25,
8 October 1791*
86. ibid.
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I have consistently with my Instructions, seized every 
opportunity of recommending and forwarding the earliest 
Conclusion of the Pacification... and I shall continue 
most carefully to avoid all Distinctions, whatever is 
discussed, without committing in any Manner or shape the 
absolute Independence of my Court, from whatever Foreign 
Engagement•
Meanwhile, the Grand Vizir Yusuf Pa^a, realizing at last 
the weakness of the Ottoman armies, concluded that peace was 
to he made with Russia. Moreover, the Re*is Efendi and most of 
the Ottoman officials openly began to support the views of the
q»7
Grand Vizir. But on the other hand the Sultan was not yet
prepared to end the war on dishonourable terms. Ainslie in his
despatch of 25 October informed Grenville that "the Sultan who
is both - head strong and capricious unexpectedly refused his
Ear to the Deputation of the Cabinet, composed of the Mufti,
88the Reis Effendi and the Vizir’s Lieutenant", when they 
advised him to make peace.
While the Sultan was obstructing the road to peace,
Ainslie received a new instruction, dated 9 September 1791? 
ordering him to continue his representations at the Porte "till 
the [war] is finally c o n c l u d e d . H e ,  without losing time on
87* Uzunparsili, op. cit., IV/l, pp. 5&9-90.
88. Ainslie to Grenville, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/12A, no, 26,
25 October 1791*
89* Grenville to Ainslie, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/12A, 9 September 1791*
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8 November submitted a memorandum to the Porte, "by which he
90urged the Ottomans for the s
conclusion la plus prompte possible de la Paix avec la 
Russie; puisque les circonstances actuelles de LfEurope 
presentent en general plusieurs motifs d*apprehension, et 
aucune probabilite dfavantages dans le cas d*un trop long 
delai de se rendre aux conseils des veritables Amis, et 
d*ecouter les voeux de l*humanite.
As the Prussian ambassador had ’’lost much of [jhisj
Influence” at the Porte, Ainslie on 21 December was to declare
that "For My Part I lose no opportunity of recommending the
desirable Peace, and I have the satisfaction to find that the
91Vizir, and the best part of the Council”, supported his
recommendations. A few days later, he informed Grenville that
the Seraglio had requested his opinion on the general political
92
situation in Europe. Of this event he emphasized that :
I did not lose the favourable opportunity to recommend 
Peace... as more consistent with the Honor and with the 
Interests of this Empire than contracting any Engagements, 
tending to prolong the Duration of the ruinous War, 
risking its dangerous Consequences,
Eventually by the end of 1791» ‘the Sultan had abandoned 
his hope of seeing Prussia declare war against Russia and he 
agreed with his ministers* advice to end the long Russo-Turkish
90. The memorandum is in P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/12A, see also Ainslie 
to Grenville, F. 0. 78/12A, no. 27, 10 November 1791*
91. Ainslie to Grenville, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/12A, no. 32,
21 December 1791
92. Ainslie to Grenville, P. R. 0., F. 0, 78/l2 A, no. 34,
24 December 1791*
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war. The negotiations for the peace settlement began at Yasi,
93and ended on 31 January 1792. Thus a peace treaty had "been
signed between Russia and the Ottoman Empire without the
94intervention of the Triple Alliance, as Catherine had desired.
Following the conclusion of the peace, Selim III now 
devoted himself to the internal problems of his empire and 
gradually started to plan reforms, by which a new era was to 
begin in the Ottoman Empire.
After the conclusion of peace, diplomatic activity at
Istanbul diminished, at least for the time being. In consequence,
during the closing years of his embassy to the Porte, Sir Robert
Ainslie had no major role to play and it may therefore be
supposed that much of his time must have been taken up by
improving his collection of ancient coins, which still commem-
98orates his name. Such elegant past times notwithstanding, 
Ainslie continued to send home despatches fairly regularly but 
these contain little information on international affairs 
though they may prove more valuable for students of Ottoman 
social history. A large number of the despatches written during
93. Uzunqar^ili, op. cit., IV/I, pp. 590-93.
94. 0. E. Noradounghian, Recueil dfActes Internationaux de 
1*Empire Ottoman, II (Paris, I900), pp. 16-21. "
95* See, P. U. d. Ainslie.
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this final period of his embassy relate to altercations in late
1792 and most of the following year with certain British merchants
at Istanbul who had light-heartedly flaunted the cockade upon the
French revolution. These activities led Ainslie to complain
96
repeatedly and bitterly to his superiors, asking :
how I ought to treat those of my Mad Countrymen, who 
renouncing every rule of reason and obligation of 
allegiance for the modern doctrines of Liberty and 
Equality still presume to claim the Rights and Privileges 
of Englishmen, with the French Cockade in their Hats#
Ainslie received no answer to his complaints, but in
August 1793* he was informed by Lord Grenville that the King,
"having thought proper to make some changes in his foreign
missions", had appointed the then British ambassador in Sweden,
97Robert Liston, to succeed Ainslie in Istanbul# There was
evidently no urgency in implementing this decision, however,
for it v^ as not until June 1794 that Ainslie left the Porte,
bringing to a close a diplomatic career which had lasted the
best part of eighteen years. His lengthy representation of His
Britannic Majesty at the court of the Ottoman Sultan was rewarded
98
by the grant of a pension of one thousand pounds "as a mark of
99His Majesty1s Royal Favour" towards him#
96. Ainslie to Grenville, P# R# 0., F» 0. 78/14* no# 7* 26 March 1793* 
97* Grenville to Ainslie, P. R# 0#, F# 0. 78/14* no. 6, 2 August 1793. 
98. D. N# B # Ainslie.
99* Grenville to Ainslie, P. R, 0#, F. 0. 78/14* no. 6, 2 August 1793.
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The Empress Catherine II of Russia was not satisfied with 
the implementations of the terms of the 1774 treaty of Kuquk 
Kaynarca as interpreted hy the Turks whose conduct created 
continuing friction between the two powers. The Aynalikavak 
Convention of 1779 mediated hy Prance failed to prevent a 
further deterioration in Russo-Turkish relations which resulted 
in the final annexation of the Crimea hy Russia in 1783* The 
good offices of the French and British ambassadors in Istanbul 
were effective in obtaining a suspension of open warfare at 
this point.
The change in the administration in England had implied 
only a temporary preoccupation with domestic problems. For Pitt 
was no isolationist but patiently sought means to secure a part 
in continental affairs. At this time the main concern of Russia 
and Austria was with the Ottoman Empire and the British Prime 
Minister’s refusal to acquiesce in supporting Catherine’s 
expansionist policy was to cost Britain the renewal of the Anglo 
Russian commercial agreement of 1 1 6 6 , which would have been due 
for renewal in 1786, In her place France was raised to the 
status of most favoured nation, as a reward for abandoning her 
traditional friendship with the Turks. As a result of this
191.
change vis-a-vis Russia, Pitt initiated an obstructive policy 
at the Porte, ordering his ambassador there, Sir Robert Ainslie, 
to oppose any French initiatives such as mediation and the 
furthering of Francefs Black Sea commerce.
Ainslie, earlier, had seen no solution for the Russo- 
Turkish problem except further concessions by the Porte and 
quiescence on the part of Britain: his instructions of December 
1786 to change all this, and he worked faithfully at frustrating 
the peace moves of the French ambassador Choiseul-Gouffier, a 
line of conduct much criticised by the French and the Russians 
who, perhaps exaggerating, accused Ainslie of being the real 
cause of war. It must be said in his defence that once he 
realized that war was inevitable, he offered, contrary to his 
instructions, his own mediation to both Courts, even if this 
necessitated co-operation with Choiseul-Gouffier: the Russian 
ambassador’s refusal made the suggestion abortive.
In the event, the isolation of Britain after the treaty of 
Versailles of 1783 was ended by the creation of the Triple 
Alliance in August 1788 as a result of internal troubles in 
Holland and the evolution of Prussia’s policy following the 
Russo-Turkish war. Ewart, the British ambassador at Berlin, was 
largely instrumental in pressing upon the British government
192.
the supposed advantages implicit in what M. S. Anderson refers 
to as the "complex, cynical and impracticable scheme"^ of 
territorial exchanges embodied in Hertzberg’s plan - a plan 
which depended for its success upon full Turkish co-operation, 
which was unforthcoming unless Prussia was willing for her part 
to compel Russia and her ally Austria to restore the Crimea.
Ewart’s support of the Hertzberg plan involved Ainslie in 
fresh diplomatic activity requiring co-operation with the 
Prussian ambassador and mediation by the Prussian and British 
governments to end the hostilities between the Turks and the 
imperial powers. Although rejecting the Kertzberg plan in all 
its ramifications, Pitt favoured Ainslie1s co-operation but 
without his committing Britain. Even while experiencing some 
friction with Diez, whose excessive zeal led him to commit his 
government too far by concluding an offensive-defensive alliance 
with the Porte - an act which led to his recall - Ainslie was 
successful in helping the Prussian ambassador while yet remaining 
within the strict letter of his own instructions.
Pitt’s apprehension concerning this treaty was somewhat 
relieved by the death of Joseph II, for his successor Leopold II
1. M* S« Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774 - 1923? A Study in 
International Relations (London, 1966), p. 14*
was anxious to end hostilities with the Turks and to settle his 
differences with Prussia, It was due to Ewart that Austria and 
Prussia were enabled to conclude the Reichenbach Convention in 
July, 1790 under the mediation of the Triple Alliance and to 
make peace with the Turks on the basis of the status quo ante 
bellum, Ainslie*s part in this was to join with the Prussian 
ambassador, Von Knobelsdorff, in explaining the advantages of 
the Convention to the Sultan who, perceiving these, soon made 
an armistice v/ith the Austrians, although his hope of an early . 
settlement was frustrated by the prolongation of the negotia­
tions by Leopold until the August of 1791*
Despite the Reichenbach Convention Catherine pursued her 
inexorable policy towards the Porte and cleared her flank for 
fresh hostilities by concluding peace with Sweden. The Turkish 
refusal to seize the opportunity to make peace at the same time 
may have been due to the influence of Ainslie.
Frederick William of Prussia was still bound by the Diez 
treaty, which committed him to assist the Turks in regaining 
their lost territories, though this did not extend to recovering 
the Crimea. In spite of Ewart’s persistance in arguing the 
importance of the Prussian alliance, British hesitation alter­
nately led to a failure to support Prussia in compelling Russia
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to make pea,ce on the basis of the status quo ante bellum. The 
upshot was that Ainslie was instructed afresh from London to 
urge the need of concessions upon the Turks, a task rendered 
more difficult since he had been assuring them of the support 
of the Triple Alliance and even more difficult because he 
received no assistance from the Prussian and the Dutch ambassadors 
in this matter, Von Knobelsdorff having abandoned his earlier 
support. In the end, events themselves compelled the Turks to 
make peace without the mediation of the Triple Alliance and at 
the price of an abandonment of the status quo ante bellum. 
Nevertheless Ainslie was not slow to claim some credit for 
having influenced the Porte in concluding peace with Russia.
In assessing the success or failure of the embassy of Sir 
Robert Ainslie at Istanbul it would be well to begin by 
remembering that the good and amicable relations which had 
existed between the Porte and the British governments had been 
much weakened by the pe^me incident in 1770* A coolness crept 
into the Turkish attitude towards the British ambassador at the 
Porte and Ainslie*s predecessor, Murray, had left behind him a 
need for the re-establishment of the good relations which had 
become overlaid by Turkish fears of some future re-appearance 
of Russian warships in the Mediterranean.
In so unpromising a situation Sir Robert Ainslie was, 
surprisingly, quickly able to develop good relations with the 
dignitaries of the Porte, for example the Kapudan Pa?a and, 
later, his creature, the Grand Vizir, Yusuf Pa^a, This success 
was due to a combination of factors. In the first place he was
2as an individual sufficiently flexible to adopt Turkish customs
being strongly attached to the manner of the people... in 
his house, his garden, and his table he assumed the style 
and fashion of a Mussulman of rank; in fine, he lived en 
Turc, and pleased the natives so much by this seeming 
policy... that he became more popular than any of the 
Christian Ministers.
It is a further indication of his instinctive savoir faire at
the Porte that he did not let pass the occasion provided by the
religious festivals to "caress” the ministers by giving them
rich presents such as watches and telescopes which he had
imported especially for this purpose. On a larger scale and
perhaps more significantly, he was careful during the period of
the Ottoman wars with the Russians to maintain a flow of
military supplies and to provide for the sale of a number of
warships for the Turks. Fourthly, although paid by the Levant
Company, he was not much concerned to press the Turks in regard
of fresh trade concessions■to British merchants, preferring
always to remain on good terms with the Ottoman officials in
order to pursue government policy rather than drawing their
2* The St. James1s Chronicle or British Evening Post, 9 December 
1750
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attention to the complaints of the merchants. This neglect of
the British trading interests was not without its risks, for
the Levant Company felt free at the end to complain to his
3
successor concerning Ainslie1s inactivity. The reason for this 
neglect lay in Ainslie1s basic scepticism concerning the 
development of the British trading interests in Egypt^ and the 
Black Sea, the. commercial future of the latter area he in 1734
R
tartly dismissed as being "much cry and little Wool", this at 
a time when the French were much concerned to expand their 
trading interests there. Much later in 1791 he offered unprompted 
the opinion that such a market was bound to be restricted by the 
inferior character of the raw material originating in the Black 
Sea region, comparing them with those available in the Baltic 
area: "the Exports i.e., Black Sea consist chiefly of very- 
indifferent Wheat and Barley, Caviare, Iron, Hemp, Masts and 
Timber, all which we procure cheap and better from the Baltic."13
From the point of view of his superiors in London, Ainslie -
3. Levant Company to Liston, P. R. 0., S. P. 105/121, London,
15 July 1794; cf., Levant Company to Ainslie, S. P. 105/121, 
London, 15 October 1793 and Levant Company to Ainslie, S. P. 
105/12X, London, 27 Mayl71V.
4. See, R. J. Said, George Baldwin and British Interests in 
Egypt, (1775 to 1793)~L o ndon, Ph.D., unpub1is he d thesis, 1968.
5. Ainslie to Leeds, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/5* no. 24, 10 November 
1784.
6. Ainslie to Keith, P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/12A, 19 January 1791.
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often for long periods, sometimes as much as eight or nine 
months, without precise instructions in a remote embassy - was 
uniformly successful in pursuing the general aims of the British 
government and its restless ally Prussia, without allowing 
himself to engage in any embarrassing or dangerous formal 
commitments to the Turks.
Even during the tensest period of the "Ochakow Crisis",
Pitt and Leeds did not trouble to consult Ainslie and it must 
stand to his personal credit that, although the members of the 
Triple Alliance failed to come to the aid of the Turks at this 
time, he was still able to maintain his own influence upon the 
dignitaries of the Porte - an influence which he enjoyed up to 
the closing days of his embassy.
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A P P E N D I X  I
P. R. 0., 3. P. 97/52.
The speech of His Excellency Sir Robert Ainslie
to His Highness the Grand Vesir (30 November 1776),
The King of Great Britain my Royal and Most Gracious 
Sovereign having been pleased to honour me with the Character 
of his Ambassador to the Sublime Porte, and in Consequence of 
His appointment to give me Credential Letters for His Imperial 
Majesty, and for your Highness; I have the Honour to present 
myself in order to deliver this most friendly Letter to your 
Highness, and at the same time to desire that I may be admitted 
to the Honour of paying my respect to His Imperial Majesty, and 
to Present to him upon His Imperial Throne the letter from my 
Royal Masters
I also Request your Highness to favour and to forward e v e r y  
Business which during the Course of my Embassy, I shall have the 
honour to represent to you; and that our Consul, Dragomen, and 
Merchants may, in Conformity to the sacred Capitulations, enjoy 
the greatest Security and Tranquility under your most happy 
Administration, Thus your Highness will Strengthen more and more 
the inviolable Peace, and Cement the Amity which, during the 
Course of so many years has happily subsisted between the Court 
of Great Britain and the Sublime Porte,
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A P P E N D I X  II 
P. R* 0., S. P. 97/53. 3 January 1777.
Ainslie to the Kapudan Pasa.
L'Exposition que vous m'avez faite des affaires, presente une 
situation egalement amharrassante et critique, qui demande les 
plus grands soins, et 1*attention la plus suivie de la Part 
des ministres, a fin d'eviter des Troubles, et pour detourner 
les malheurs, dont 1'Empire Ottoman est menace*
D'un Cote la Cour de Russie reclame hautement par son 
Ministre l'Execution des articles de la derniere Paix de 
Chiuseieux [sic] Cainargi, signee par le Supreme Vizir Moussun 
Oglu, ratifiee ensuite par le Grand Signor dans son Divan, 
Traite par consequent revetu de toute la solemnite, dont un 
Engagement sacre est susceptible* — Deux des articles du 
Traite, surtout, presentent des Difficultes dans l'Execution; 
l'un le 3me stipule l'Ind&pendance de tous les Peuples Tartares 
sans Exception* Le lime accorde aux sujets de l'Imperatrice de 
toutes les Russies la Navigation libre de la Mer Noire pour 
leurs Vaisseaux Marchands, - Ces deux articles contiennent a 
peu pres tous les avantages que cette Nation a obtenu par la 
derniere Guerre, et l'on ne peut pas se dissimuler, que leur
Reclamation est fondee
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De l1autre Cote, les Tartares eux-memes, par attachement 
pour La Porte, ainsi qufa leurs anciens usages s’opposent a 
l*Execution de l'Article 3me qui les regarde: Ils appuyent leur 
Refus sur des motifs tires de la Religion, et par la se sont 
assures de la Protection des Gens de Loi, et du Peuple, qui 
forme la plus grande, ainsi que la plus redoutable Partie de la 
Ration; dfailleurs lfArgument etant dfune nature des plus 
delicats, le Ministere ne doit pas passer outre, sans prendre 
des Precautions suffisantes pour eviter des Troubles, et peut 
etre des Commotions dans le Centre de lfEmpire.
Voila la Situation qui forme la Crise actuelle - Le 
Ministere doit se precautionner dfune part contre l®Effet des 
Cabales des Tartares, De 1*autre Ils ont a crain^fe le Ressenti-^ 
ment de la Cour de Russie, qui, toute fiere des Succes de la 
derniere Guerre, ainsi que de la Protection heureuse, qu’Elle 
avoit accordee, dans ce meme temps au Roi de Pologne, dont le 
sort lui est subordonne, n’hesitera pas a recourir aux Armes 
contre La, Porte, dans le Cas que Celle-cy refuse d*executer les 
articles de Paix; Elle y sera encouragee par la situation 
actuelle des Choses, - en Effet, les Royaumes ne sont forts ou 
faibles, que comparativemcnt, et la Comparaison n'est que trop
visiblement en faveur de la Russie.
—L 1Empire Ottomane dans le moment actuel ressemble a un Homme 
naturellement des mieux constitues et des plus vigoureux, mais 
dont les Forces sont diminuees par une longue et dangereuse 
maladie, dont II releve a peine; dans cette Situation, un autre 
Homme, moins fort, peut etre, mais jouissant dfune bonne Sante, 
est en Etat de le vaincre; et Je ne balance point a croire, que 
La Russie, dont les Troupes victorieuses et Lien disciplines, 
occupent les Lignes de Perecop, ainsi que les Villes et For- 
teresses d*Oczakow, Jenecale, Kerche, et Kimbourn, commandees 
par le Mar^chal de Romanzow ne remporteroient des gra.nds 
avantages, et n1occasionneraoient de malheurs dans i’Empire 
Ottomane, deja epuise, et maintenant engage dans la Guerre de 
Perse, - II est aussi probable, que dans une Querelle commencee 
en consequence d’une Injustice evidente, La Russie agira avec 
Ressentiment, et dans un Esprit de vengeance; et que non seule- 
ment, une Paix future seroit tres difficile a arranger, mais 
que les malheurs occasionnes par une double Guerre pourroient 
amener des Troubles affreux dans l*Etat, tant en Asie, qu’en 
Europe•
Voila des Motifs pour faire des Reflexions des plus 
serieuses; J*en ai fait, sont il resulte, que Je regarde une 
Guerre avec la Russie dans le moment actuel, comme le plus 
grand malheur qui peut arriver a lfEmpire Ottomane, que le
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Ministre doit lfeviter par des soins assidus, et jfestime que 
les Loix de la Justice de la Prudence, et surtout de la 
Necessite (qui est le Maitre de tous les Kommes, et de tous 
les Empires) le veulent absolument.
Quant aux Embarras qui existent, ou qui pourroient naitre 
de la Part des Tartares, ou par leurs Machinations, Je conviens 
que 1*Objet est important, et de nature a donner de lfInquietude 
a La Porte; heureusement le mal est prevu; les Ministres ont le 
temps et les moyens dfen empecher les Effets, en prenant des 
Precautions justes et convenables aux Circonstances. - Les 
Personnes raisonables et bien disposees pour la Patrie comprend- 
ront facilement, que les malheurs arrive pendant la derniere 
Guerre sont la seule Cause de la Situation actuelle; que le 
Defaut de Mediateurs avoit soumis les Ministres a conclure avec 
La Russie tel Trait& de Paix qu*Elle a voulu accorder, et que 
les articles de cette Paix doivent avoir leur Execution, dfautant 
plus, que La porte n!ayant pas eue encore le temps de reparer 
les L^sordres de cette derniere Guerre malheureuse est hors 
d’Etat dans sa situation actuelle de soutenir une Rupture.
Pour tranquilizer le Peuple, lf0n peut dire, ce qui est 
egalement vrai, et ce qui est stipule dans le 3me Article du 
Traite, que les Tartares doivent jouir de tous leurs Droits,
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ainsi que de 1’Exercice de leur Religion en entier, sans 
contrainte quelconque, et que La Porte ne permettra point que 
I’On fasse la moindre infraction a ces Droit sacres. - mais 
comme le Peuple est une B§te Feroce dans tous les Pays, il 
convient sans - Doute de prendre des Precautions, et de les 
contenir par les Efforts des Officiers braves et intelligents, 
qui scauront faire respecter les ordres de Leur Maitre. — en 
fin, quand un Danger est prevu, il cesse d*en etre un.
Si l*on admet la necessite d'eviter dans ce moment une 
Guerre d*animosite avec la Russie, I1on sentira egalement, que 
loin de faire naitre des obstacles a la bonne Intelligence, il 
convient au contraire d’applanir toutes les Difficultes.
Si les deux Navires qui sont icy sont des marchands, le 
Traite de Paix Leur - donne le Droit incontestable de Passage 
dans la Mer Noire, — Si au contraire, ces Navires sont des 
Pregates de Guerre, masques sous — l’Apparence des Marchands,
La Cour de Russie les envoye pour renforcer leur Escadre, 
destine a forcer La Porte a tenir ses Engagements. - Mais si la 
Porte est determinee a executer les articles du dernier Traite
s.
de Paix, Elle nfa rien a craindre, ni de la Russie, ni de ses 
Escadres, et toutes les Preparatives de Precaution de cette Cour 
deviennent en Pure Perte, et seront abandonnees, sitot que la 
Paix sera confirmee.
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A P P E N D I X  III
P. R. 0., F. 0. 78/5.
Translation:
Imperial Command directed to the Stamhol Efendi, 
to the Molla of Galata, and to the Chief 
Customer of Constantinople#
Whereas the most distinguished among the Grandees of the 
Christian Nation, Sir Robert Ainslie British Ambassador residing 
at this Court (whose end may be attended with happiness) in a 
Memorial presented to my Sublime Porte, has requested, by the 
direction of his Court, that, in consideration of the ancient 
and perpetual connexion of Friendship, and good Intelligence, 
subsisting between my Sublime Porte, and the Court of England, 
and in virtue of the sincere dispositions entertained by this 
last towards my Sublime Court, an Imperial Grant might be given, 
in order that the British Merchants should enjoy the exemption 
from the Mastaria Duty, so as not to be subject to any such 
payment in future, in the like manner as has been granted to 
the French, Germans, and Russians; We, in conformity with the 
perfect good Harmony which now subsists, and which, it is 
obvious, will, more and more, increase between the two Courts, 
and agreably to Our Royal determination of paying every regard
*to the above mentioned Court, have given our Imperial Consent 
to the said request, conformably to the Hatti Sherif i.e.,
Imperial Command We have issued for that purpose*
We, therefore have granted this Imperial Command, directing 
you aforenamed, to employ your utmost attention, that no 
Mastaria Duty be, henceforward, demanded from the British
Merchants (being truly such) on all the Goods they import from
their Country to Constantinople, and upon such Merchandize as, 
not being liable to the Standing Prohibitions, they export from 
Constantinople into their Country, after paying the other customs 
prescribed by the sacred Capitulations; which Grant is to take 
place in virtue of Our Hatti Sherif, and on condition, that it 
may have no effect with others. You are also to cause this
Imperial Edict to be registered in your Cancellarias, and to be
entered in the Records of the Custom House; and you are constantly 
to conform to its tenor, and to the Directions it contains.
We order you, therefore, by this Imperial Command to act in 
obedience to its purport, and to abstain particularly from doing 
any thing to the contrary.
Given at Our Imperial Residence of Constantinople, the latter 
end of the Moon Gemazied Ahir 1198. (i.e.,) about the 19th May 1784*
BAY RAM ’’Festival", the four-day sacrifices 
(Kurban hayrami) celebrated annually 
at the time of the Pilgrimage; also 
the three-day 1 feast of Ramazan* to 
celebrate the end of the month of 
fasting.
BEGLIKQI Head of the government Chancery office, 
the president of Chancery.
CEBECIBA?! The chief of the Sultan’s armourers.
DEFTERDAR Head of a finance department, but 
normally used (e.g., by Ainslie) to 
signify the Ba? Defterdar, the chief 
of the whole treasury organization, 
"minister of finance".
DIVAN Imperial Council, the central organ of 
the Ottoman government meeting under 
the presidency of the Grand Vizir.
207.
DRAGOMAN (A. tarjuman) 1 interpreter* . In general
a guide for visitors to Islamic countries 
more specifically, one of the salaried 
translators attached to the Ottoman Divan 
and chancery and to the staffs of foreign 
embassies.
FETVA The legal opinion given by a jurisconsult 
(mufti) in response to a question sub­
mitted to him.
GRAND VIZIR See, Sadrazam.
HIL*AT Robe of honour.
KAfIM-MAKAM Representative of the Grand Vizir when 
he was absent from the capital.
KAPUDAN PA§A High admiral and minister of marine,
the grand admiral of the Ottoman fleet.
KAZI-*ASKER The two highest judicial authorities
of the empire after the geyh-ul-i slam> 
the senior being Kazi-* asker *of 
Rumeli1, the other *of Anatolia*.
I
KIAYA, KAYA, KAHYA 
MU^AVERE
MUFTI
RE*IS EFENDI,
RE * IS—UL-KUTTAB
SADRAZAM
208.
The agent of the Grand Vizir in 
military and political matters.
An extraordinary consultation of 
Ottoman dignitaries, often convened at 
the residence of the Seyh-ul-islam, 
sometimes at the Porte.
See,  ffeyJv u l - i s l a m .
Literally chief of the clerks, was 
originally head of the Ottoman 
chancery. In the eighteenth century 
the official was responsible for the 
foreign affairs and also called the 
Re*is Efendi.
The chief executive of the Ottoman 
Empire, in Ottoman constitutional 
theory the "deputy plenipotentiary" 
(vekil-i mutlak) of the Sultan.
SERAGLIO The Sultan*s palace.
SER* ASKER
§EYH-UL-isLAM
rULEMA
209.
A commander-in-chief, sometimes the Grand 
Vizir himself, sometimes a vizir appointed 
•appointed to conduct a specific campaign.
In origin title of the chief mufti (juris- 
concult) of Istanbul, who came to be 
officially recognized as the head of the 
corporation of the SfLema, the muslim 
"religious institution".
The members of the closely organized 
"religious institution" of the Ottoman 
Empire.
VALIDE SULTAN The mother of the reigning Sultan.
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